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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the pricing relationship
between the FTSE 100 Stock Index and the FTSE 100
Stock Index futures market. We develop and apply a
framework in which it is possible to evaluate whether
or not markets can be said to function effectively and
efficiently. The framework is applied to both the
daily and intra-daily pricing relationship between the
aforementioned markets. In order to analyse the
pricing relationship within days, we develop a new
method to remove the effects of nonsynchronous trading
from the FTSE 100 Index. We find that on a daily
basis the markets generally function effectively,
although this does not carryover to the intra-daily
pricing relationship. This is especially true during
the October 1987 stock market crash, where it is
argued that a possible cause of the breakdown lies
with the stock market. If this is the case, then any
regulation should be aimed at the stock market, not
the stock index futures market.
INTRODUCTION
'Of course, the real reason the market
reacts one way or the other is because many
traders are irrational and emotional.'
(Quoted in Antoniou (1986, p.1)).
This somewhat traditional notion that prices react in
the way they do because of the emotional and
irrational reaction of market participants to new
information has led to the charge that the
introduction of futures markets helps only to worsen
the situation. Emotional and irrational reaction in
one market is bad enough. Emotional and irrational
reaction in another market closely related to the
underlying spot market can only make spot market
traders' reactions worse. This charge seems
particularly true of stock index futures markets.
Moreover, to support this argument, proponents need
look no further than the growing body of evidence
emerging from the US that the stock index futures
market leads the stock market. Of course, such
reactions could just as easily be indicative of
effectively functioning and efficient spot and futures
markets. The problem is that there is no framework in
the existing literature in which these charges and
countercharges can be objectively appraised. 	 This
thesis provides such a framework.	 In addition,
although we discuss this framework in the context of
the pricing relationship between the stock market and
stock index futures market in the UK, it is
sufficiently general that it can be applied to an
analysis of pricing relationships between any markets
with little or no modification.
In chapter two, we start with a critique of the
existing methods available for appraising and
analysing pricing relationships between stock and
stock index futures markets. We then move on to
consider how the problems noted with, for want of a
better word, 'traditional' approaches can be overcome.
Within the 'traditional' approach to the analysis of
pricing relationships there are two distinct and quite
separate areas of interest : lead-lag relationships
between spot and futures prices and deviations of the
futures price from its theoretically correct price to
determine the presence of arbitrage opportunities. It
is the fact that these two areas are studied
independently that gives the anti-futures markets
lobby its ammunition : because they are studied
independently they can be used independently to
justify the claim that futures markets provide no
benefits.
Using the framework provided by a general to specific
modelling methodology (see Hendry and Richard (1982,
1983) for an overview of general to specific modelling
and Hendry and Ericsson (1991a,b) and Garrett and
Priestley (1991) for applications), we unify these two
independent areas into a coherent whole. By treating
these two areas as a whole, we derive a framework
within which it is possible to appraise whether or not
equity markets are effectively functioning and
efficient in their processing of information. The
advantage of this framework is that if they are not
functioning effectively or efficiently, it is possible
to pinpoint reasons why this might be the case. Using
this framework, chapter three empirically investigates
the functioning of the UK stock market, proxied by the
FTSE 100 Share Index, and the UK stock index futures
market, where a contract written on the FTSE 100 Index
is traded.
In chapter four, we move on to consider the nature of
the pricing relationship between the FTSE 100 Index
and futures contract on an intra-daily time scale. In
recent studies, primarily in the US, where intra-daily
data has been used, concern has been expressed about
the use of an Index that is calculated in real-time
(often minute by minute) without taking the fact that
not all of its constituent-shares will have traded
within that minute into account. This has come to be
iv
known as the nonsynchronous trading problem. We
propose a method for removing its effects which
overcomes the at times substantial problems, whether
they be conceptual or data-related, with other methods
that have been proposed. Having calculated indices
which are devoid of nonsynchronicity, we analyse the
minute by minute relationship between the FTSE 100
Index and futures contract, noting the implications of
the results obtained by applying the framework
developed in chapter two for those studies,
particularly in the US, which identify what is
potentially false volatility in the pricing
relationship. The empirical findings in this chapter
only serve to reinforce the advantage of using the
framework developed in chapter two.
In chapter five, we utilise the models derived in
chapters two and four to analyse the still
controversial October 1987 stock market crash.
Following the crash, many commentators have argued
that stock index futures markets played a substantial
role in the decline and as such they should be subject
to greater regulatory control. The anti-futures lobby
have even argued that the crash is just one more piece
of evidence against the justification for the
existence of futures markets. We assess the validity
of these claims using minute by minute data on the
FTSE 100 Index and futures contract for the 19th and
20th October 1987. Once again, the advantages of
utilising the framework developed in chapter two to
evaluate the validity of the 'regulate futures to
prevent it happening again' argument are emphasised
and the findings of this chapter merely confirm the
advantages such a framework generates.
Chapter six, the final chapter of the thesis, briefly
restates the conclusions of the analysis undertaken in
this thesis and points out some extensions of the
results herein that should prove fruitful and
interesting.
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CHAPTER ONE : THE ECONOMICS OF STOCK INDEX
FUTURES MARKETS
1 . 1 .	 INTRODUCTION
The past two decades or so has witnessed an explosion
in the growth and availability of derivatives on
financial instruments. The growth in financial
products and markets introduces constant change which
causes problems for regulatory regimes and may
introduce new sources of systematic risk, especially
if the innovation is an innovation for innovation's
sake. This growth has created a need for a more
systematic investigation of the functioning of
markets, especially the interrelationships between
spot and derivative markets. Knowledge of the
interrelationships between these markets is vital from
a regulatory and policy-making perspective, for if the
nature of these relationships are not well understood,
incorrect regulatory and policy decisions may result.
One aspect of this growth has been the emergence of
stock index futures markets, which have been
phenomenally successful in the US and have an ever-
increasing role to play in the UK as well. The
extraordinary growth in the market for stock index
futures in the US has prompted a great deal of
1
research, both theoretical and empirical, into various
aspects of their functioning. One of the purposes of
this chapter is to evaluate this literature, which is
almost exclusively concerned with the US markets.
This allows us to focus on the weaknesses of the
existing approaches to analysing pricing relationships
between the stock and stock index futures markets.
These weaknesses provide the rationale for the
analysis that follows in the subsequent chapters of
this thesis.
We start. by discussing the general nature and features
of futures contracts and discussing how they provide
an alternative to forward contracts in order to set
the scene for what follows. In section three, we
focus on the issue of market completeness and how
futures markets can aid in completing markets,
providing a rationale for the existence of futures
markets in general, and stock index futures markets in
particular. We demonstrate that, theoretically, the
introduction of a futures contract on an index
(portfolio) completes an otherwise incomplete market.
Of course, in practice markets are not complete but
stock index futures do contribute by providing a means
for hedging otherwise unhedgable stock market risk.
We show that this is indeed -the case in section four,
where we demonstrate that the introduction of a
2
futures contract on an index, such as the Financial
Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100 Index enables stock
market participants to introduce negative correlations
into their portfolio of stocks and as such reduce
systematic risk. Having discussed the economic
justification(s) for the existence of a futures
contract on a stock portfolio, we move on to provide
an appraisal of the literature in section five. The
literature on futures markets, and its spillover into
stock index futures, is now so vast that a full review
is impossible to undertake. Therefore, the discussion
of the literature will be quite selective, focusing on
the predominant and most important papers directly
relevant to the task at hand, that is, the analysis of
pricing relationships between the stockmarket and the
market for stock index futures. 	 Section six
concludes.
1 . 2 .	 THE NATURE OF FUTURES CONTRACTS
Futures contracts in financial instruments are a
relatively new innovation (for example, the London
International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE) was
only established in 1982), futures contracts on
commodities have been in existence for much longer.
Essentially, one can argue that futures contracts
emerged from forward contracts which have been
established in one form or another for centuries. As
3
such, futures markets bear the same feature of
forwards, that is, they trade deferred claims on
assets. Forward markets evolved as parallel markets
to commodity spot markets (the place where the
commodity is physically sold) not only to facilitate
greater trading in the spot market but also to create
some form of certainty for traders, whether they be
buyers or sellers. Futures contracts can in some
respects be viewed as a refinement of, although not
necessarily a substitute for, 1 forward contracts and
have special features which readily distinguish them
from forward contracts.
The first apparent difference between the two concerns
the terms of the respective contracts. Forward
contracts are tailor-made to the individual's
requirements. Given that individual's requirements
will invariably differ, forward contracts are in this
respect heterogeneous goods. For example, with a
forward contract the delivery date is agreed between
the two parties to the contract rather than being
fixed. Futures contracts, on the other hand, are
standardised in just about every aspect : they are
homogeneous with well-specified commitments for a
1 This is readily shown by the failure of foreign
currency futures contracts traded at LIFFE. Trading
ceased because the forward market overwhelmed the
futures market : the futures market could not compete
with the demand for forward foreign exchange
contracts.
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carefully described commodity (whether it be financial
or physical) which will be delivered at a certain time
on a certain date. Unlike the forward contract, this
standardisation means that futures contracts have
fixed expiration dates, although these do differ
across contracts on different assets. 2 In addition,
the size of the futures contract, unlike a forward
contract, is fixed. These features may appear to make
the futures contract unattractive at first sight.
However, in conjunction with the other features of
futures contracts they actually serve to enhance their
appeal to a wider range of economic agents.
The second difference that emerges between the two
stems form the fact that futures contracts are
standardised. They are standardised because, unlike
forward contracts, they trade on organised exchanges,
which are non-profit-making organisations, according
to a prespecified set of trading rules. Thus futures
contracts are relatively easier to trade. In addition
to trading on organised exchanges, futures markets are
characterised by the presence of a clearing house
2 To illustrate the point, all futures contracts
traded on LIFFE (which are contracts for financial
instruments) expire in March, June, September and
December whereas futures contracts traded on the
London Grain Futures Market expire in January, March,
May, June, September and November. Further, the
expiry day within the expiration month will differ for
different commodities but will not differ for
contracts on the same commodity.
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which again is a non-profit-making institution. The
purpose of the clearing house is to ensure that the
futures market functions effectively and can
substantially aid reduction in transaction costs. It
does this by interposing itself between the buyer and
seller of the futures contract without actually taking
an active position in the market on its own behalf.
Therefore, traders are undertaking transactions with
an impersonal, non-profit-seeking body.3
The final difference between the two is the margin
system that operates in futures markets. The margin
is a deposit the trader must make with the broker in
order to trade in a futures contract.' The margin may
be posted in the form of interest-bearing securities
such that the opportunity cost of investing in a
futures contract is effectively zero. This margin is
then adjusted every day in the so-called marking-to-
market process where any losses that reduce the margin
posted with the broker to below the minimum level are
made good. The principle idea behind the margin is,
3 The argument is analogous to that used in
justifying the development of a financial system to
overcome the problems of an economy trading through a
barter system, namely one does not have to seek out
another party to the contract : it is already there in
the form of the clearing house and there is no need
for a double coincidence of wants.
4 According to Franklin and Ma (1992), the margin
is calculated as 11 + 3a where 11 is the average of the
absolute daily price change of the futures contract
and a is the standard deviation of this change.
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as mentioned earlier, to act as a deposit and thus to
reduce as far as possible the risk of default. Since
the margin system works as a deposit system, an
investor who has promised to buy gold, say, at a price
of $400 per ounce, is less likely to default if the
price of gold is $350 at the time the trade is due to
take place because the trader can retrieve the
'deposit' simply by reversing the futures trade. In
this situation, then, the margin only serves to
enhance the attractiveness of futures markets by
virtually eliminating default risk, something that is
not so readily done with forward contracts.
To summarise thus far, then, futures differ from
forwards through the standardisation of contracts
which are traded on an organised exchange through a
clearing house, with a deposit equal to only a
fraction of the price being necessary to undertake the
futures trade. 5 It is precisely these differences
that provide futures contracts with several advantages
over forward contracts.
5 One must be careful not to treat futures and
forward prices as synonymous. In a theoretical
framework, Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1981) show that
forward and futures prices will only be equal if
interest rates are nonstochastic, a rather restrictive
assumption. From an empirical standpoint the evidence
is rather mixed, pointing to no difference between
futures and forward prices for financial instruments
but significant differences for commodities (see
Cornell and Reinganum (1981), French (1983) and Park
and Chen (1985)).
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The standardisation of futures contracts in the first
instance reduces the (indirect) transactions costs
faced by the futures market participant since there is
no need to incur costs in ensuring and ascertaining
not only the quality of the contract but also the
integrity of the other party to the contract. This is
achieved because the other party to the transaction is
the clearing house. Having the clearing house as the
other party to the transaction, in conjunction with
the margin system, virtually ensures the removal of
default risk. This represents another reduction in
transactions costs to the futures trader.
Second, given that a futures contract is a deferred
claim on another asset, it should provide information
about likely future movements in the spot asset's
price. Of obvious importance is whether or not the
futures market can do this efficiently for it seems a
natural place for new information about the asset to
appear first. The centralisation of the futures
market, coupled with the speed with which a futures
transaction can be effected (there is no need to spend
time finding out about the quality of the contract
since it is standardised) and the very low
transactions costs (the margin can be posted in the
form of interest-bearing securities so there is no
opportunity cost and there is only one transaction to
be undertaken so brokers fees are minimal), means that
8
the futures market is likely to serve its price
discovery role well which can only improve the
information reflected in the underlying asset's price
such that market participants, whether they be
hedgers, speculators or arbitrageurs, receive accurate
price signals.
One of the criticisms that has been levelled at
futures markets, however, is the supposed
destabilising effects they have on the underlying spot
market, especially through increased volatility in the
spot asset. The argument here is that futures
markets, given the advantages outlined above, will
attract speculators who have no interest other than
making a quick profit. Therefore, so the argument
goes, speculative trade will be destabilising and this
will manifest itself in increased price volatility in
the spot market, distorting signals sent by prices to
other types of trader. Speculators, however, are
necessary in any futures market to provide liquidity
for hedgers. 6 Moreover, if speculative traders are
well informed, then any increase in spot market
volatility could be due to the more efficient
processing of information.
6 The argument here is that hedgers are more risk
averse than speculators and therefore are looking to
transfer price risk. Speculators will take on this
price risk and hedgers are prepared to pay them a
premium (in the form of a lower futures price), the
so-called risk premium.
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The counter argument to the charge of destabilisation
is that speculative trade decreases price volatility
since speculators buy low and sell high, thus avoiding
large price swings. The evidence, at least for the
UK, seems to suggest that futures markets decrease
spot price volatility (see Antoniou and Foster (1992)
for evidence for Brent Crude Oil and Antoniou and
Holmes (1992) for evidence for the UK stock market).
To conclude this section, then, futures markets have
proved to be a very useful innovation in terms of what
they offer to investors. The rest of this chapter
will now. focus on various aspects of stock index
futures. In the next section, we shall consider a
powerful economic justification for their existence
that of completing markets.
1.3. STOCK INDEX FUTURES AND MARKET COMPLETENESS
Securities exist so that economic agents, whether they
be firms or individuals, can postpone current
consumption in order to invest in productive
opportunities to increase future consumption. Given
that an investment involves the postponement of
consumption now for consumption in the future, the
consumption-investment decision is necessarily an
intertemporal one. However, the intertemporal nature
of the consumption-investment decision introduces risk
and this can be problematic.
	 The problem arises
10
through the very nature of securities. A security can
be viewed as a collection of possible future payoffs
out of which only one will occur and that one which
does occur is dependent upon the state of the world in
the future. The risk occurs rather obviously because
the state of the world that will occur is, ex ante,
unknown and as such risk averse investors will wish to
minimise this risk.
However, in an risky world without markets for all
assets, economic agents cannot create payoffs that
reflect their own preferences and hence they cannot
create payoffs that cover every possible future state
of the world. They cannot translate their preferred
bundle of 'goods' into an equivalent actual bundle of
'goods'. To demonstrate, consider the following
example discussed in Copeland and Weston (1988,
p.112). Suppose there are three states of nature and
three assets available. The first asset, a risk-free
one, generates the following payoffs : (1,1,1). The
second asset, a risky security, generates a payoff of
(1,0,0) and the third asset, which is risky debt, has
a payoff pattern given by (0,1,1). We have three
assets and three states of nature but we do not have
complete markets. The reason for this is that the
payoff pattern for the risk-free asset can be
constructed as the sum of the payoffs for the other
two assets.	 Thus, because the number of linearly
11
independent assets/securities is not equal to the
number of possible outcomes, a portfolio that covers
all possible outcomes cannot be constructed. For
example, the payoff pattern (0,1,0) cannot be
constructed from the three securities and as such
there is, in some sense, an absence of a market.
The implication of this is that with the absence of
markets for some goods and services economic agents
cannot have a unanimous ranking of alternative
opportunities. This is illustrated by the example
above whereby because the payoff (0,1,0) cannot be
constructed, and hence a value cannot be attributed to
it, one agent may think it is worth more than another
agent : prices assigned to this hypothetical security
need not be the same.	 Thus, the absence of a
unanimous ranking of assets through market
incompleteness implies that risk-sharing arrangements
in an uncertain world are sub-optimal and this sub-
optimality arises through incomplete markets.
1.3.1.	 How CAN FUTURES COMPLETE MARKETS?
If incomplete markets generate sub-optimal risk-
sharing arrangements, the interesting question is how
can markets be completed. This is where derivative
instruments written on the underlying asset enter the
picture.
	
The issue of how derivative markets can
12
complete otherwise incomplete markets was discussed by
Ross (1976) in relation to options. Ross's work built
upon the work of Arrow (1964), who analysed the role
of securities in the allocation of risk.
Arrow (1964) formulated the argument about complete
markets in terms of spanning a space whereby the space
represents each potential state of nature thta can
occur. The argument is then one of incomplete markets
through incomplete spanning of the space. In this
framework, Arrow (1964) demonstrates that an
inadequate number of state contingent claims will lead
to inefficiency' because the feasible set of pure
contingent claims' fails to span the space. Ross
builds on this by noting that the possibility of
writing options on securities (or primitive assets in
Ross's terminology) opens up new opportunities for
spanning the space of the natural states of the world
that can occur. The argument for using derivative
markets to provide the opportunities for spanning the
state space are intuitively appealing. As Ross (1976,
p.76) argues,
7 Efficiency in the context of market completeness
is in relation to Pareto optimality as opposed to
definitions of efficiency that arise from the
Efficient Markets Hypothesis.
8 Pure contingent claims, or pure securities, are
ones which offer a claim to wealth if a particular
single state occurs and zero otherwise. We will
return to this point later.
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'If the introduction of a contingent claims
market will use more resources than it will
save, in an opportunity cost sense, by
moving closer to efficiency, then within the
context of the institutional structure of
the economy the absence of a market is
required for efficiency...[However], in
general, it is less costly to market a
derived asset generated by a primitive than
to issue a new primitive, and there is at
least some reason to believe that options
will be created until the gains are
outweighed by the set-up costs.'
Although Ross illustrates his argument with respect to
options, the same argument applies to futures markets
given their low transaction costs, as discussed
earlier. • Thus, we can use Ross's framework to
demonstrate that stock index futures can be used to
complete the market.
Following Ross, assume for simplicity that the only
assets are securities which yield a return in each
state of the world and there are n such assets,
denoted by x i , i-1, 	  ,n. Further assume that the
number of future states is finite and that there are
m states of the world denoted by 031j , j-1, 	  ,m
Denote by X the mxn matrix with typical element xij
which represents the return on asset x i in state COj and
let K2 = If rank (X) m, then the market
is complete and there will exist a matrix of
portfolios, A, formed by combining the n primitive
assets, such that we have
14
XA = I
where I is an mxm identity matrix. If this is
possible, then combining the primitive assets allows
the formation of a complete set of pure securities,
where a pure security is defined as yielding a return
of 1 if that state of the world occurs and zero if
that state does not occur. If it is possible to form
such a portfolio of securities, then because the
identity matrix is of full rank, a pure security
payoff can be created for each state and markets will
be complete. The problem that is faced is that
typically there are more coi than there are xi and
therefore the space cannot be spanned and markets are
incomplete. However, if it is possible to derive new
assets from the primitives, it is possible to provide
more spanning opportunities. This is where futures
enter the picture. However, as we shall see, creating
a futures contract for each primitive asset does not
necessarily provide a solution and this is where stock
index futures become useful. To demonstrate, consider
examples one and two from Ross (1976, p.80).
Suppose X contains a single asset, x, and there are
three states of the world. Further, suppose x offers
the following payoff pattern for the three states :
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(1.2)
and 4(2) = (1.3)
1
x= 2
3
Since x is a vector, it has a rank of 1 and cannot
therefore span the space of future states of nature.
Therefore, markets are incomplete. Suppose now that
two futures contracts are available on x with
settlement prices 1 and 2 and these have the following
payoff patterns9
X now contains three assets and the payoffs are given
as
[x 4(1) 4(2) =
100
210
321
(1.4)
Clearly, rank (X)	 3 and there are three states so
the market is complete. Thus, there will exist some
9 The two futures contracts could have different
expiration months, for example.
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(1.5)
A such that XA = I and from this, X = A-1 which tells
an investor which securities to buy (if the elements
of A-1 are positive) and sell (if the elements are
negative) to obtain the particular pure security
payoff they prefer (in this case either (1,0,0),
(0,1,0) or (0,0,1)). In actual fact, if markets are
complete economic agents can internalise the risk by
constructing their portfolios such that they will
receive a payoff of 1 regardless of which state of the
world occurs. To see this, note that A-1 is given by
	
1	 00
	
A'= -2	 1	 0
	
1	 -2	 1
Now to create a pure security payoff of (1,0,0) buy
one unit of the security that yields (1,2,3), one unit
of that which yields (0,0,1) and sell two units of
(0,1,2). Similarly for (0,1,0) buy one unit of
(0,1,2) and sell two units of (0,0,1) and to obtain
(0,0,1) simply buy one unit of (0,0,1). If the
economic agent engages in these strategies the payoff
will be 1 regardless of which state of the world
occurs, such that there is no uncertainty about future
payoffs.
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However, this situation will not necessarily always
occur, for if there are some states in which assets
have the same returns it is impossible to derive
futures contracts that will distinguish them. This
possibility leads Ross to propose the following
theorem which provides a sufficient condition for
completeness (Theorem 1 of Ross (1976), p.81)
THEOREM : The dimension of F(X) is full if and only
if no two rows of X are identical.'
The reason why completeness requires F(X) as opposed
to X to be of full rank is that, as the example above
showed, X does not have to be full rank if it can be
augmented by futures, giving F(X) which must be of
full rank if markets are to be complete. In other
words, if the theorem is true F(X) will span a.
The requirement from Theorem 1 of Ross (1976) that
markets can only be made complete through the use of
derivatives if no two assets offer identical payoff
patterns is somewhat problematic. In addition, when
the number of primitive securities is large, there
will be a need for multiple, complex futures contracts
which are very rare, if they exist at all. To
overcome these objections, Ross derives an interesting
Fic (X ) is simply X augmented by all futures
written on X.
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and powerful result relating to the role a simple
futures contract written on a portfolio can play in
completing the market. Suppose that investors can now
form portfolios of the primitive assets and denote
these by P. In addition, simple futures contracts can
be written on P. Denoting F(P) as the space spanned
by the futures written on the portfolio, then Ross
demonstrates the following theorem (Theorem 4 of Ross
(1976, p.84))
THEOREM : A necessary and sufficient condition for
rank F(P) = m is that there exists a single
portfolio such that XA = b with b i # bi for
all i,j.
The importance of this result should not be
understated. As Ross (1976, pp.85-86) points out,"
'When we are permitted to write options on
portfolios, a necessary as well as
sufficient condition for efficiency is that
there exists a single portfolio a with the
property that options written on it can span
Herein lies the importance of the stock index futures
contract and, for that matter, the stock index options
contract. The stock index futures contract represents
the simple futures contract written on the underlying
" Since Ross talks about completeness with regard
to options, and since it is a direct quote, we have
left in the word options. The quote is still equally
applicable.
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portfolio constructed from primitive assets. Whilst
in practice markets are not complete, a stock index
futures contract on a portfolio can reduce market
incompleteness and provide a step nearer to complete
markets. This is a powerful economic justification
for their existence.
The stock index futures contract that exists in the UK
is the FTSE 100 index futures contract and the
underlying portfolio which it is written on is the
FTSE 100 Share Index. We will discuss some of the
features of . these instruments in the next subsection
and this will clarify how stock index futures can help
to complete the market.
1.3.2.	 THE FTSE 100 INDEX AND INDEX FUTURES
CONTRACT
The FTSE 100 Share Index was introduced in January
1984 in order to support a futures contract based on
the UK equity market. The FTSE 100 Share Index is a
representation of the market value of the outstanding
shares of the 100 companies that comprise it. The
Index is calculated as a real-time weighted arithmetic
average of the market value of the outstanding shares
of the component companies, the weight each company's
share price receives being dependent upon its market
capitalisation. The design of the FTSE 100 Index is
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such that it mirrors the movements of a 'typical'
well-diversified institutional portfolio. However,
whilst the FTSE 100 Index serves this important
function, investors cannot buy the Index per se.12
However, the Index does represent a good underlying
instrument for a futures contract based on the stock
market precisely because it closely approximates the
size and composition of institutional portfolios.
Indeed, such is its success in this role that it
provides not only a benchmark against which portfolio
performance can be compared but also it is widely
recognised a an indicator of the performance of the
stock market as a whole.
The FTSE 100 stock index futures contract, on the
other hand, represents the purchase or sale (depending
upon whether the futures contract is bought or sold)
of the 'basket' of shares that comprise the Index in
a proportion consistent with their allocated weights
within the portfolio. The trade date for the
transaction is specified as the expiry date of the
futures contract. Of course, since the Index does not
exist as a tradeable instrument in itself, actual
purchase or delivery of the Index cannot take place."
12 Although some unit trusts may well provide a
close approximation to it.
" Even if it did exist as a tradeable instrument,
it is unlikely that investors would wish to purchase
or deliver the Index in any case.
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Consequently, the stock index futures market is a cash
settlement market rather than a delivery market, with
all contracts outstanding on the expiration date
deemed to be settled by either the purchase or sale of
the Index (depending upon whether the position taken
in the futures market was short or long) at its
closing price on the expiration date. In all cases,
investors stand to gain or lose the difference between
the price at which they bought (sold) the futures
contract when taking their initial position and the
price at which they sell (buy) the futures contract
upon expiration in order to close their position.
Given that in the space of one transaction the
purchase of the stock index futures contract
represents a purchase of a future claim on all of the
shares of the Index and given the low transaction
costs involved in the purchase of a stock index
futures contract," stock index futures provide
increased opportunities for investors to create
payoffs in accordance with their preferences.
Moreover, whilst they are designed with the FTSE 100
Index as the underlying portfolio, they can still be
utilised by investors who hold portfolios that differ
from the FTSE 100 because their purpose is to provide
" Recall that the purchase of a futures contract
only requires the posting of a---margin which is a
fraction of the price, and this margin can be posted
in the form of interest-bearing securities so that
there is effectively no opportunity cost to investing
in futures.
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a vehicle for, say, hedging against general movements
in the stock market.
1 • 3 • 3 •	 THE USES OF STOCK INDEX FUTURES
In general, the use of stock index futures contracts
falls into three categories : hedging, speculative
trading and arbitrage trading. Whilst all three of
these categories are important, perhaps the most
important from the point of view of the existence of
futures markets is the hedging category," which we
will return to in more detail shortly. Briefly,
hedging involves the purchase or sale of a stock index
futures contract in anticipation of an intended
transaction in the spot market. Thus, futures allow
investors to reduce risk since they provide the
investor with some level of compensation should there
be adverse movements in the spot market prior to the
intended transaction taking place.'
n Futures are, after all, primarily a risk-
reducing instrument, allowing hedgers to transfer
their own price risk to speculators.
" It should be noted, however, that a cross hedge
is nearly always involved when hedging with stock
index futures. The reason for this is that the
portfolio being hedged invariably differs from the
portfolio underlying the stock index futures contract.
This does not mean they cannot reduce risk. It means
they cannot reduce all risk since there is a risk that
the portfolio and stock index futures contract will
not track each other exactly.
	
See Anderson and
Danthine (1981).
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Speculative traders can use stock index futures simply
to speculate on the direction of future price
movements in the stock market as a whole. Given the
low transaction costs and the speed with which a
futures trade can be executed, it is much easier for
a speculator to take a position in the futures market.
Thus, given that speculators will only take a position
in one market, those that use futures to speculate
will provide much needed liquidity to the market. It
is perhaps no coincidence that those futures markets
that survive tend to have a bigger speculative trader
component. 'This is especially true if the futures
market is in an asset for which prices can be quite
volatile. If a market is more volatile, 'abnormal'
price movements will tend to be more frequent and this
is what speculators try to take advantage of. By the
very nature of a speculative trade, it is more risky
than a hedge trade. In addition, speculative traders
do not hold the futures contract for great lengths of
time since this makes their position even riskier."
The third category of traders that stock index futures
support are arbitrageurs. Arbitrageurs simultaneously
purchase and sell stocks and futures in order to
capitalise on perceived mispricing. Technically, such
" For example, 'scalpers' are speculative traders
who try to take advantage of very short term intra-
daily price movements.
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a trade is risk free, although this may not
necessarily be true since the portfolio of stocks they
sell may not be of exactly the same makeup as the
index on which the futures contract is written. To
take advantage of the mispricing they will take
opposite positions in the markets (buy stocks and sell
futures or vice versa). The effect this has is to
drive prices back to their true levels. As such,
arbitrage is very important if futures and the
underlying spot prices are to be kept in line.
To see this; suppose an arbitrageur believes the
futures price is undervalued because speculative
trade, say, has driven the futures price below what
can be termed its fair value." The natural trade to
undertake is to buy the futures. In addition to this,
the arbitrageur will also sell the stocks. Therefore,
the initial selling pressure in the futures market is
transmitted as selling pressure to the stock market.
Now, suppose that trading activity after the arbitrage
trade is such the futures contract becomes overvalued.
The arbitrageur will then sell the futures contract
and buy the stock. Thus, the buying pressure
initiated by arbitrage trades is transmitted to the
spot market. In addition, the arbitrageur has made a
" The fair value is given by equation (1.17) (see
section 1.5.3.).
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risk free profit.' Arbitrageurs will thus ensure
that prices in both the spot and the futures market
will not drift to far away from their equilibrium
values and as a consequence hedgers, for example, will
receive accurate signals upon which they can base
their hedging strategy. The whole idea of a hedge is
that the two prices move in the same direction such
that risk reduction is possible (gains in one offset
by losses in the other). If arbitrage does not
function effectively, or arbitrage opportunities are
left unexploited, this will not happen and the futures
market becomes redundant.
1 . 4 .	 STOCK INDEX FUTURES AND DIVERSIFICATION
In the previous section we saw how, at the theoretical
level, stock index futures contracts can complete
otherwise incomplete markets. Of course, in reality
markets are not complete but if stock index futures
are serving their purpose correctly, they can greatly
enhance the range of risk-sharing arrangements
" An assumption implicit within this example is
that the portfolio of stocks sold by the arbitrageur
is exactly the same as the underlying stock index.
This assumption is not necessary, but it does indicate
the risk-free nature of the trade. Suppose the
arbitrageur anticipated the movement of the markets
incorrectly. A profit would still have been made even
if the futures market and the stock market continued
to fall, for in closing out the position, the loss on
the futures would be offset by the gains from the
spot. This is what is meant by a risk-free profit
the arbitrageur could not lose.
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available to the investor through the provision of
hedging opportunities. Indeed, not only do they
enhance risk-sharing arrangements, they also allow
investors to reduce systematic risk through
diversification, something they could not do prior to
the introduction of derivative assets.
The notion of risk reduction through diversification
stems from the work of Markowitz (1952). The argument
is that rational, risk averse investors should
concentrate on combining assets into a portfolio that
gives the maximum expected return for a given level of
risk. Equivalently, they will minimise the level of
risk for a given level of expected return. Whichever
way the issue is approached, the argument is one of
the optimal management of risk. By assuming that
investors are rational, risk averse utility maximisers
and that returns are normally distributed, Markowitz
shows that combining different spot assets into a
portfolio can substantially reduce risk. Moreover, by
assuming normality, the expected return is given by
the mean return and the level of risk is given by the
variance of returns. Thus, investors make their
investment decision solely on the basis of the mean
and variance of the distribution of returns. For the
sake of exposition, suppose there are two risky assets
A and B, the returns of which are random variables.
The variance of the portfolio combining these two
27
assets is given by the well-known formula"
2	 2222
Op = xAGA 
.1_ 
XB OB + 2 XA XB COV (RA,RB)
which, noting that cov(RA ,RB) aAaBp AB , can be rewritten
as
2	 22	 22
a = XA A + XB B + 2 XA XB A a BOAR
where xi is the proportion of funds invested in asset
Gi is the standard deviation of the returns of asset
i and p is the correlation between returns on assets
i and j. The extent to which diversification is
possible is determined by the correlation between
returns on the assets. As far as risk reduction is
concerned, the important term in (1.7) is the last one
on the right hand side. From this term, the lower the
correlation, the greater is the reduction in risk that
can be achieved through diversification. If the asset
returns are perfectly positively correlated there is
no gain in reducing risk from diversification.
" For the more general case of n assets, the
variance of the portfolio is given by
where X is an nx1 vector of weights and I is the nxn
variance-covariance matrix of returns.
(1.6)
(1.7)
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However, the implication of perfect negative
correlation is quite different : with perfect negative
correlation it is possible to construct a portfolio
which is risk-free. Noting that xB=(1-xA), then
differentiating (1.7) with respect to x.A and solving
the derivative for xA yields
2
UB PABGAaB
2	 2
GA + G B - 2 PABGAUB
which is the proportion of funds that should be
invested in asset A if the minimum variance portfolio
is desired. Now, if the correlation between A and B
is perfectly negative then investing x; in A will set
a2 equal to zero.
Thus, diversification and risk reduction are most
fruitful when negative correlation can be introduced
into the portfolio. The problem with this, however,
is that most spot assets such as stocks and bonds tend
to be positively correlated' such that there will
always be some risk that cannot be diversified away.
This risk is known as systematic risk.
One method by which this problem could be overcome is
" Even international asset markets are positively
correlated.
(1.8)
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through the short sale of stocks such that gains in
one are offset by losses in the other. In this way,
short sales would expand the opportunity set available
to investors, which in turn helps to complete markets.
However, there are problems with short trading. The
first is a rather insurmountable one : the only people
who can short sell in the UK are market makers and
they can only short sell during the account period; it
is illegal otherwise. Such short selling restrictions
are not present in the stock index futures market.
The second is that even if short selling were allowed,
although short selling would expand the trading
opportunity set, it would not expand it as much as
stock index futures can. With stock index futures,
there are four expiry months and typically three
different expiration contracts trading at any one
time. Thus, there are three/four index futures
contracts that can be used in the investment
opportunity set at any one time, offering more trading
opportunities through the potential of at times quite
complex spreads across different maturity contracts.
In addition, transactions costs in the stock index
futures market, and futures markets in general, are
less.
A more viable possibility for introducing negative
correlation into the portfolio, then, is to allow
trade in stock index futures contracts and allow
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investors to introduce negative correlation into their
portfolios this way. It is straightforward to
demonstrate how stock index futures can do this, and
indeed how it is possible for stock index futures to
facilitate construction of a risk free portfolio (the
so-called hedged portfolio) • 22
Suppose a rational, utility maximising, risk averse
investor holds a stock portfolio that mimics the FTSE
100 Index and wishes to use stock index futures to
reduce the risk associated with the portfolio. To
reduce the risk of the portfolio, the investor will
short stock index futures. Denoting the number of
stock index futures contracts the investor will short
by h, then the investor's expected return comprises
the expected return from the spot portfolio and the
expected return from the futures position
E (Rhp ) = E(R5) + hE (Rf)
	 (1.9)
where E(Rhp ) is the expected return on the new hedged
portfolio, E(R) is the expected return from the spot
portfolio and E(RO is the expected return from the
futures position.
	
The variance of the hedged
22 The arguments that follow are also used by
Tucker, Madura and Chiang (1991) to demonstrate the
use of forward foreign exchange contracts in
constructing a risk-free hedged portfolio.
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2 2 	 2
a hp = a + h af + 2hasfs (1.10)
_h
- asf
2
af
(1.12)
portfolio is given by
where asf is the covariance between spot and futures
returns. To determine h, minimise (1.10) with respect
to h
a a2hp— 2ha, + 2c1 = 0
ah
Solving (1.11) for h, the futures position is given by
The optimal futures position has a negative sign
because the investor is participating on the short
side of the futures market. If h=0 such that the
investor does not use the stock index futures market,
then o a!. Therefore, the percentage of risk
eliminated by participating on the short side of the
futures market is
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2
as
22ha
x (1.14)
2	 2
	
X- a s - ahp
	 (1.13)
2
as
Substituting (1.12) into (1.10) and the result into
(1.13) yields
Now, suppose that the spot and futures prices are
perfectly positively correlated (x=1), such that the
futures position is -1, that is, sell one contract.
For this to be true, then from (1.12), a4 must be
equal to zero. Thus by participating on the short
side of the stock index futures market it is possible
to create a risk free portfolio by hedging. This must
be so because if the spot and futures prices move
together exactly, gains from the stock portfolio are
exactly offset by losses in the stock index futures
market : short sales of the derivative instrument
introduce the negative correlation necessary for
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diversification to be most effective. 23 The full
range of possibilities open to the investor with the
introduction of stock index futures are plotted in
figure 1.1. Notice that the introduction of futures •
caters not only to the conservative investor (h=-1)
but also to the aggressive investor (h=l) who can use
futures to increase expected return (with a
corresponding increase in risk). Obviously, rational
investors will only be interested in portfolios that
lie on the curve. Those beneath it are sub-optimal
and those above it are unobtainable.
As a final point to consider in this section, note
that perfect positive correlation between the two
markets actually completes the market since risk can
be eliminated. This is confirmed by the example in
the previous section (the matrix given by (1.5)). To
construct a portfolio that offers a payoff of one in
every state that can occur, the investor shorts
futures contracts. In the example, the overall net
position is sold one futures contract. If there is
perfect positive correlation between spot and futures
prices, then the model in this section shows that the
investor should be short on one futures contract. If
23 Note that, if prices are perfectly positively
correlated the hedge portfolio constructed from a
combination of a stock portfolio and short sales of
stock index futures provides an alternative measure of
the zero beta portfolio in Black's (1972) Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
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Expected Return
h= -1
=1
h = 0
Risk
there is perfect positive correlation, then, futures
t
must complete the market. Moreover, it is the
allowance of short sales of the futures contract that
actually enables it to complete the market. Without
this short sale facility, their usefulness would be
questionable.
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1 . 5 .	 LITERATURE REVIEW
In this section, we will review the literature
relevant to our study. The literature review will be
quite selective, focusing on those papers considered
to be of primary importance in relation to the subject
under study here. The reason for this is that the
literature that on futures markets in general, and
stock index futures markets in particular, is vast and
the number of areas of interest is quite wide-ranging.
Thus we keep the review selective to avoid detracting
from the main issue(s) under consideration in this
thesis. Before doing this, there are two areas that
are worthy of minor comment. These are hedging and
volatility. In the literature on hedging, emphasis
has been on the effectiveness of futures in
reducing/removing spot market risk. Figlewski
(1984,1985) analyses the effectiveness of hedging with
stock index futures, explicitly accounting for the
risk introduced into the hedge by the basis. The risk
arises because the portfolio being hedged may not be
the same as the portfolio the stock index futures is
written on. Therefore, they may not track each other
exactly. Junkus and Lee (1985) also examine the
effectiveness of hedging with stock index futures by
comparing three hedging strategies : a classic hedge
(positions of the same size), one based on Johnson's
(1960) mean-variance model of hedger behaviour and one
36
based on the basis risk approach to hedging (Working
(1953)). Rolfo (1980) analyses the effect of
differing degrees of risk aversion on hedging with
cocoa futures.
With volatility, the focus has been on the appropriate
measure of volatility to use (see Garman and Klass
(1980), Parkinson (1980) and Kunitomo (1992)) and the
effect of volume on volatility (Grammatikos and
Saunders (1986)). For a review, see Karpoff (1987).
An interesting critique of these tests comes from
Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990), who show that if
volatility is modelled in the more preferable ARCH
framework, volatility in stock prices is completely
explained by volume, that is, once volume is included
in the conditional variance equation, ARCH effects
disappear. For a different application of ARCH to the
volatility issue, see Chan, Chan and Karolyi (1991).
The reason why these areas are of minor interest is
that hedging requires correct specification of the
pricing relationship and volatility, especially if
modelled as an ARCH process, could be due to
misspecification. Thus, correct specification of the
pricing relationship can affect them both.
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1 . 5 . 1 . LEAD-LAG RELATIONSHIPS AND NONSYNCHRONOUS
TRADING
Whilst stock index futures were originally proposed to
aid investors in spreading risk (achieved through
aiding in the completion of markets and allowing
investors to introduce artificial negative
correlations into their portfolios, as discussed
earlier), another important function has emerged which
stock index futures should fulfil. This function
relates to the role of information and how information
is transmitted and incorporated into prices, an issue
intimately related to market efficiency. Market
efficiency is explicitly tied to the notion of how
prices reflect information, as embodied in the three
forms of efficiency discussed in Fama (1970) : weak
efficiency, where prices fully reflect all information
implied by past price movements; semi-strong
efficiency, where prices fully reflect all publicly
available information; and strong efficiency, where
prices reflect all relevant information, whether
publicly available or not. Clearly, since the stock
market is a major allocator of resources, an
informationally efficient stock market is vital.
This notion of efficiency has prompted a good deal of
research testing the various forms of efficiency (see
Fama (1970) for a review of early work and LeRoy
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(1989) for more recent tests). The empirical evidence
on this issue is somewhat mixed, although the more
recent evidence has tended to point to inefficiency.
These results, coupled with the theoretical results in
Grossman and Stiglitz (1976, 1980) which show the
impossibility of an informationally efficient market,
have prompted concern over the functioning of equity
markets and attention has focused on the role stock
index futures can play in improving the informational
efficiency of the underlying stock market.
The argument concerning the informational role of
stock index futures stems from the nature of the stock
index futures contract. As mentioned earlier, a trade
in a stock index futures contract is a trade in a
future claim on the shares that comprise the
underlying index in a proportion consistent with their
allocated weights. Therefore, they reach a new
equilibrium price with each trade.
For the underlying stock index, and hence the stock
market, to reach a new equilibrium price, however, all
of the constituent shares must trade. As a result,
the stock index futures price will lead the stock
index because it reacts instantaneously to the new
information causing the price movement. This is
indeed one of the implications of the model of stock
index futures trading derived by Subrahmanyam (1991).
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This conclusion also arises from models of
restrictions on trading in the stock market, see for
example Diamond and Verrechia (1987). In their model,
short selling constraints means that stock prices are
slower to adjust to private information, especially if
it is bad. Such short sale constraints are not
present in the stock index futures market and hence,
if traders are willing to use futures, the futures
will convey predictive information to the stock
market.
These theoretical arguments showing that the stock
index futures market will lead the stock market have
generated a good deal of empirical work in the US24
that tests precisely this proposition. These tests
are typically carried out using Granger-Sims causality
tests (see Granger (1969) and Sims (1972)), with
variable deletion tests being used to determine what
leads what, if at all. The hypotheses to be tested
are formulated in different ways, but essentially they
are testing the same thing. Whilst the theory models
suggest that the futures will lead the spot, the
empirical models are modified slightly to allow for
the possibility of feedback, that is, not only does
the futures lead the spot but the spot also leads the
Unfortunately there are no papers that test
lead-lag relationships between the stock and stock
index futures market in the UK.
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futures.
The justification for formulating the econometric
model in which the hypotheses are nested in this
fashion are that although the stock index futures
price will lead the underlying index price, the
futures price will tend to react to information that
is economy-wide.' The underlying stock index, on the
other hand, will not only react to economy-wide
information but also to information that may only
affect a subset of securities that comprise its make
up. In this situation, the spot may lead the futures.
One of the first papers testing lead-lag relationships
between the stock market and stock index futures
market was written by Kawaller, Koch and Koch (1987,
1988). Using minute by minute price data for Standard
and Poor's 500 Index (the S&P 500) and index futures
contract' they sought to investigate first whether
the index futures price lead the stock market and
second whether the observed lead-lag behaviour
differed according to the time to expiration of the
By economy-wide information, we mean such
things as inflation announcements, trade figures and
so on.
Using data from 1984 and 1985, they examine
lead-lag relationships eighty-eight days, sixty days,
thirty days, fourteen days and one day before
expiration and the expiration day itself for the
March, June, September and December 1984 and 1985 S&P
500 Index futures contract.
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futures contract. They formulated their tests in the
context of the following model
A i t = Yio + Ek612 1 a ik A it-k rk.=50 DikAft-k
E=0
	 4_ V60 R A f
Aft Y 20 + L4k=0 a 2k	 Lek=1 F 21c "a ft _k e2t
(1.15)
where Ai, is the change in the log of the index price,
Aft is the change in the log of the futures price and
eit are white noise error terms (i.1,2). Kawaller,
Koch and Koch (1987) quite correctly treat (1.15) as
a system because first contemporaneous values enter
the equations and it is well recognised that spot and
futures prices are jointly determined; second, if spot
and futures prices are jointly determined, and
determine each other, then the e it will be correlated
across equations since the markets will tend to react
to the same information. Kawaller, Koch and Koch
(1987) then estimate (1.15) by 3SLS" and test the
hypotheses 1-t,; : = 0 and IC : oca 0. Rejection of
1-1, and acceptance of IC means that the stock index
futures price leads the stock market and vice versa.
Rejection of both means that there is feedback.
Their general conclusion is that whilst there is quite
" Even if spot and futures prices were not
simultaneously determined, estimation of (1.1) by OLS
would be inefficient. To ensure efficiency (1.1)
would have to be estimated by SURE.
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weak evidence of a feedback relationship, the futures
leads the spot, the lead from the futures to the cash
price being some twenty to forty-five minutes whilst
the lead from the spot to the futures price rarely
moves beyond one minute. In addition, they find that
this relationship is stable across both futures
contracts and days to expiration of the futures
contract.
The results in Kawaller, Koch and Koch (1987, 1988)
have, however, been criticised for being potentially
misleading. Indeed, although they do not recognise it
as such, they actually present the reason why in their
conclusion
'The length of the lead from futures to the
index reflects, in part, inertia in the
stock market. Stocks are not traded as
readily as futures contracts.' (Kawaller,
Koch and Koch (1987), p.1327).
The criticism of their results is that this so-called
inertia in the stock index in actual fact leads to
potentially spurious conclusions. This is because the
measure of the index used may not actually reflect its.
true value due to nonsynchronous, or thin, trading.
Intuitively, the nonsynchronous trading problem arises
because not all shares within the index (or portfolio)
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will trade in any one given minute. 28 Therefore, if
they react to information with a lag, they will
generate serial correlation in index returns, serial
correlation which may not be genuine but rather may be
due simply to the way the index is constructed.
The issue of nonsynchronous trading is not new, it was
recognised by Fisher (1966) with regard to the
construction of stock indices. However, much of the
attention until recently focused on the effect it had
on the estimates of beta used in tests of the CAPM.29
The more recent literature has concentrated on
estimating the probability of nontrading (Lo and
MacKinlay (1990)) and removing its effects (Harris
(1989), Stoll and Whaley (1990) and Garrett (1991)).
Nonsynchronous trading cannot be ignored, as the
following ten-point 'checklist' from Lo and MacKinlay
28 Essentially, the nonsynchronous trading
problem, certainly for stock returns, is founded on
the notion that share i will not trade with
probability p i and will trade with probability (1-p1).
This forms the basis of Lo and MacKinlay's (1990)
model of nonsynchronous trading.
29 This is perhaps not surprising given the
controversy surrounding the validity of asset pricing
models and the mixed results from tests of such
models, particularly the CAPM, in the late 1970's and
early 1980's. See the attack on the CAPM by Roll
(1977) and the alternative Arbitrage Pricing Theory of
Ross (1976). For the effects of, and how to correct
for, nonsynchronous trading in estimates of beta see
Scholes and Williams (1977) and Dimsom (1979).
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(1990, pp.198-199) demonstrates"
Nonsynchronous trading
a) Does not affect the mean of returns, whether they
be an individual security's or a portfolio's.
b) For a non-zero mean return, the variance of
individual security returns increases.
C) If a well diversified portfolio consists of
securities with the same probability of not
trading then the variance of that portfolios
returns will decrease.
d) Induces negative serial correlation which
• declines geometrically in securities where the
mean return is non-zero. (Their emphasis).
e) Induces positive serial correlation which
declines geometrically in observed portfolio
returns when the portfolios are well diversified
with common nontrading probability of the
constituent shares, yielding an AR(1) process for
observed returns. (Their emphasis).
f) Induces asymmetric cross correlation between the
returns of two different securities which
declines geometrically. This is due to the
assumption that different securities have
different nontrading probabilities. (Their
emphasis).
g) Induces positive cross correlation between two
well	 diversified portfolios with common
nontrading	 probabilities.	 Again,	 this
correlation declines geometrically. 	 (Their
emphasis).
" Although Lo and MacKinlay (1990) derive a model
of nonsynchronous trading, they note (p.198) that the
implications that follow are 'consistent with earlier
models of nonsynchronous trading.'
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h) Induces positive serial correlation in an equally
weighted index if the betas of the securities
generally have the same sign. (Their emphasis).
i) Coupled with aggregation over time, the maximal
negative serial correlation in observed security
returns induced by nontrading increases.
However, this is attained as time aggregation
increases, with the nontrading probability
nearing unity.
j) Coupled with time aggregation, the
autocorrelation in portfolio returns induced by
nontrading decreases. This is true for all
nontrading probabilities.
Unfortunately, Kawaller, Koch and Koch do not report
the aik' s
 
so it is difficult to assess whether
nonsynchronous trading is a problem in their study.
However, the above concerns would suggest that it may
well be.
Harris (1989) examines lead-lag relationships between
the S&P 500 Index and the S&P 500 index futures
contract around and on the stock market crash of
October 1987. Harris uses observations five minutes
apart over the period 12th October 1987 to 23rd
October 1987. However, unlike Kawaller, Koch and Koch
(1987, 1988) Harris incorporates nonsynchronous
trading effects into his calculation of the S&P 500
Index. To do this, Harris constructs what is
essentially a latent factor model to extract the
common factor, which is the true underlying value of
the Index, from transactions and price data for each
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of the stocks that comprise the S&P 500 Index. Harris
then analyses the lead-lag relationship between the
adjusted index and the stock index futures price using
cross correlations.
Harris's main findings are that first, nonsynchronous
trading effects are present in the data, although
removal of this effect still leaves autocorrelation in
the Index, suggesting that the autocorrelation is
genuine and price changes are not independent of each
other. Second, Harris finds that the futures strongly
leads the Index, with apparently no feedback although
again this is difficult to assess since Harris does
not report the standard errors for the cross
correlation coefficients. Analysis of the cross
correlation coefficients between the change in the
adjusted indices and the first lead of the change in
the futures price (panel c of table II, Harris (1989,
p.89)) does seem to suggest that again there is weak
feedback from the spot to the futures on most of the
days in Harris's sample.' However, given that
Harris's case stands and falls on the analysis of the
correlation properties of the data alone some caution
must be used in interpreting his results.
" For example, for the 12th October the cross
correlation coefficient—between the perfect foresight
index and the first lead of the futures price is
0.390. Likewise, for the 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th
they are 0.027, -0.201, 0.218 and -0.026 respectively.
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Stoll and Whaley (1990) analyse lead-lag relationships
between the S&P 500 Index, the S&P 500 Index futures
contract, the Major Market Index (MMI) and IBM share
prices over a stable time period. Again, they analyse
5 minute movements using data over the period April
21st 1982 to March 31st 1987. As with the results of
Harris (1989), Stoll and Whaley find that
nonsynchronous trading is somewhat of a problem with
the effects of infrequent trading more prevalent in
the indices, especially the S&P 500. To remove the
effects of infrequent trading, Stoll and Whaley derive
a model whereby observed returns follow an ARMA(p,q)
process when there is infrequent trading. 32 They then
interpret the residuals from the ARMA model as the
adjusted index and use these residuals in their tests
of lead-lag relationships. They find that an ARMA
(2,3) is required to remove the effects of
nonsynchronous trading (and the bid-ask spread) from
the S&P 500 and MMI indices whilst for IBM an ARMA
(0,3) is the appropriate model.
Using the residuals from these models as proxies for
the true returns on the indices they then test the
lead-lag relationship in the context of the following
model
32 In fact, Stoll and Whaley's model takes account
not only of nonsynchronous trading but also the bid-
ask price effect.
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(1.16)
where AS is the change in the true value of the
relevant index and AFt, i is the lead/lagged change in
the futures price. If the coefficients with negative
subscripts are significant, the futures leads the spot
and if the coefficients with positive subscripts are
significant the spot leads the futures. Stoll and
Whaley estimate (1.16) by OLS and they conclude that
the futures leads the spot, although again there is
weak evidence of feedback between the two.
There are, however, several points that must be borne
in mind when interpreting their results. First, use
of an ARMA(p,q) model to extract true returns is
problematic given the well-known identification
problems that accompany such models, not only in terms
of identifying the orders of the autoregressive and
moving average terms but also in the identification of
the coefficients if the model is over-parameterised.
Second, use of the residuals as the proxy for true
returns forces true returns to be white noise since
the residuals from all of their estimated models are
indeed white noise. This imposes weak efficiency,
which may or may not be true. In addition, use of the
residuals is incorrect since they represent not the
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adjusted index but the adjustment that should be made
to the index. Third, futures and true spot returns
will still be contemporaneously correlated and
therefore estimation by OLS is inappropriate. We will
return to some of these points later in the thesis.
A final study we can consider with respect to lead-lag
relationships is that of Chan (1992). Chan uses data
on the MMI, the MMI futures contract and the S&P 500
futures contract over two periods : from August 1984
to June 1985 and from January 1987 to September 1987.
The reason for doing this is to try and assess the
robustness of the results to improved trading
practices.' To overcome the nonsynchronous trading
problem, Chan uses transaction and price data from the
20 component stocks that make up the MMI and
recomputes the Index over a five minute time interval.
This reduces the infrequent trading problem to
negligible levels. In a preliminary analysis of the
data, Chan finds that the nontrading probability,
whilst small for the 1984/1985 sample, is virtually
nonexistent for the 1987 sample.34
This is based on an observation by Froot and
Perold (1990) that the autocorrelation in short-term
returns on several market indices decline over time.
One interpretation of this is that improved and
changed trading practices increase the speed with
which stock prices react to new information.
34 Chan defines the probability of nontrading as
the proportion of five minute intervals in which a
stock comprising the MMI Index does not trade.
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Chan uses (1.16) to test the lead-lag relationship
but, unlike Stoll and Whaley (1990), the model is
estimated using Hansen's (1982) Generalised Method of
Moments (GMM). Thus, Chan does in some respects
recognise the simultaneity issue. As with the other
studies discussed earlier, Chan finds that the futures
leads the spot but again there is some weak evidence
of feedback. Moreover, the lead-lag relationship is
an asymmetric one, a point not drawn out in previous
studies. An interesting finding that does emerge from
Chan's results, however, is the lead-lag relationship
changes over time. In particular the lead from the
futures to the spot price is shorter in the 1987
sample, a result consistent with the arguments of
Froot and Perold (1990).
To further assess the robustness of the results, Chan
also analyses the lead-lag relationship under good and
bad news, the intensity of trading and in relation to
market-wide movement in prices. To test the good
news-bad news relationship, the sample is sorted into
quintiles by size and sign, with trading time being
split into thirty minute intervals. 	 The bad news
group is then represented by the first quintile and
the good news group by the fifth quintile. Chan
interprets the bad news group as the one most likely
to be subject to short sale constraints and in this
respect he provides an indirect test of Diamond and
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Verrechia's (1987) proposition. The conclusions from
this test are illuminating
'Summarising the results, it does not seem
that the futures leads the cash index only
under bad news. Neither is there a stronger
tendency for the futures to lead the cash
index under bad news than under good news.
This may suggest that short-sale
restrictions are not a constraint to
marginal arbitrageurs, who are able to
exploit their information by selling stocks
under bad news.'	 (Chan (1992) p.137).
This is an important finding given that arbitrageurs
are vital in ensuring futures and spot prices remain
close together. Following a similar procedure for
trading volume, Chan finds that the lead-lag
relationship remains essentially unaltered under
different intensities of trading. However, market-
wide movement does affect the lead-lag relationship.
Indeed, Chan finds that when there is substantial
market-wide movement the feedback from the futures to
the cash market is stronger, implying that indeed cash
and futures markets have different access to
information. Chan also suggests that this finding
might explain the apparently strong lead-lag
relationships that exist between the S&P 500 Index and
Index futures contract : it is market-wide movement
that drives it because information appears first in
the futures market.
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1.5.2.	 MISPRICING
Another issue that has received prominent attention is
that of mispricing. The mispricing literature is
geared towards the identification of arbitrage
opportunities, and thus how good the stock index
futures market is at pricing these contracts, and how
the mispricing that may arise behaves over time. The
starting point for analysing mispricing is based on
the notion of the theoretically correct stock index
futures price and how this differs from the actual
futures price. Typically, the fair (theoretically
correct) futures price is calculated from the formula
derived by Cornell and French (1983a,b) 35 and is given
as 3 6
35 Black (1976) derives a different formula based
on the Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing model.
Whilst Black uses his model for forward prices, Cox,
Ingersoll and Ross (1981) demonstrate that in the
presence of nonstochastic interest rates forward and
futures prices will be equivalent.
36 This is rather a simplistic statement of the
fair futures price for a stock index futures contract
since taxes and the timing option associated with tax
payment are ignored. However, Figlewski (1984, p.666)
suggests that the magnitude of the tax-timing option
'is probably not large'. In addition, Yadav and Pope
(1990) point out that it is probably not a problem in
the UK since the tax liability only arises when the
position is closed. The evidence in Cornell (1985)
seems to confirm the point that tax-timing is
negligible. For the pricing formula with taxes see
Cornell and French (1983a,b).
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where F . , ,I. is the theoretically correct stock index
futures price quoted at time t for delivery at time T,
S, is the current index value, r is a risk-free
interest rate of approximately the same duration as
the futures contract has to expiration, (T-t) is the
time to expiration and the second term on the left
hand side represents the present value of the flow of
dividends derived from holding the index portfolio
until expiration. Analysis of mispricing then
consists of comparing the price calculated from (1.17)
with the actual futures prices to see if arbitrage
opportunities are available. Defining Ft,T. as the
actual futures price, then if F,.1. < Ft,T/ the futures
contract is undervalued and the arbitrageur would buy
futures and sell stock. If the futures contract is
overvalued, the reverse trade would be initiated.
In practice, however, these trading strategies will
not be so straightforward because of the presence of
transactions costs. In one of the first studies of
mispricing and the behaviour of futures prices, Modest
and Sundaresan (1983) show that the differential will
fall between an upper and lower bound determined by
transactions costs and as long as the futures price is
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within these bounds arbitrage will not be profitable
and therefore will not take place. The bounds they
derive assuming dividends are paid are37
(1.18)C + C s F - F * s - C - Cfs	r,T	 t,T	 Ps	 fl
where Co is the cost of being long in the spot index,
Cps is the cost of being short in the spot index, C f , is
the cost of being long in the futures contract and Cfs
is the cost of being short in the futures contract.
The evidence in Modest and Sundaresan (1983) is that
these bounds are infrequently violated such that
arbitrage opportunities are few.
MacKinlay and Ramaswamy (1988) analyse mispricing
between the S&P 500 Index futures and its fair value
using intra-daily data from April 1982 (the start of
trading in the S&P 500 contract) to June 1987.
MacKinlay and Ramaswamy construct their mispricing
series' based on index and futures prices quoted at
fifteen minute intervals for each of the March, June
September and December contracts in their sample. To
assess the significance or otherwise of nonsynchronous
trading in their data, MacKinlay and Ramaswamy
Modest and Sundaresan (1983) compare the
futures price with the spot price rather than the fair
price. However, the argument is still the same.
55
calculate autocorrelation coefficients for fifteen,
thirty, sixty and one hundred and twenty minute
intervals. They find that lengthening the time
interval reduces the size of the first order
autocorrelation coefficient and they interpret this as
evidence of a nonsynchronous trading effect. However,
they also note that nonsynchronous trading is not the
only source of autocorrelation in the index,
suggesting that perhaps prices are predictable and the
market is inefficient on an intra-daily basis.
The question of interest that MacKinlay and Ramaswamy
examine is whether any degree of mispricing that falls
outside of the no arbitrage bands determined by
transaction costs persists or whether arbitrage
activity is sufficient to drive the mispricing back
within the no arbitrage bands. This is an important
hypothesis, for if arbitrage opportunities persist the
implication is that markets are inefficient. If
markets are inefficient then the assumption that
prices are correct is not warranted and therefore any
hedging decisions, for example, may be incorrect and
sub-optimal.
MacKinlay and Ramaswamy set their total transaction
cost bands at ± 0.6% based on a round-trip stock
commission of 0.7%, a round-trip futures commission of
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0.08%, a market impact cost" of 0.05% in the futures
market and a market impact cost of 0.35% in the stock
market, with the S&P 500 Index level set at 200. To
assess the robustness of the results they also used
transaction cost bands of ± 0.4% and ± 0.8% (although
they do not report results for these latter bands
since the results are apparently unaltered).
The hypotheses of interest in this study are the
behaviour of mispricing with time to maturity and the
path dependence of mispricing. With regard to the
behaviour of mispricing and time to expiration the
question they investigate is does the average
magnitude of the observed mispricing increase with
time to maturity. The reason for analysing this
hypothesis is that if average mispricing is dependent
upon time to maturity, then the boundaries within
which mispricing can fall without triggering arbitrage
are not constant, indicating factors other than
transactions costs determine arbitrage opportunities
the further away the contract is from maturity.
" The market impact cost reflects the impact of
a trade on the bid-ask spread. Given that the spread
represents a transaction cost in buying and selling,
it is important in determining the transaction cost
bands.
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To test this hypothesis, MacKinlay and Ramaswamy
estimate
IN
z4T =f3 0 +(3 1 (T-t)+Et,T Zt,T =ABS E xt,T(j)/Nt	 (1.19)
-.1
where Xt,T (j) is mispricing for the jth quarter-hour
observation, N t is the number of observations in day t
and (T-t) is time to maturity of the futures contract.
For the sixteen contracts used in their study the
estimate of p i was positive for fourteen of them and
statistically significant for eleven. For the two
contracts with negative coefficients, they were small,
with the coefficients being insignificantly different
from zero. Thus, they find strong evidence to support
the hypothesis that the absolute value of mispricing
is positively related to time to maturity.
The path dependence argument is one of the behaviour
of arbitrage. The path dependence or otherwise of
mispricing arises because arbitrageurs have what is
termed an unwinding option. This is the situation
where arbitrageurs will close out a position taken
when mispricing was outside of one of the bounds
before it reaches the other bound. There are two
possibilities (MacKinlay and Ramaswamy (1988, pp.155-
156):
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i) Mispricing is path independent, following a
stochastic process that is pinned on zero at
expiration.
ii) Mispricing is path dependent such that the
probability of mispricing hitting the upper
(lower) bound, conditional on it having hit
the lower (upper) bound is smaller.
With i), the probability of mispricing hitting the
upper or lower bound having returned to zero after
hitting either of the bounds is equal. With ii), it
is lower (p < 0.5). From their sample, they identify
one hundred and forty two cases where mispricing
crosses the upper or lower bound, returns to zero and
then crosses the upper or lower bound again. Of
these, eighty two were situations where mispricing hit
the upper bound and 60 were cases where mispricing hit
the lower bound. For the upper bound cases, they find
that
p (x hitting upper 1 x hit lower and crossed 0)	 0.36
p (x hitting upper 1 x hit upper and crossed 0)	 0.73
For the lower bound cases,
p (x hitting lower 1 x hit upper and crossed 0) 	 0.27
p (x hitting lower 1 x hit lower and crossed 0) 	 0.64
MacKinlay and Ramaswamy's results, then, provide clear
evidence that for the S&P 500 index futures market,
59
mispricing is positively related to time to maturity,
indicating that factors other than transactions costs
affect the arbitrage bands, and it is also path
dependent, implying that arbitrageurs do tend to
exercise the unwinding option available to them.
Using MacKinlay and Ramaswamy's (1988) data, Brennan
and Schwartz (1990) also investigate mispricing and
the presence of arbitrage opportunities. The
innovation of this paper, however, is that they
explicitly model the stochastic behaviour of the
mispricing series and use the parameter estimates of
the stochastic process to examine the behaviour of the
profits obtained from a simulated arbitrage strategy.
Brennan and Schwartz begin by defining two sets of
transactions costs.
The first, which they denote by C I , is the transaction
cost involved in executing the 'simple' arbitrage
trade, where the simple long (short) arbitrage
position involves a long (short) position in the
underlying portfolio and a short (long) position in
the futures, held to maturity of the futures contract.
If this strategy is followed, then transactions costs
consist of two stock commissions, two futures
commissions and one market impact cost. The second,
denoted by C2 , is associated with the early unwinding
of the arbitrage position and the transactions costs
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Brennan and Schwartz use for this strategy is simply
one market impact cost." They assume that mispricing
evolves according to the following Brownian Bridge
process (Brennan and Schwartz (1990), p.S12, equation
8)
de(t) = - I dt + ydz	 (1.20)
where E is mispricing, T is the time to maturity of
the futures contract, dz is the increment to a Gauss-
Wienér process (Brownian motion), 7 is the
instantaneous standard deviation of the increment to
the Gauss-Wiener process and 11 represents the speed of
mean reversion.
The reason why Brennan and Schwartz use this
stochastic process is that arbitrage profit has a
tendency towards zero (it is mean reverting) and will
equal zero upon maturity with probability equal to
one, which must happen anyway through institutional
arrangements (see section 1.3.2.). By deriving an
expression to value the right to unwind the arbitrage
position early, and calculating it using the estimated
parameters from the Brownian Bridge process, Brennan
" Using the transactions costs reported in Stoll
and Whaley (1987), Brennan and Schwartz calculate C 1 to
be 1.2 index points and C 2 to be 0.5 index points.
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and Schwartz compare the actual profit with the
theoretical profit predicted by their model, both
under transaction cost scenario 1 and 2. They find
that their model underpredicts, that is, the actual
profit figures are greater than the theoretical value
of the arbitrage opportunity. They attribute this to
sampling error, the discreteness of the observations
on the spot and futures prices and the possible
misspecification of the stochastic process.
The latter is the most likely source of the problem
with their model for the simple reason that, using the
same data set, MacKinlay and Ramaswamy (1988)
established the path dependence of mispricing. The
Brownian Bridge process is, however, path independent.
That misspecification of the stochastic process is the
source of the problem with Brennan and Schwartz's
model seems to be confirmed by the instability of the
estimate of 7, the speed at which mispricing mean
reverts, across futures contracts.
Yadav and Pope (1990) analyse mispricing and test for
the presence of arbitrage opportunities for the UK
markets using daily data on the FTSE 100 Index and the
FTSE 100 Index futures contract. They replicate
MacKinlay and Ramaswamy's (1988) models to determine
whether or not findings from the UK markets are
consistent with findings from the US markets. One of
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the major differences between the US and UK markets
that Yadav and Pope (1990) identify is the size of
transactions costs, which are typically higher in the
UK."	 In addition, given that different market
participants have different transactions costs, Yadav
and Pope use transaction cost bands of 0.5%, 1.0%,
1.5% and 2% in determining the presence or otherwise
of arbitrage opportunities.
Yadav and Pope find that before the Big Bang of
October 1986, mispricing is consistently negative
whilst post Big Bang there is a greater tendency for
mispricing to reverse back to zero. In addition,
mispricing is best described as a stationary AR(1)
process, indicating that it may be a mean-reverting,
path independent process. They point out that the
behaviour of mispricing pre and post Big Bang is
consistent with the growth and improvement of the
arbitrage sector, though they also note that the
mispricing seems too great to be accounted for solely
by transactions costs.
In order to investigate the potential for arbitrage
profits, they use four trading rules (Yadav and Pope
° For example, according to Yadav and Pope (1990,
p.579) one extra source of transaction cost is stamp
duty, payable by all investors, with the exception of
market makers and broker/dealers, at a rate of 0.5% on
every purchase transaction.
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(1990, pp.590-593) from a simple hold to expiration
strategy through to hold with an early unwind option
or a roll forward into the next contract option,
whichever is the more profitable.
An interesting result that emerges from these ex post
trading rules is that roll forward and early unwinding
strategies generate additional profit which are not
eradicated by transaction costs. Yadav and Pope argue
(Yadav and Pope (1990, p.593) that this implies
substantial transaction cost discount and as such, it
should generate arbitrage activity even if mispricing
falls within the no arbitrage boundaries. It is
interesting to note, however, that executing the
trading rules ex ante substantially reduces the
arbitrage profit available relative to the ex post
strategies.
A final issue Yadav and Pope (1990) examine is whether
mispricing is path independent or path dependent. To
test this hypothesis they estimate two models
Xra. = a + 13(T-t) + et
	 (1.21)
and
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I Xt,T I = a 1- 13(T-t) + Et
	 (1.22)
where Xt,/, and IXt,T1 are mispricing and absolute
mispricing respectively, (T-t) is the time to
expiration of the futures contract and e t is a white
noise error term. They estimate (1.21) using Beach
and MacKinnon's (1978) maximum likelihood method with
AR(1) errors, and they estimate (1.22) as a Tobit
model, censored at zero. They find evidence from both
of these models that supports path dependence,
consistent with MacKinlay and Ramaswamy's (1988)
results for the US.
However, one must be a little cautious in interpreting
these particular results, for both models are
misspecified. This is especially evident from (1.21).
The residual autocorrelation in this model is most
unlikely to be genuine. Rather, given that earlier in
their paper they found that mispricing follows a
stationary AR(1) process, it probably results from the
omission of (k T )	 from the model.
In addition, it is well known that static models with
AR(1) errors impose non-linear restrictions (the so-
called COMFAC restrictions) on more general linear
dynamic models. Given that these restrictions have
been imposed rather than tested, and given the
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evidence that mispricing follows an AR(1) process, the
conclusion that mispricing is path dependent appears
unwarranted.'
Yadav and Pope (1992) further investigate the issue of
mispricing,	 in	 particular	 the	 existence	 of
seasonalities, both intra-weekly and intra-daily,
using hourly data on the FTSE 100 Index and the FTSE
100 Index futures contract over the period April 26th
1986 to March 23rd 1990.
The aim of this study is to see whether the
institutional features and settlement procedures in
the UK stock and stock index futures markets
contribute to a seasonal pattern in mispricing
returns. The reason for analysing this is to
determine whether the markedly different trading
systems and settlement procedures in the stock and
stock index futures market contribute to any observed
seasonalities.
There are three major differences between the stock
market and stock index futures market in the UK.
First, trading in the stock index futures market is
open outcry, as opposed to the predominantly screen-
" Note that, although MacKinlay and Ramaswamy
(1988) do not report any test statistics for serial
correlation, these same criticisms may apply.
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based trading system that operates in the stock market
(the so-called pure dealership system). Second,
settlement in the futures market is undertaken daily
with marking to market (see section 1.2.) whereas
settlement in the stock market is based on a two
(sometimes three) week account period.	 Third,
transactions costs are lower in the futures market and
liquidity is higher. The question is do these
differences present themselves in the form of
seasonalities?
Yadav and Pope (1992) find that this is indeed the
case. To summarise their results, the stock market
does exhibit seasonality within the settlement period,
particularly on the first Monday of the period, a
feature which carries over to the futures market. In
addition, they find evidence in the stock market that
refutes the 'bad news arrives over the weekend'
hypothesis, with any abnormal returns on Monday
accruing during the trading day rather than over the
weekend non-trading period. Several other anomalies
suggest that trades based on mispricing can yield
positive abnormal returns. In particular, two
observations stand out : systematic falls in the UK
markets when the US markets open, and a tendency for
prices in the stock market to rise whilst the market
is open whilst prices in the futures market rise while
the market is closed.
	
This latter result seems
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somewhat surprising. However, in this situation Yadav
and Pope show that a long futures-short cash hedge
yields significant positive returns during trading
periods and a short cash-long futures yields
significant positive returns during non-trading
periods.
A final paper we consider is that of Chung (1991).
Chung's paper is of interest because he casts serious
doubts on the conclusions reached in other studies.
The reasons for such potentially false conclusions are
twofold.	 First, there is no allowance for an
execution lag in the arbitrage trade. The second
reason relates to Chan's (1992) critique of tests of
lead-lag relationships, that is, failure to take
proper account of the fact that the quoted value of
the index is not necessarily synonymous with its true
value.
The reason why these issues are ignored, Chung argues,
is because the issue under consideration is not
correct. The issue to be investigated is not the size
and frequency of violations of the no arbitrage
boundaries. It is the size and frequency of
profitable arbitrage opportunities. 42 As Chung (1990,
42 Note that this particular point is not
applicable to Yadav and Pope (1990) for they expressly
test for profitable arbitrage opportunities.
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p.1792) observes,
'A market efficiency test should be carried
out as an ex ante test to see the extent to
which arbitrageurs can make positive ex ante
profits after observing ex post mispricings.
What appears ex post as a riskless profit
opportunity is not necessarily a real ex
ante exploitable profit opportunity because
there is no guarantee that the prices at the
next available transaction will still be
favourable to the arbitrageur.'
This is an important point, for as long as there are
no ex ante profitable arbitrage opportunities, the
presence of ex post ones seems to be of less
impoftance. In addition, the presence and persistence
of apparent ex post opportunities may not be
indicative of inefficiency at all but rather
indicative of model inadequacy in terms of the
misspecification of the no arbitrage boundaries.
To overcome the shortcomings of other studies, Chung
uses minute by minute prices of individual stocks that
comprise the NMI and of the MMI Index futures contract
in the construction of the mispricing series. Chung
conducts all of his tests using ex ante arbitrage
trading strategies, allowing for various execution
lags (twenty seconds, two minutes and five minutes)
and various transaction cost scenarios (0.5%, 0.75%
and 1.0%).
69
By approaching the issue in this way, Chung finds that
previous studies have overestimated the size,
persistence and frequency of arbitrage opportunities.
Moreover, the persistence of profitable ex ante
opportunities have declined as the stock index futures
market has matured. The overall conclusion Chung
reaches is that there are some profitable arbitrage
opportunities available, but not nearly as many as
previous studies tend to suggest. Moreover, those
profits that are available cannot be solely attributed
to inefficiency because profits realised from the
arbitrage strategies are not riskless.
1 . 6.	 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we set out to analyse the nature of
futures contracts in general, and stock index futures
contracts in particular, looking at economic
justifications for their existence. Futures contracts
represent a deferred claim on an asset and in this
sense they are the same as forward contracts.
However, futures contracts do offer several advantages
over forward contracts, such as a substantial
reduction in transaction costs through such factors as
the virtually complete removal of default risk.
From an economic viewpoint, we demonstrated in the
context of Ross' (1976) framework for completing
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markets using options that stock index futures markets
are a powerful addition to any economy by the fact
that, theoretically at least, they complete markets
and thus substantially reduce risk. Even in this case
where markets are not complete, stock index futures
can complete them if stock index futures prices are
perfectly positively correlated with the stock index
price. This is because in their role as instruments
for hedging and diversification, the ability of
investors to short stock index futures allows them to
construct risk-free portfolios.
The fact, then, that stock index futures can complete
markets, not just theoretically but potentially in
practice as well, is a powerful economic justification
for their existence. Moreover, it makes them worthy
of systematic investigation, both at the theoretical
level and the empirical level.
In terms of the literature analysing the behaviour of
stock index futures, two growth areas, indeed areas
that are beginning to predominate the stock index
futures literature, are the analysis of lead-lag
relationships between the stock and stock index
futures market and the analysis of mispricing of the
stock index futures contract. The former is concerned
with whether prices in one market lead prices in the
other.	 This issue is founded on the notion that
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because trade in stock index futures is less costly
and there are less frictions in the stock index
futures market, for example short sales are allowed,
information should manifest itself first in the stock
index futures price. Therefore, given that, in
principle, stock and stock index futures prices track
each other very closely (they must do otherwise
futures would not fulfil their functions discussed
earlier), the information will be transmitted from the
futures to the stock market and thus the futures price
leads.
The issue is, however, not as clear cut as it may
seem. First, it is entirely feasible that, at least
empirically, a feedback relationship exists such that
the stock index price also leads the stock index
futures price.
Second, and more important, is how are the results
influenced by nonsynchronous trading in the stock
index? Nonsynchronous trading is the situation where
not all stocks within an index trade in any given
trading interval. As a result, the lag in their
reaction to information generates serial correlation
in observed returns on the index. The problem is that
it is not genuine serial correlation one is observing.
It is serial correlation that arises because of the
way the index is constructed. Therefore, failure to
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account for it leads to invalid inference. As such,
before analysing lead-lag relationships the index must
be adjusted for nonsynchronous trading.
The mispricing literature is concerned with analysing
whether or not deviations of the futures price from
its fair price are of sufficient size and persistence
to allow arbitrageurs to trade profitably. The reason
for analysing this is that it allows an analysis of
the efficiency of the market, with sustained,
profitable arbitrage opportunities being indicative of
systematic mispricing and hence inefficiency.
There are several objections that can be raised with
regard to the analysis of lead-lag relationships and
mispricing and we address these in the following
chapters. First and foremost is the way these two
issues are analysed, both conceptually and
empirically. If one were to read a paper on lead-lag
relationships, then it would be difficult to conceive
that there is another equally important area of the
pricing relationship. The same applies in reading
papers on mispricing : the two subject areas tend to
be treated entirely independently of each other. This
is problematic to say the least, for they are far from
independent. Indeed, the literature on mispricing has
a great deal to contribute to the analysis of lead-lag
relationships.
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Accordingly, in the next chapter we unify these two
apparently diverse strands of the literature in a
coherent, error correction framework. This is where
mispricing contributes, for the literature on
theoretically correct stock index futures prices
actually provides us with the error correction
mechanism. As it happens, the natural error
correction mechanism is the futures to cash price
differential, known in the parlance of futures markets
as the basis, which we show to be equivalent to
mispricing of the stock index futures contract. The
natural result of analysing the pricing relationship
in this framework is that the issue of lead-lag
relationships and mispricing become the single issue
of effectively functioning equity markets, an issue
that has become so much more important since the
October 1987 stock market crash. We show how
effective price functioning can be tested objectively
within this framework and we distinguish between two
categories of effective functioning.
Having demonstrated how it is possible to test for
effectively functioning equity markets, we show how
this framework can be used to provide an objective
test of the efficiency of both the stock and stock
index futures markets. In fact, we show that
efficiency and effectiva functioning are virtually
synonymous.
	
We also discuss the contribution the
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analysis of effectively functioning equity markets can
make to the vexed issue of the behaviour of mispricing
discussed above. In chapter three we utilise this
framework to test whether the stock and stock index
futures markets in the UK are effectively functioning
using daily data on the FTSE 100 Index and FTSE 100
Index futures contract.
In chapter four we move on to consider the issue of
nonsynchronous trading and how it may be estimated.
We propose a new method for estimating the
nonsynchronous trading effect which is more
intuitively appealing and easier to implement than
extant methods. We use this method to construct a new
Index and, using the new Index, we analyse the intra-
daily pricing relationship over a stable period to
investigate whether markets can be said to be
effectively functioning on an intra-daily basis.
In chapter five, we use the framework developed in
chapter two and the method for estimating the
nonsynchronous trading adjustment in chapter four to
examine the minute by minute pricing relationship on
October 19th and 20th 1987, the time of the stock
market crash. The value of analysing the effective
functioning of equity markets as opposed to lead-lag
relationships and mispricing is demonstrated once more
in this chapter, for using this framework we are able
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to determine the cause of the massive downward spiral
in prices that occurred on the 19th and the reason why
they stabilised somewhat on the 20th. Chapter six
summarises and concludes the thesis.
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CHAPTER Two : A FRAMEWORK FOR MODELLING THE
PRICING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STOCK INDEX FUTURES
AND THE UNDERLYING STOCK INDEX
2 . 1 .	 INTRODUCTION
The establishment of the FTSE 100 stock index futures
contract in May 1984, coupled with the FTSE 100 option
contract, offered investors a much greater degree of
flexibility in the construction of their investment
portfolios and in the timing of transactions
associated with such portfolios. With the emergence
of such markets worldwide, there is a growing body of
literature, primarily concerned with the stock index
futures contracts in the United States (especially the
S&P 500 index futures contract), examining the pricing
relationship between the stock and stock index futures
markets (see inter a/ia Kawaller, Koch and Koch
(1987), MacKinlay and Ramaswamy (1988), Stoll and
Whaley (1990) and Chan (1992)). 1 Much of this
examination of the pricing relationship has been
1 Given the much wider availability of finer data
bases in the US, many of the studies that examine the
pricing relationship use intra-day data over long
periods of time. For example, Stoll and Whaley (1990)
use prices quoted at five minute intervals from April
1982 to March 1987. Unfortunately, such data over
reasonable periods of time is not widely available in
the UK and thus we are restricted to using daily data.
Nevertheless, this does not diminish the arguments
that will follow.
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concerned with identifying the lead-lag relationship
between prices in the two markets to try and determine
which market, if either, reacts to new information
first. In this chapter we focus on the nature of the
pricing relationship between the two markets, arguing
that the focus of those studies of the US stock index
futures markets are inappropriate and flawed, both in
the way they approach the issue conceptually and in
the econometric methods they employ to test their
proposed models.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. The
second section discusses the nature of lead-lag
relationships and how they might arise. Section three
focuses on the 'traditional' method of estimating and
testing for lead-lag relationships and points out the
deficiencies with such an approach. A new and
alternative framework and method for addressing the
question of lead-lag relationships is proposed in
section four. This framework demonstrates that the
issue to be examined is one of whether equity markets
function effectively. In section five, we link this
framework to the issue of market efficiency,
suggesting that tests of efficiency should be
conducted in the framework of effectively functioning
equity markets. In section six, we focus our
attention on the behaviour of mispricing, using the
framework proposed in this chapter to argue that it is
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a path independent, stationary, mean reverting
stochastic process. Section seven concludes.
2.2. THE NATURE OF LEAD-LAG RELATIONSHIPS
The argument that underlies the analysis of lead-lag
relationships between indices and index futures is
predicated on the observation that this relationship
is indicative first of how well integrated the markets
are and second of how quickly the markets reflect the
arrival of new (and relevant) information relative to
each _other. If markets were perfect and investors
fully rational with costless and equal access to the
same information set then as Zeckhauser and
Niederhoffer (1983) point out, it is not unreasonable
to assume that stock index futures prices would carry
no predictive information and would therefore have no
role to play. 2
 However, the existence of transactions
costs and other imperfections ensure that stock index
futures do have a role to play because in this
situation, they will convey relevant information about
future movements in the stock index.
There are several reasons as to why this may be the
2 The argument here is that if markets were
perfect and investors fully rational then because
markets would be frictionless, the spot price would
contain all the relevant information and investors
could buy and sell whole portfolios given the absence
of transactions costs.
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case. One intuitive reason is similar to Black's
(1975) analogy concerning the role of option contracts
in the provision of relevant information for the
underlying asset. Futures markets are very liquid
with relatively low transactions costs. Moreover,
investing in a futures contract requires no capital
outlay since the margin can be posted in the form of
interest-bearing securities and as such there is no
opportunity cost. Thus, suppose an investor acquires
new information on the health of the economy, say,
that is worth acting upon. The investor has to decide
whether to purchase stocks or a stock index futures
contract. Purchase of the stocks requires a
substantial amount of capital, a substantial amount of
time and relatively substantial transactions costs.
Purchase of the index futures contract, on the other
hand, can be affected immediately with little up-front
cash. Therefore, if the investor is willing to trade
in futures, the futures transaction is the one to
choose. The information will be incorporated in the
futures price, driving it upwards. This will widen
the differential between the futures and spot price
which in turn will attract arbitrageurs.	 Since
arbitrageurs trade simultaneously in cash and futures
markets the information will be transmitted from the
futures to the cash market. Thus, the futures price
will lead the cash price__
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Other reasons as to why the futures will lead the cash
stem from institutional arrangements such as short-
sale restrictions that are present in the cash market
but not in the futures market. In this setting,
Diamond and Verrechia (1987) demonstrate that prices
will be slower to adjust especially to bad news if
traders who have private information are not allowed
to short the security/securities. Such constraints
are not present in the futures market, hence traders
can short the futures contract. This will drive the
futures price down, narrowing the differential between
spot . and futures prices and again attracting
arbitrageurs. The futures price will thus lead the
cash price. The relationship will, of course, not be
as one-sided as it appears from the above discussion.
A stock index futures price will tend to react to
economy-wide information3 as opposed to security-
specific information. Thus, information concerning a
specific security or group of securities may cause the
cash market to lead the futures market, such that a
(potentially complex) feedback relationship exists.
This recognition that the futures price should lead
3 This actually serves to enhance the
justification for the existence of stock index
futures, especially given the increasing body of
evidence that macroeconomic variables can help predict
stock market returns, violating market efficiency. If
the stock index futures price reacts first to new
information contained in these variables then this can
only help improve the efficiency of the underlying
stock market.
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the stock price has formed the basis of a great deal
of empirical work geared to testing this very
proposition (see for example Kawaller, Koch and Koch
(1987), Stoll and Whaley (1990) and Chan (1992)).
However, as we shall see, these studies are flawed and
the results that they generate are potentially
misleading.
2 . 3 .	 TESTING LEAD-LAG RELATIONSHIPS : THE
'TRADITIONAL' APPROACH.
Typically, tests of lead-lag relationships in the
extant literature are similar in spirit to Granger-
Sims-type causality tests (see Granger (1969) and Sims
(1972)). The model that is usually estimated is of
the following form
1=+k
AS = cco + a 1 E A Ft _ t +
	 (2.1)
1 = -k
where AS is the change in the spot price, AFt is the
change in the futures price and u t is the usual white
noise error term. Tests of the lead-lag relationship
then consist of testing the significance of the lag
and lead coefficients on the futures prices. If the
lags are significant and the leads are zero, the
futures leads the spot. If the opposite is true then
the spot leads the futures. If some of both the lead
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and lag coefficients are statistically non-zero, then
a feedback relationship exists.
There are, however, two important and inter-related
criticisms that can be addressed to the 'traditional'
method of testing lead-lag relationships. One is
concerned with the estimation of, and inference about,
models such as (2.1) and the second is concerned with
the specification of such models. To formalise
matters, first note that whilst theory models suggest
that an asymmetric feedback relationship is likely to
exist, they give little guidance about the nature and
form this asymmetry takes. Thus, models such as (2.1)
are inevitably statistical models within which what
effectively amounts to Granger-Sims causality tests
are undertaken. The method of estimation in this
context becomes vitally important if valid inference
is to be sustained. This is one of the criticisms
that can be levelled at Stoll and Whaley (1990) who
estimate (2.1) by Ordinary Least Squares, immediately
casting doubt on their results. To see why this is
the case, consider the following, very general, data
generation process (DGP) describing the joint density
of all variables 4 (see, inter alia, Hendry and Richard
4 This approach to econometric modelling has come
to be known as the LSE approach following the work of
Sargan and its formalisation and extension primarily
by Hendry (see, for example, Hendry and Richard
(1983)). For a very readable exposition of this
approach, see Gilbert (1986).
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(1982, 1983) and Hendry, Pagan and Sargan (1984))
T
11 D (X tlXt_i;e)
	
(2.2)
t=1
where x, is a vector of observations on all variables
in period t, X,1 . (x1,x2,...,x)' and 0 is a vector
of unknown parameters. This density function is far
too general to be useful. However, the vector x can
be partitioned into those variables of interest and
those of no interest. We then have (Ericsson (1992))
D (x, I Xt_i ; 0) = D1 (y, I Irt_1, Zt ; 1 1 )D2 (ze 1 Zt_1, 1C_1 ;12)
	 (2.3)
where D 1 is the density function of those variables of
interest that are selected as endogenous, y„ which are
conditioned on lagged y and current and lagged values
of the exogenous variables, Z. D I , then, represents
the conditional model. D2 is the density function of
those variables of interest that are deemed to be (at
least weakly) exogenous, z, (the marginal model).
The crucial issue now with regard to estimation is the
partitioning of density function of the DGP with
respect to the conditional density for Yt and a
marginal density for the exogenous variables. Define
X . (A1,2t,;)" in (2.3) as the parameters of the
conditional and marginal models and ALI and AL2 as the
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parameter spaces for X i and 21/2. For the conditioning
assumptions (that is, conditioning y, on current and
lagged values of Z,) to be valid, and for efficient
estimation and inference using OLS, we require that
the variables Z, be weakly exogenous for the endogenous
variables of interest. For weak exogeneity, we
require a sequential cut such that parameter space A
is the product of AI and AL, and X E A1 x A2 .	 In
addition, we require that the parameters of interest
are a function of Xi alone. For the purpose of
inference, if Z, is weakly exogenous for the parameters
of interest then the marginal model for Z, does not
need to be estimated since it contains no information
relevant to the estimation of the conditional model
for Irt•	 This is what is required for Stoll and
Whaley's	 (1990) results to be valid, for by
implication they have AS, being equivalent to Yt and
AF, being equivalent to Zr. However, it is well
recognised in the literature that spot and futures
prices are simultaneously determine& and therefore,
in principle, weak exogeneity does not hold, though it
is testable.
It is also illuminating to consider the role of
5 This is especially recognised in the literature
on hedging (see, for example, Stein (1961) and
Anderson and Danthine (1981)). Garbade and Silber
(1983) also consider the simultaneity of spot and
futures prices in their model of price dynamics. We
will return to this point later.
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Granger non-causality in this context. Granger non-
causality is related to marginalisation as opposed to
conditioning in so far as, in the context of
marginalising the DGP, Granger non-causality relates
to strong exogeneity, whereby strong exogeneity is
weak exogeneity plus Granger non-causality of Y, 1 for
zt . Strong exogeneity is necessary if we wish to make
valid forecasts of y using the conditional model,
given forecasts of Z from the marginal model.
Moreover, in this context Granger causality tests are
only meaningful if we have weak exogeneity. Thus, as
far as the results of Stoll and Whaley (1990) are
concerned, they must be viewed as suspect.
It is possible to argue that the approach adopted by
Chan (1992) overcomes this problem since he estimates
(2.1) using Hansen's (1982) Generalised Method of
Moments (GMM), thereby allowing for simultaneity.
However, it is illuminating to consider Chan's (1992)
reasons for using GMM : it is to correct for serial
correlation and heteroscedasticity in order to provide
consistent standard errors for the purposes of
inference. This suggests that whilst, indirectly,
Chan (1992) goes some way to recognising the
simultaneity problem, the need for valid conditioning
is completely ignored, hence the need to 'correct'
serial correlation, whichin itself is suspect given
that it most likely arises not because it is genuine
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but because the dynamics of the model are
misspecified. The model estimated also imposes common
unit restrictions (which are not tested) and which may
therefore be invalid (see Hendry and Mizon (1978)).
This leads to the second concern regarding the
specification of models such as (2.1).
As far as the specification argument is concerned,
leaving the issue of exogeneity to one side for a
moment, (2.1) is incorrectly specified. This arises
through invalid conditioning, primarily through the
exclusion of, when the system is written out in full,
AS, i and AFt _ i , ±=1.. .k, without these zero restrictions
being tested (see equation (2.16) and the discussion
that follows it). This essentially forces the spot
and futures prices individually to be well
approximated by martingale sequences which, a priori,'
may or may not be true. The fact that one may draw on
arguments of weak form efficiency do not in themselves
stand up unless weak form efficiency, which is a
testable proposition in itself, is verified. There
is, however, no a priori empirical reason why markets
should be weakly efficient all of the time.
6 Such an exclusion would probably be defended on
the grounds of market efficiency. However, such a
defence is dubious when intra-day data is employed,
especially when the autocorrelation properties of the
spot series reported in some of the above-mentioned
studies tend to support the data following an AR(p)
process rather than being white noise.
87
Perhaps more important here, however, is the nature of
the interaction between spot and futures markets and
the effect this has on the specification of models
such as (2.1). The reason for such specification
problems stems from the fact that in considering the
pricing relationship between stock index futures
markets and the underlying stock market, two quite
distinct and seemingly independent strands have
emerged in the literature : those studies that analyse
mispricing by comparing the actual futures price with
its fair, or theoretically correct, value to determine
whether profitable arbitrage opportunities are
available (see inter a/ia MacKinlay and Ramaswamy
(1988), Yadav and Pope (1990) and Chung (1991)) and
those that analyse the lead-lag relationship between
the two markets (Kawaller, Koch and Koch (1987),
Harris (1989) and Stoll and Whaley (1990)). Most
studies tend to focus on either the former or the
latter issue, but not both.
This is where the specification problems arise for
rather than being apparently independent areas of
investigation, the former, that is, mispricing,
provides some valuable insights into the likely
behaviour of lead-lag relationships and indicates
that, in addition to those points mentioned above,
results from studies of the lead-lag relationship must
be viewed with some caution. To demonstrate, consider
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two commonly used and well known theoretical models
showing the relationship between the stock index
futures price and the underlying stock index
portfolio. First, we have (see Cornell and French
(1983a,b))
F t* = te r(T-t) _ E D ke r(T-k)	 (2.4)
k=t +1 
where F,T is the fair or, equivalently, the
theoretically correct stock index futures price quoted
at time t for delivery at time T, St is the value of
the underlying stock index (spot portfolio), r is a
riskless interest rate of approximately the same
duration as the time to expiration of the futures
contract and D is the daily dividend inflow from the
portfolio until maturity of the stock index futures
contract. Alternatively, we can consider the
following model (MacKinlay and Ramaswamy (1988))
F t*T = ste(r-d)(T-t)	 (2.5)
where F T and St are defined as above, r is the
risk—free rate of interest, d is the yield on
dividends from the underlying portfolio and (T-t) is
the time to maturity of the futures contract. The
expression (r—d)(T—t) is generally referred to as the
cost of carrying the spot portfolio until maturity.
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Now, studies that analyse mispricing and the existence
of arbitrage opportunities typically compare the
differential between the actual futures price quoted
at time t for delivery at time T, F t,T , with the fair
futures price, FT.
However, it is straightforward to demonstrate the role
of the simple basis' in this analysis. For ease of
exposition, we will work with (2.5), though similar
arguments follow for (2.4). The theoretical basis,
Ft,T	 FT., is compared with transactions costs to
determine if arbitrage opportunities are present.' If
the theoretical basis falls outside of the no
arbitrage window determined by transactions costs then
dependent on whether the futures contract is
undervalued (overvalued) due to, say, bearish
(bullish) speculation in the stock index futures
market, arbitrageurs will buy (sell) futures and sell
(buy) stocks. It is clear that the theoretical basis
is very important in the pricing relationship given
that index arbitrage links the two markets and the
theoretical basis determines whether arbitrage
7 One must be careful in talking about the basis
for there are several definitions. Where there may be
confusion, we will refer to the futures to cash price
differential as the simple basis. When there is no
risk of confusion, we will refer to it as the basis.
The futures to fair price differential will be
referred to as the theoretical basis.
8 Note that since the yield on dividends is
typically less than the yield on the riskless asset,
the basis should theoretically be positive.
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opportunities are available.
To see the importance of the basis itself in the
pricing relationship, take natural logs of (2.5)
(lower case letters denote variables in natural
logarithms)
ft:r = St (r -d)(T -t)
	 (2.6)
Clearly, if the futures market is pricing the stock
index futures contract correctly then we have that
AT -AT* = 0
	 (2.7)
Now, to see the importance of the basis in the pricing
relationship, substitute (2.6) into (2.7) and
rearrange to obtain
ft, - st = (r-d)(T-t)
	 (2.8)
It is clear from (2.8) that the simple basis also has
an important role to play in the arbitrage process.
It is also apparent that upon expiration (t.T), the
basis will equal zero whilst with non—expiration it
will, theoretically, equal the cost of carry, though
if the contract is near to maturity carrying costs
become trivial.	 From a theoretical viewpoint, the
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basis is crucial given that arbitrage provides an
important link between the two markets. From an
econometric point of view, the basis also has the
rather appealing interpretation as the error
correction mechanism which prevents prices in the two
markets drifting apart without bound. The importance
of the basis cannot be understated, for as Harris
(1989, p.77) points out,
'The (simple) basis is studied because it is
a key determinant of whether arbitrage
opportunities exist, because variance in the
basis is a measure of how well integrated
the markets are, and because the basis is
telated to tests for causality among the
prices in the two markets.'
The problems with the specification of (2.1) can now
be made clear and can be redressed.
2 . 4 .	 FORMULATING TESTS OF THE LEAD-LAG
RELATIONSHIP AND THE ISSUE OF EFFECTIVELY
FUNCTIONING MARKETS
To recap the problems mentioned earlier, the results
from extant tests must be viewed with extreme caution
given the problems of invalid conditioning and in some
cases (implicit) invalid (and untested) exogeneity
assertions. To combat these problems, it is important
to note that, essentially, (2.1) is a VAR (Vector
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AutoRegression). If (2.1) is treated as a VAR, then
any empirical model of lead-lag relationships must be
viewed as a system. Treating (2.1) as a VAR has
important implications for the marginalisation of the
DGP, for now we require any non-modelled variables to
be strongly-exogenous. However, in analysing lead-lag
relationships, the variables under consideration are
the stock index futures price and the value of the
stock index, which are both jointly determined. Thus,
there are no exogenous variables and as such the DGP
becomes
D(xtlIft_i; 0) = D(y e l Yt_i ; 0)	 (2.9)
where Ir't
 [f:s;]. Clearly, if there are no exogenous
variables then, in conjunction with the conditioning
assumptions, the system will be closed and it will
have a VAR representation. Any tests of lead-lag
relationships must then be undertaken within the VAR
framework.
Within the VAR framework, tests of the lead-lag
relationship then become ones of testing zero
restrictions on the VAR in order to arrive at a
parsimonious representation of the VAR. As proposed
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4111,4,,
by Hendry and Mizon (1990), 9 only once a parsimonious
parameterisation of the VAR has been achieved can
structural models be considered and any valid
structural model should encompass the VAR, the
encompassing test being a test for the validity of the
overidentifying restrictions (Hendry and Mizon
(1990)).
Consider the following closed system where yt is an Nxl
vector of endogenous time series variables
Yr	 + lige-1 112Yr-2 + HP yt-P + ut	
(2.10)
where the ni are NxN coefficient matrices, g is a
vector of deterministic components (e.g. deterministic
constants) with ut being random disturbances with mean
zero and variance-covariance matrix X. Using lag
operator notation, we can rewrite (2.10) as
II(L)y = it + ut	 (2.11)
where (L) is the lag operator and n is a p-th order
matrix polynomial with no = IN , an NxN identity matrix.
9 See also Mizon and Clements (1991) and Clements
(1991). Monfort and Rabemananjara (1990) discuss
similar proposals for VAR models in stationary
variables.
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Consider traditional tests of lead-lag relationships.
These are conducted in the context of variables in
first differences and thus we have
A(L)A yt
 = IL + u:
	
(2.12)
where A is the first difference operator. It can be
clearly seen that (2.12) is equivalent to the
'non-structural' formulation of lead-lag tests. First
differences are often used because the series are
stationary and, conveniently, log first differences
gives, the variables in returns form. However,
consider the following definitions provided by Engle
and Granger (1987, pp.83-84)
i) 'A series with no deterministic component
which has a stationary, invertible ARMA
representation after differencing d times is
said to be integrated of order d, denoted
y-I(d) .10
ii) The components of the vector y, are said to
be cointegrated of order d,b, denoted
y,-CI(d,b), if (i) all components of y, are
I(d); (ii) there exists a vector a (#0) so
that z, = Wyt-I(d-b), b>0. The vector a is
called the cointegrating vector.'
" That is, for some p and q y, will belong to the
ARIMA (p,d,q) class of models proposed by Box and
Jenkins (1970).
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Clearly, definition i) provides us with (2.12), the
'quasi-unrestricted' n
 model used in the 'traditional'
tests of lead-lag relationships discussed above.
However, 'traditional' tests ignore the second
definition and it is this, in conjunction with invalid
conditioning, that leads to specification problems.
An important case with respect to cointegration is
when d=b=l. When d=b=1, then from the Granger
Representation Theorem (Engle and Granger (1987)) if
both definitions i) and ii) hold there exists an error
correction representation of the VAR, given the
natural isomorphism between cointegration and error
correction models. Now, if both the spot and the
futures prices are nonstationary, or I (1) in the
terminology of Engle and Granger (1987), then their
first differences will be I(0), that is, stationary.
However, from definition ii), it is possible that spot
and futures prices cointegrate, that is, a linear
combination of the two I(1) series will be I(0). In
fact, from the mispricing literature we know that the
cointegrating vector a should equal 1, that is, the
basis should be the error correction mechanism.
n We refer to the model in first differences as
the quasi-unrestricted model for such a model still
imposes common unit restrictions. We use the term
quasi-unrestricted to denote the fact that zero
restrictions on the coefficients of lagged dependent
variables are not imposed.
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The implication of this is clear : models such as
(2.1) or (2.12) will be misspecified unless there is
no cointegration or the error correction term is
insignificant in all equations. Estimation of the VAR
in first differences without taking into account the
information provided by theory about the long-run
equilibrium between the two markets will be
misspecified and hence any test of lead-lag
relationships through the testing of zero restrictions
will be invalid, as will any use of the VMA (Vector
Moving Average) representation of (2.12) to analyse
impulse response functions. Thus, rather than using
(2.12), (2.11) should be reparameterised in error
correction form as (Johansen (1988) and Johansen and
Juselius (1990))
where the lagged levels term yt _k represents the short-
run equilibrium error, or deviations from the long-
run equilibrium, and of which at least one element
must be non-zero. The information about the impact of
the equilibrium error is provided by Johansen
(1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) factor the
long-run response matrix into n alP where IP is the
matrix of cointegrating coefficients such that
13'yt_k-I(0) and a is the matrix of adjustment
coefficients.	 Note that the matrix n will have
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reduced rank if any of the variables in the vector y
are cointegrated and this forms the basis of the test
for cointegration proposed by Johansen (1988). If we
denote rank(fl) by r, there are three possibilities.
First, r=0 in which case all of the variables are I(1)
and there are no cointegrating vectors. Second, r.N
in which case all of the variables are 1(0) and there
are N cointegrating vectors since any linear
combination of stationary variables is in itself
stationary. Finally, 0<r<N in which case there will
be r linear combinations of the nonstationary
variables that are stationary. Equivalently, there
will be N-r common stochastic trends (Stock and Watson
(1986)).
That the issue of cointegration is ignored might seem
surprising. However, as already mentioned the issues
of mispricing and lead-lag relationships are
incorrectly analysed independently of each other.
Nowhere is this more clear than the frequently-used
model of simultaneous cash-futures price dynamics
proposed by Garbade and Silber (1983). This model
typically provides the foundation for analysing which
market dominates the other and how mispricing behaves
(see for example Yadav and Pope (1990)). Garbade and
Silber's (1983) final estimable model is given by
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Ill - 1 a(411 + r -411)	 an	 {41 ÷ fait- (1 - 4 12) sr-1	 142]20 (2.14)
where f t is the log of the futures price, s t is the log
of the spot price and the u it are random error terms.12
Rewriting this model with the restrictions imposed
yields
{
Aftl = [ awl ra ni [ft-i -s,d [tilt
A st 	 a20	 ft21	 U2r
(2.15)
(2.15) is nothing more than a restricted VAR(1), the
restriction being long-run homogeneity in both
equations of the system. Clearly, this (modified)
model shows explicitly the intimate ties between
mispricing and the pricing relationship between the
two markets, although this connection has been ignored
in the extant literature. Making use of the VAR, we
can also see a further problem with the traditional
approach to testing lead-lag relationships. Consider
the following typical 'structural' models that are
estimated, viz. (2.1), with k set equal to 1 for ease
Garbade and Silber (1983) actually derive a
model for the relationship between the fair futures
price and the spot price. However, the discussion in
section 2.1.1 shows that the interesting relationship
is the one between the actual futures price and the
spot price.
99
of exposition
A ft = au) ± a n A st	 + n A st_l /sitanAft-i a
As = a20 + an Aft + an A ft-i + a23 A st_l 112t
(2.16)
When equation (2.1) is written out in full as a
system, it becomes clear that in addition to the
specification problems already discussed, particularly
the omission of any cointegrating vectors, the models
used are not identified since the equations differ
only by normalisation and as such cannot be
distinguished. Seen in this light, the results in
Chan (1992), who indirectly recognises simultaneity,
must be viewed as suspect. If we solve the equations
in (2.16) for their respective reduced forms then we
obtain the following estimable just-identified
representation of the system
A f	 + il A	+	 +	 (2.17)
A st = 120 + 121A ft-1 + y 22 A st_1 v2t
where
a l° + a ll a20
Ym 
1 - a ll a21
_  
a20 +a21 a 10
Ym
1 - a21 a ll
a 12 +a 11 a22
Yn 1-a11
 a21
a 22 + an an
Y21 - 1 - a21 a ll
a n + an a23
112 1-a
H an
Ym 
a23 + a21 a 13 
1 -a21 a ll
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Estimation of models of the lead-lag relationship by
OLS, as in Stoll and Whaley (1990) is only justifiable
in the context of (2.17), unless there is weak
exogeneity. However, (2.17) is equivalent to a VAR in
first differences and as such is subject to exactly
the same critique discussed earlier, that is, the
misspecification problems generated by the omission of
any cointegrating vectors.
It is also useful to consider the role of Sims' (1972)
interpretation of Granger causality tests in this
context as tests for exogeneity, required if
interpretations of 'structural' models such as (2.1)
or (2.16) are too have any meaning (cf. the results of
Stoll and Whaley (1990)). Cooley and LeRoy (1985)
point out that Granger causality tests cannot be
interpreted as tests of exogeneity or
predeterminedness in the usual sense of systems of
equations and as such any defence of models such as
(2.1) or (2.16) on these grounds are invalid. 	 The
argument is as follows. For the futures price to be
strictly exogenous, say, in (2.16) we require that
a11=a13= 0 whereas if a13#0, the futures price is
predetermined. In the context of the reduced form
(2.17) Granger non-causality requires 1 12.0. From the
definition of len above, y12=0 implies that an+a a isn n is
zero.	 However, it is obvious that it does not
automatically follow just because yn is zero that
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an=an=0, or even a=0. 	 Thus, assertions about
exogeneity in the traditional sense cannot be
sustained from tests of Granger non-causality. Again,
in this context it would appear that Granger non-
causality is only relevant in testing strong
exogeneity which, as mentioned earlier, is relevant
not so much to conditioning but to marginalising the
DGP.
Consider again the VAR model proposed by Garbade and
Silber (1983)."	 Suppose that, for the sake of
argument, we accept Granger causality tests as valid
tests of lead-lag relationships. How are the
conclusions of these tests affected by Garbade and
Silber's (1983) model? The answer is the conclusion
that the stock index futures market leads the spot
market is unwarranted and invalid. The reason for
this stems from the fact that the restricted version
of Garbade and Silber's (1983) model requires
cointegration and requires the cointegrating vector to
be the basis. Now in this model, the basis is
important in both the futures and spot equation. As
such, even if the lagged changes in spot and futures
prices are zero in both equations (as in the
'standard' test for lead-lag relationships), there
" Note that Garbade and Silber (1983) do not
interpret their model as a VAR and do not estimate it
as one in their empirical study.
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must be Granger causality from the futures to spot and
spot to futures, that is, feedback must be present
within the system. In this context, both markets
would appear to lead each other. In fact, a more
reasonable interpretation of this apparent feedback is
Campbell and Shiller's (1988) argument that
cointegration arises not so much because there is true
causality between two variables but because one is a
good forecast of the other. In this case, then, we
have the fact that the futures and spot prices are
good contemporaneous forecasts of each other, a not
unreasonable proposition since on the one hand one is
a derivative of the other yet on the other one reacts
to information quicker than the other.
One final point that can be considered is the notion
that once we analyse lead-lag relationships and
mispricing as interdependent issues, then conceptually
issues of lead-lag relationships and mispricing
effectively become the single issue of whether or not
equity markets can be said to function effectively.
To demonstrate the argument, let us write the reduced
form VAR system (2.15) in more conventional notation
as
Y = XB + e
	 (2.18)
Since (2.18) is a VAR, it can be estimated by OLS and
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the system estimator is given by
= 0 (xly'x' 1r
	
(2.19)
From the discussion earlier we know that upon
expiration of the futures contract, the futures price
will equal the spot price and thus, by implication and
through the nature of short-run deviations from the
long-run equilibrium, the spot and futures prices will
converge upon each other as expiration approaches.
The implication of this is that as (T-t) 0, so X -*
Y and the estimator for B becomes
= 0 (111 -1 1r/ jY - A =1	 (2.20)
Substituting into (2.18) we have that
Y=X+e	 Y=Y since lirnX=Y and e= 0 (2.21)
t-T
such that the two series become indistinguishable and
we have an identification problem, which follows
somewhat trivially from the long-run equilibrium.
However, what is not trivial is the fact that if
(2.15) is the correct model regardless of the time to
expiration then the system cannot be identified.
Thus, once we treat lead-lag relationships and
mispricing as interdependent, non-identification of
the system becomes indicative of effectively
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functioning	 equity markets	 since with non-
identification the two series are indistinguishable.
To summarise thus far, ignoring the insights that can
be gained from the mispricing literature when
conducting tests of lead-lag relationships can be
disastrous given the misspecification problems that
arise. In addition, failure to treat the models used
as a system can generate invalid results since the
models typically used are not identified. Estimating
such models by GMM or instrumental variables does not
overcome the problem and estimation of the
'structural' models by OLS yields biased and
inconsistent estimates through invalid (and untested)
exogeneity assumptions.
Considering the two strands of the literature in
unison provides a whole new conceptual outlook on the
problem. From the mispricing literature, we have that
the long-run equilibrium between stock index futures
prices and the value of the underlying stock index is
a homogeneous one such that short-run deviations from
this equilibrium are given by the basis. This result
is reinforced by the reduced form VAR model of Garbade
and Silber (1983).
Taken together, these models imply that the system
relating the spot and futures prices is not identified
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and as such, the two markets are indistinguishable.
If this is the case then equity markets can be said to
function effectively. Moreover, analysing the issue
of effectively functioning equity markets in this
framework allows us to be more specific about what we
mean by effectively functioning. It is possible to
categorise two forms of effectively functioning
financial markets those that are strongly
effectively functioning and those that are weakly
effectively functioning. Obviously, if markets are
neither of these then they are said to be
ineffectively functioning. 	 We will deal with the
conditions for these classifications in turn below."
a) Strongly Effectively Functioning
For the functioning of spot and futures markets to be
classified as being strongly effective we require
three conditions to hold
i) the price series cointegrate, with the
cointegrating vector being the basis. In
other words, the homogeneity restriction
must hold.
" We discuss these conditions in the context of
the model of the pricing relationship between stock
index futures prices and the underlying stock index
price. These conditions can obviously be readily
generalised for a system comprising more than two
equations.
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ii) the system cannot be identified from the
reduced form.
iii) the reduced form is stable such that the
pricing relationship does not change over
time.
If these conditions hold then prices in the two
markets will be indistinguishable and they will both
depend only upon the same common factor which is the
basis, or equivalently the degree of mispricing, so
important in the arbitrage process.
Taken'individually, these conditions are necessary but
not sufficient to ensure that markets are strongly
effectively functioning. However, if we take all of
the conditions together, then they are both necessary
and sufficient to ensure that markets are strongly
effective in their functioning.
b) Weakly Effectively Functioning
For the functioning of spot and futures markets to be
classified as being weakly effective, then we require
conditions i) and iii) from the definition of strongly
effective functioning to hold. However, condition ii)
is relaxed somewhat in the case of weakly effectively
functioning markets. Specifically, if some, but not
all, of the equations in the system can be identified
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markets are said to be weakly effectively functioning.
Again, taken individually these conditions are
necessary but not sufficient to ensure weak
effectiveness. Taken together, they are both
necessary and sufficient for markets to be weakly
effectively functioning. In addition, if markets are
only weakly effectively functioning, we can obtain
some indication as to which market regulation (in
whatever guise) should be aimed at.
If markets are neither strongly nor weakly effectively
functioning then they must be ineffectively
functioning. If they are ineffectively functioning
then it is important that the source of the
ineffectiveness be pinpointed or, if it cannot be
pinpointed exactly, it must be possible at least to
obtain an indication of what is causing the
ineffectiveness. This is possible within this
framework.
Specifically, if conditions ii) and iii) for strong
effectiveness hold but there is either no
cointegration or the cointegrating vector is not the
basis then this is suggestive of the fact that markets
are ineffectively functioning because arbitrage is not
functioning effectively. Thus, regulation (reform) of
trading systems may be in_order.
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If the first and third conditions for strong
effectiveness hold but the system can be identified,
then markets are ineffectively functioning because
prices do not incorporate all the available
information. Again, one reason may be frictions in
the trading system.
If the first and second conditions for strong
effectiveness hold but there is instability in the
system the pricing relationship could change over
time, which would be indicative of ineffectively
functioning financial markets. Again, this
information can be used for pinpointing the nature of
the ineffectiveness. For example, if the instability
occurs because of a specific incident and persists
after this incident, the source of the instability can
be pinpointed.
Being able to classify markets in this way, then,
allows any necessary regulation to be targeted at the
correct market. For example, it would be possible in
principle to appraise Kleidon and Whaley's (1992)
argument that the source of the October 1987 market
breakdown in the US was the stock market.
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2.5.
	
THE LINK BETWEEN EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING
AND MARKET EFFICIENCY
A further advantage of analysing effective functioning
of financial markets, as opposed to analysing lead-lag
relationships and mispricing separately, is that, with
a slight modification of the interpretation of the
results, it is possible to use exactly the. same
framework to test the efficiency of both markets
jointly. Thus, effective functioning in some sense
becomes synonymous with market efficiency. In this
section, we will reinterpret the approach in the light
of market efficiency and provide conditions for which
the system exhibits market efficiency similar, but not
quite as restrictive, to those provided for
determining whether financial markets are effectively
functioning. Before doing this, however, there is a
point to note about the definition of efficiency we
use here. The definition of efficiency we use is
different to those definitions in Fama (1970). We use
the definition discussed by Dwyer and Wallace (1990),
which is the definition that underlies the discussion
of exchange rate market efficiency in Levich (1985)
and from an economic viewpoint is more interesting.
A market is said to be efficient if there are no
profit opportunities available which will increase
agent's expected utility. As Dwyer and Wallace (1990,
p.2) note,
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'...it is hard to see how a market with no
expected-utility increasing profit opportunities
available to agents based on expected-utility
maximising acquisition of information could be
characterised as inefficient in any interesting
sense of the word.'
In the context of tests of the efficiency of spot
markets that have derivative instruments traded upon
them, the emphasis has predominantly been on the
relationship between spot and forward prices. In
particular, the methodology usually employed is to
test whether the forward price is an optimal predictor
of the future spot price, or whether it is biased and
there'is a (possibly time-varying) risk premium. This
hypothesis has been tested in the context of exchange
rates by, inter alia, Geweke and Feige (1979), Hansen
and Hodrick (1980), Baillie, Lippens and McMahon
(1983), Fama (1984), Domowitz and Hakkio (1985) and
Hakkio and Rush (1989), for the London Metal Exchange
by MacDonald and Taylor (1988, 1989) and for commodity
spot and futures markets by Antoniou and Foster
(1991).
The general approach underlying these tests is based
on the notion that under rational expectations, with
agent risk neutrality and the absence of profitable
arbitrage opportunities, we must have that
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E ( St+, I	
= Ft,t+n
	 (2.22)
where St  is the spot price at time t+n, F t,t+ , is the
forward/futures price quoted at time at time t for
delivery at time t+n, 4 is the information set as of
time t and E(.) is the mathematical expectations
operator. Rational expectations further implies that
St+, = E (St+, I ( r) + t+n where E (e t+,I Or) = 0 (2.23)
where e t .m is a zero mean, MA(n-1) error which is
independent of the information set. Substituting
(2.22) into (2.23) we have that
St+, = Ft,t+, + t+,	 (2.24)
Equation (2.24) states that the forward/futures price
quoted at time t for delivery at t+n is an unbiased
predictor of the spot price at time t+n. Further, et+n
can now be interpreted as the forecast error. In
testable form, (2.24) is
= 13 Ft,t+n + t+n
	 (2.25)
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where for efficiency we require that 0=1.
Tests of efficiency based on the forward/futures price
being an optimal predictor of the future spot price
have yielded mixed results. Tests based on (2.25)
tend to accept the restriction and conclude that the
forward/futures price is indeed an unbiased predictor
of the future spot price. Other studies have
formulated the model to be tested as (as before, lower
case letters denote variables in natural logarithms)
A sr.. = a + p (f -s) + e t+n	 (2.26)
and have rejected the restrictions a=0, p=1 such that
the forward rate is a biased predictor and there is a
risk premium (a#0). 15 	 The problem with this
Is More recent studies (Domowitz and Hakkio (1985)
for example) have tested for a time varying risk
premium using the ARCH-M(q) formulation discussed in
Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987), its generalisation to
a GARCH-M(p,q) model (Bollerslev, Engle and Wooldridge
(1988)) or the multivariate GARCH-M model (Baillie and
Bollerslev (1990)). In this formulation, the
intercept term in (2.26) is modified to allow the
conditional variance of the residuals to directly
affect the mean, that is,
a = 00 + 0 1 ht+1
q	 P2	 2	 2
where ht+i = a l) + E a i e i., 4- E 13 iht_i+i
1=1
For more details on ARCH models, see chapter 5 and the
review in either Engle and Bollerslev (1986) or
Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992).
113
conflicting evidence is the approach adopted. Tests
based on (2.25) will find it hard to reject 13=1 first
because the two prices will track each other closely
and second, the model is capturing not the true
relationship between the two prices but the fact that
they both follow very similar trends. This second
point is very damaging to tests based on (2.25)
because the data are nonstationary and it is well
known that in this situation (nonstationarity),
standard inference procedures are invalid. Rejections
based on (2.26) have been attributed by some authors
(for example, Hakkio (1981)) to misspecification of
the model. Hakkio and Rush (1989) propose a framework
within which this dilemma can be resolved.
First, given the well-documented evidence that spot
and	 forward/futures
	
prices
	 are	 stochastic
nonstationary (see inter a/ia Baillie and Bollerslev
(1989) and Antoniou and Foster (1991)) (2.25) can be
viewed as a cointegrating regression. Thus, a first
step is to test for cointegration, or equivalently
test for a unit root in (st.., 	 In this
instance, cointegration (with p=1) is necessary for
efficiency. As Dwyer and Wallace (1990) point out,
studies that find that (s t.,,, ft,t+n) is the
cointegrating vector (for example, Baillie and
Bollerslev (1989)) are wrong to conclude that
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cointegration is evidence of inefficiency.	 Non-
cointegration is evidence of inefficiency.
Cointegration, with the forecast error being the
cointegrating vector, however, is not sufficient to
ensure efficiency. A second step must be used and
this is to test for efficiency in the reduced form
error correction model that follows given
cointegration. Specifically, setting n equal to one
for ease of exposition, estimate
(2.27)A	 = a ft,t+i + p (s - 13f.• -x-i,t+i ) 	Et+1
and test the joint hypothesis that H 0 :-p=a=13.1. If
16 The temptation to conclude that cointegration
implies inefficiency, as Baillie and Bollerslev (1989)
do, stems from the apparently contradictory
observation by Granger (1986) that first, there should
be no cointegration between two speculative markets if
they are efficient and second, markets in which prices
move closely together, such as spot and futures
markets, should cointegrate. Baillie and Bollerslev
(1989) appear to be treating spot and forward foreign
exchange markets as separate speculative markets since
they argue that prices can be predicted from the error
correction term. This is incorrect. For example, we
have already seen that if spot and futures markets are
functioning effectively, they are indistinguishable,
that is, they function as one market. If they are
functioning as one market, then cointegration must
imply efficiency. The way to think of this is that if
the forward or futures price is an optimal predictor
of the spot price, then the forward market now
reflects the spot market in n periods time.
Therefore, they are essentially the same market and in
essence one is testing the efficiency of one market at
two different points in time. Thus, Granger's (1986)
observation is not contradictory.
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this is valid, then (2.27) collapses to (2.25) and we
have market efficiency. Moreover, test statistics
from (2.27) are powerful because standard inference
applies.
This principle is equally applicable to the stock and
stock index futures markets, although it does need
modification. In fact, with the modification the
conditions for efficiency are in some senses less
stringent. Recall from theory that the stock index
futures market will be efficiently pricing contracts
if the actual stock index futures price is equal to
ft*a. = St + ( r -d)(T-t)
	
(2.28)
The long-run equilibrium from this is simply f=s,
implying the restriction 0.1 in ft = Ps t + E t . This
can be tested by checking for the presence of a unit
root in (ft -s), the null hypothesis of a unit root
being rejected if the restriction is valid. The
system reduced form error correction model that
follows on naturally from this is already familiar to
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(2.29)
A st 	 aM	 u
In terms of the system (2.29) reducing to f=s (s=f),
the very formulation of the error correction term
ensures that this will happen." The advantage of
addressing the efficiency question in this systems
framework lies in the fact that, unlike the
'traditional' framework discussed above, we are
concerned with efficiency in both markets.
In the context of the systems approach we require
slightly different conditions than those required in
using the approach discussed above. As it turns out
these conditions are not at all dissimilar to those
required to ensure strongly effectively functioning
equity markets.18
a) Both Markets are Efficient
For both markets to be classified as efficient, we
" To see this, note that in a steady-state,
static equilibrium, f t=f t _ i =f and s t =S t _ i =s. f=s and s=f
then follows automatically.
18 As with the conditions for effectively
functioning markets, we—discuss the conditions for
efficiency in the context of the stock and stock index
futures markets. They can obviously be generalised
for systems containing more than two markets.
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require the basis to be the cointegrating vector and
that the system as a whole cannot be identified.
These two conditions are exactly the same as the first
two necessary conditions for markets to be strongly
effectively functioning. If these conditions hold,
then together they are necessary and sufficient to
ensure market efficiency.
The difference between efficiency and strongly
effectively functioning financial markets is that
there is no a priori reason to require stability as a
necessary condition. If the model is stable, so much
the better since this implies that the market will be
efficient all of the time. However, given that there
is no a priori reason to suppose that markets are
efficient all of the time' (and the increasing body
of literature on stock market inefficiency suggests
that this is the case), stability is not necessary for
efficiency. If the model is unstable, it simply means
that efficiency will be specific to the sample period
under consideration.
b) One Market is Efficient
The conditions for one of the markets to be efficient
19 The argument here is that efficiency is not
necessarily a time invariant, intrinsic property of
markets.
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correspond primarily to those for weak effective
functioning of financial markets. We require that the
cointegrating vector be the basis and that one of the
equations comprising the system to be under
identified. The equation which can be identified then
corresponds to the market which is inefficient.
Moreover, the inefficiency should be an exploitable
one since identification will require the presence of
either lagged futures returns, lagged Index returns or
both in the equation, which in turn implies
forecastability of future returns in whichever market
is inefficient. The stability condition is not
required for the same reasons given in the discussion
on efficiency in both markets.
Obviously, as with the discussion of the conditions
for markets to function effectively, we can also
identify situations when both markets will be
inefficient. If there is no cointegration, or the
cointegrating vector is not the basis, then
inefficiency in both markets is implied. Given that,
by its designated role, the stock index futures price
and the stock index price should track each other
almost exactly, the absence of cointegration between
the two implies that they will drift apart without
bound. If this is the case, it should be possible to
develop a trading strategy that exploits with the
express purpose of earning abnormal returns.
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In the case where there is cointegration but the basis
is not the cointegrating vector, predictability of
prices is implied and again investors should be able
to take advantage of this to earn abnormal returns.
Finally, if both equations of the system can be
identified, the implication is that future returns in
both markets can be predicted and investors again
should be able to formulate a trading strategy that
exploits these inefficiencies.
As a final point in this section, the paradox here, as
it is with the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, is that
investors who take advantage of the inefficiencies
will ensure that the market is efficient. If
investors believe that both markets are efficient and
operate buy-and-hold-type hedging strategies, the
markets will remain inefficient since there will be
nothing to correct prices so that they fully reflect
information available.
2 . 6 .	 Is MISPRICING PATH DEPENDENT ?
A final issue that we can consider in this chapter is
the implication of the above exposition for the
behaviour of mispricing. In particular, does the
above model have anything to offer on the issue of
path independence versus pathdependence? The answer
to this question is yes, not so much as a direct
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implication of the model but as a direct implication
of the arguments used in its construction.
Recall from chapter one that in analysing the
behaviour of mispricing, MacKinlay and Ramaswamy
(1988) found evidence of path dependence in the
measure of mispricing for the S&P 500 Index futures
contract in the US and Yadav and Pope (1990) found
similar evidence for the FTSE 100 Index futures
contract in the UK. However, in attempting to model
the theoretical properties of mispricing, Brennan and
Schwartz (1990) allow mispricing to evolve according
to the following continuous time stochastic process,
known as a Brownian Bridge process
de (t) = -	 dt + ydz	 (2.30)
where e is mispricing, T is the time to maturity of
the futures contract and g is the speed of mean
reversion. The distinguishing feature of this
stochastic process is that it is path independent,
with mispricing reverting back to zero and equalling
zero with a probability of one when T=T, i.e.,
expiration of the futures contract.
Consider now the nature of mispricing (the basis) and
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the nature of tests for path dependence. It was
argued earlier that 'traditional' tests of lead-lag
relationships are misspecified because they ignore any
cointegrating vectors. From cointegration, a
cointegrating vector will exist if a linear
combination of two 1(1) variables is I(0). An I(1)
variable is a variable in which the nonstationarity is
stochastic rather than deterministic such that shocks
to the process will be permanent. Therefore, if a
cointegrating vector is a linear combination of two
stochastic nonstationary variables, it is not
unreasonable to hypothesise that the linear
combination will be a stationary stochastic variable,
following an ARMA(p,q) process.	 We know that in
effectively functioning equity markets, the
cointegrating vector is the basis, which is the
measure of mispricing and which will be a stationary
stochastic process.
Tests for path dependence in mispricing on the other
hand typically involve regressing mispricing on time
to expiration and testing whether time to expiration
is significant. The sign of the coefficient then
gives the nature of the path dependence. Time to
maturity is measured by (T-t )120 where T is the
" Some studies express time to maturity as a
fraction of a year, that is, (T-t)/365. The argument
is equally applicable to this measure of time to
maturity.
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maturity date, which is fixed. Define t as the number
of trading days the contract has to run. (T-t) then
represents the number of trading days to maturity.
Since T is fixed, (T-t) decreases by one unit each day
until expiration is reached. Viewed in this light,
(T-t) is nothing more than a deterministic time trend.
Therefore, if it is significant, mispricing is
stationary around a deterministic trend. However,
this is ruled out by the definition of cointegration.
The implication of this is that if stock and stock
index futures prices are stochastic nonstationary and
the basis (mispricing) is the cointegrating vector,
then mispricing should follow a stationary stochastic
process.
These arguments, then, are suggestive of the fact that
the finding of path dependence in MacKinlay and
Ramaswamy (1988) and Yadav and Pope (1990) is in
actual fact a finding of misspecification in the model
used to test for path dependence. Indeed, we know
this to be the case with Yadav and Pope (1990), for
before they test for path dependence they model
mispricing and find that a stationary AR(1) process
adequately describes its behaviour. This finding is
consistent with the theoretical model in Brennan and
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Schwartz (1990) which is a path independent model."
It would appear, then, that a path independent process
that has mean reverting features, as discussed in
Brennan and Schwartz (1990), is the way forward in
terms of modelling the theoretical behaviour of
mispricing.
2.6.	 CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we have set out to provide a
framework which allows us to test whether or not the
stock market and the stock index futures market are
effectively functioning, a framework which is also
easy to generalise to the case of more markets.'
If mispricing is a stationary stochastic
process, it will be consistent with a mean reverting
process. To see this, suppose mispricing, denoted by
Xt , follows the following, stationary AR(1) process
Xt = pXt_ i + ut ,	 I p 1 < 1, ut-N(0,a.2)
The s-period-ahead forecast of this is given by
E ( yt., I yt ) = P Yt
It is clear that lims „ ps 0. Clearly, in this case,
the limit of s is the expiration date, upon which time
mispricing must be zero. Thus, mispricing following
an AR(1) process that is stationary will be mean
reverting, the mean being zero. This is consistent
with a Brownian Bridge type stochastic process.
" One could think of models designed to test the
term structure relationship between short and long
term interest rates, for example, where if the short
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That this framework allows us to investigate whether
or not markets are effectively functioning comes about
by unifying two apparently diverse strands of the
literature on stock index futures into a single,
coherent framework.
Two issues in the analysis of stock index futures that
have been the subject of quite indepth inquiries have
been the presence of lead-lag relationships between
the two markets and the behaviour of mispricing and
the profitability of arbitrage strategies based on
mispricing. However, the interrelationship between
the two is typically ignored such that results from
tests of lead-lag relationships, for example, are
unreliable and must be interpreted with some caution.
We rectify this state of affairs by explicitly
considering the interrelationship, making use of the
valuable information provided by theory about the form
mispricing takes. The argument is that the models
typically used to test lead-lag relationships are
misspecified through inappropriate conditioning, that
is, the omission of lagged variables without testing
the zero coefficients these restrictions implies, and
the omission of any cointegrating vectors.
The implication of the omission of lagged variables is
and long gilt futures contracts are included, a four-
equation system will result.
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that, when the system is written out in full, both
spot and futures returns are forced to be martingale
difference processes, which may or may not be true but
is testable. Moreover, if the zero restrictions that
force returns to be martingale difference processes
are invalid, the resultant system is under identified
such that any interpretation of the coefficients and
their meaning is inappropriate. The implication of
the omission of any cointegrating vectors is that even
if the system is identified, there is an omitted
variables problem such that, again, interpretation of,
and inference about, the coefficients is hazardous.
Mispricing enters the picture in terms of providing
information about the form of the cointegrating
vector. Indeed, it is shown by manipulation of the
model giving the theoretically correct futures price
that mispricing in itself is given by the basis, which
is defined as the futures to cash price differential.
The implication of this is that if both the spot and
futures prices are stochastic nonstationary, then from
the results in Engle and Granger (1987), it is
possible that a linear combination of the two prices
is stationary.
In fact, this linear combination is the basis, such
that the long-run equilibrium relationship between the
stock and stock index futures prices is homogeneous.
Therefore, the cointegrating vector is the basis and,
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as is shown using Garbade and Silber's (1983) model,
it explains movements in both markets. Therefore,
given that stock and stock index futures prices are
jointly determined, the relationship must be treated
in a systems context.
When we treat the relationship between the two markets
as a system, a further interesting implication emerges
with regard to the identification of the equations of
the system. In particular, we have that upon
expiration the two prices become indistinguishable
such that the system cannot be identified. This
result follows rather trivially from the long run
equilibrium condition. However, what is not trivial
about this result is the fact that if the
cointegrating vector is the basis and the system
cannot be identified further away frontexpiration, the
stock and stock index futures prices are
indistinguishable, both being dependent solely upon
the same common factor, the basis, which is the degree
of mispricing.
This framework, then, shows that the natural question
to ask is not what is the nature of the lead-lag
relationship between the two markets, nor whether
arbitrage opportunities are profitable based on
simulated (and possibly unrealistic) trading
strategies. Rather, it is whether equity markets are
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effectively functioning. If the two markets cannot be
distinguished, they must be.
Whilst being able to determine whether or not markets
are effectively functioning is of immense importance,
of equal importance is being able to target the
correct market for regulation if they are not
functioning effectively. This framework allows us to
do precisely this, splitting effectively functioning
as a whole into two sub-components : strongly
effectively functioning markets and weakly effectively
functioning markets.
We provide an objective and testable necessary and
sufficient condition, which in itself is the
amalgamation of three necessary conditions, for these
two types of effective functioning to be determined
empirically. For strong effectiveness we have that
the cointegrating vector must be the basis, the system
must be under identified and the reduced form must be
stable such that the pricing relationship does not
change. For weak effectiveness, we require that the
basis be the cointegrating vector, that some, but not
all, of the equations in the system be under
identified and that the reduced form be stable, again
such that the pricing relationship does not change
over time. If some of these conditions are violated,
markets function ineffectively but within this
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framework it is possible to determine, for the purpose
of regulation, likely sources of ineffectiveness.
This framework for testing effectively functioning
equity markets also allows us to test efficiency of
both the stock and stock index futures markets.
Indeed, the two are virtually synonymous, the
difference between them being the requirement of
stability for effective functioning, a condition which
is not necessary for efficiency.
The final point which we addressed in this chapter
concerns the behaviour of mispricing and in particular
whether mispricing is path independent, as proposed by
Brennan and Schwartz (1990), or path independent as
evidence in MacKinlay and Ramaswamy (1988) and Yadav
and Pope (1990) suggests. Using the assumptions under
which the model in this chapter was derived, we showed
that mispricing should be path independent stochastic
process and as such any theoretical models of the
process driving mispricing should proceed along the
lines of path independence.
To summarise, then, the issue is not one of which
market leads each other. It is one of whether markets
are effectively functioning. This then ties into the
question of whether markets are efficient. The
implication of this framework is then that mispricing
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should only be analysed after an investigation of the
effective functioning or otherwise of the markets. If
markets are strongly effective and hence efficient,
the purpose of analysing the stochastic properties of
the basis becomes relevant only in so far as it
provides information as to the likely stochastic
process that underlies any theoretical model of
mispricing (cf. Brennan and Schwartz (1990)).
If markets function ineffectively (in which case both
will be inefficient) or one of them is inefficient
then analysis of the stochastic properties of
mispricing might suggest potentially profitable
arbitrage trading strategies. Note, however, that it
does not automatically follow that ineffectiveness
holds the key to profitable arbitrage opportunities.
For example, if we have ineffectiveness through
instability, the market can still be efficient. Hence
just because the market is ineffectively functioning,
it does not necessarily follow that it is inefficient
and therefore analysis of mispricing in this situation
will not necessarily yield profitable arbitrage
opportunities.
In the next chapter, we turn our attention to
analysing these issues through analysing the
functioning of the stock and stock index futures
markets in the UK on a daily basis.
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CHAPTER THREE : MODELLING THE maLy PRICING
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FTSE 100 INDEX AND
FUTURES CONTRACT.
3 . 1 .	 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we use the framework developed in
chapter two to analyse the price functioning of the
stock market, represented by the FTSE 100 Index, and
the stock index futures market, where the contract on
the FTSE 100 Index is traded. The previous chapter
raised several issues that are worthy of empirical
investigation. First, from the point of view of
regulators and from a policy perspective the ideal
situation is where the markets are strongly effective
in their functioning. Less appealing is that they be
weakly effective but this is preferable to both being
ineffective. If they are strongly effective, then by
implication the stock index futures market is carrying
out its prescribed role effectively, a most desirable
state of affairs.
Second, if markets can be characterised as strongly
effectively functioning then by implication they are
efficient (in the sense that no profitable arbitrage
opportunities that increase expected utility are
available).	 However, if they are not strongly
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effective in their functioning, they can still be
efficient, again an obviously desirable state of
affairs.
The final issue raised is the behaviour of mispricing.
There are several reasons for wishing to analyse this,
even in the presence of strongly effective and
efficient equity markets. If the cointegrating vector
is the basis, which is a measure of mispricing, then
it should be mean reverting, that is, a stationary,
autoregressive stochastic process. If this is the
case,. then any theoretical model geared to helping us
understand the behaviour of mispricing must proceed
along the lines of that suggested by Brennan and
Schwartz (1990).
Analysis of these issues is either conducted within,
or is derived from, the following model
[
Aft	 a10
Ast i = [ If	 all j	 u
which is a first order VAR reparameterised in error
correction form. It is this model that provides us
with the conditions not only for effective functioning
but also for efficiency. First, the error correction
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term should be the basis, that is, long-run
homogeneity should hold. This is necessary for both
effectiveness and efficiency. Second, as written both
equations in th system are under identified. This is
a necessary condition for strong effectiveness and
efficiency in both markets. A final condition
necessary for strong effectiveness, although not for
efficiency, is that the model be stable. If all of
these conditions hold, then both markets depend upon
the same common factor, the basis. We investigate the
validity of these conditions in this chapter.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In
the next section, we test to see whether the stock
market and stock index futures market in the UK are
effectively functioning and efficient. In section
three, we analyse the stochastic properties of the
basis. Section four concludes.
3.2.	 MODELLING THE DAILY PRICING RELATIONSHIP
The discussion in the previous chapter, and the
definitions provided by Engle and Granger (1987),
suggest that an appropriate starting point for
analysing the pricing relationship is determining the
properties of the series in question, that is, are the
two series individually nonstationary (possibly random
walks) and do they cointegrate with the basis being
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the cointegrating vector? To investigate these issues
and the nature of the pricing relationship we utilise
daily closing prices l of the FTSE 100 Stock Index and
the FTSE 100 Stock Index futures contract from January
1985 to December 1990. 2
 The two series are plotted in
figures 1 and 2 overleaf.
The futures price is constructed as a rollover, that
is, we take the three months of prices quoted for each
nearest maturity contract, so that the two series are
comparable. The graphs are remarkable in that it is
obvious that the two prices track each other virtually
exactly. There are also two noteworthy events that
are apparent from the graphs : the Big Bang of October
1986 and the stock market crash of October 1987.
However, even in these periods of 'disruption' the two
markets seem to track each other exactly.2
1 Obviously, the Index does not have a price as
such because it is an index rather than a tradeable
instrument. Technically, the Index has a quoted value
rather than a price. Whilst we recognise this, we
will refer to the value of the Index as its price for
the sake of convenience.
2 The data was obtained from the International
Stock Exchange, LIFFE and Datastream. I am grateful
to Stephen Wells at the ISE and Maggy Keefe at LIFFE
for providing some of the data.
3 As a little aside, it would appear from visual
inspection of the graphs that the crash was nothing
more than a long-overdue price correction, returning
prices to their pre-Big Bang trend. This would seem
to confirm that lowering interest rates for fear of an
ensuing recession was unnecessary given that the crash
would appear to have been nothing more than a price
correction.
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FIGURE 3.1 : FTSE 100 INDEX FUTURES CLOSING PRICE
2 JANUARY 1985 TO 31 DECEMBER 1990
TRADING DAYS (2 JANUARY 1985 TO 31 DECEMBER 1990)
FIGURE 3.2: FTSE 100 INDEX CLOSING PRICE
2 JANUARY 1985 TO 31 DECEMBER 1990
TRADING DAYS (2 JANUARY 1985 TO 31 DECEMBER 1990)
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Another intriguing feature of the data is that, with
the exception of the Big Bang-crash period, the two
prices seem to follow a stable upward trend,
suggesting that the prices are indeed nonstationary
(although whether they are, in the terminology of
Nelson and Plosser (1982), difference stationary as
opposed to trend stationary remains to be seen.)
For the purposes of empirical analysis, an interesting
question is whether or not the pricing relationship
differs according to time to expiration. Thus, we
analyse the behaviour of the two markets according to
the times to expiration of the contracts. For
example, we analyse the pricing relationship between
the Index and the March contract three months from
expiration, two months from expiration and in the
expiration month (full details of the construction of
the data are provided in the appendix). The reasons
for analysing the pricing relationship in this way are
straightforward and appealing : we know that in the
expiration month and upon expiration the two prices
are indistinguishable and hence the system is not
identified. The question is does this hold further
away from expiration : are the futures and the spot
price still indistinguishable further away from
expiration, for if they are not this would indicate
the presence of perhaps profitable arbitrage
opportunities amongst other things, raising questions
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over the efficiency of the markets.
We begin our analysis by examining the univariate time
series properties of the Index and Index futures price
for the various contracts and the various months to
expiration. In recent years it has emerged that many
economic and financial time series are stochastic
nonstationary, i.e. they have a unit root in their
auutoregressive time series representation (see Nelson
and Plosser (1982), Perron (1988) and Baillie and
Bollerslev (1989) for example). Nelson and Plosser
(1982) have referred to such series as difference
stationary since such series have a constant mean when
they are first differenced. The other scenario is
that the nonstationarity is deterministic in nature
such that deviations about the trend are stationary.
Determining whether the nonstationarity is stochastic
or deterministic is important for whilst the two
series may look the same graphically, they behave very
differently. To see this, consider the following two
models, one of which has a deterministic trend and one
of which has a stochastic trend. First, we have
	
yt = a + 13T+ut , ut = put_i +et , et -N(0,a:) , I p1 <1	 (3 	 1)
	where T is a deterministic time trend (T=1,2, 
	 T)
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(3.3)
and the errors follow a first order autoregressive
process. Alternatively, we have
Yt =	 Y 	 vt , vt-N(0,a)
	
(3.2)
which is a random walk (with drift if g # 0). Suppose
that yo = p.. Then by repeated substitution (3.2) can
be written as
1=1
Now to see the differences between the two series take
the s-period ahead forecast of (3.1) and (3.2)
respectively
E(Yr.i l Yr)	 a + N T") ut„jr	 ur+sjr Psur	 (14)
E(yt+,I Yt) = s P + Yr
	 (3.5)
Substituting (3.3) into (3.5) we obtain
E(yt, I yr) = P( t +s) + E vi	 (3.6) -
1=1
Now, as lim„ it is clear that in (3.4) rut
 -+ 0 and
the series becomes independent of the errors, that is,
shocks are transitory. However, for the series with
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(3.8)
(3.9)
the stochastic trend, it is clear that the shocks
persist, that is they are permanent. Thus, the
implications for the persistence of shocks are very
different for the two series.
	
Another difference
between the two series can be shown by taking the
first difference of (3.1)
	
(assuming no serial
correlation for ease of exposition) and (3.2).
An alternative way in which to view taking the first
difference of (3.2) is to see the unit root as a
coefficient restriction. Thus, for (3.2) we obtain
A yt =	 +
	
(3.7)
which, by the definition of white noise, is
stationary. However, for (3.1) the result is
potentially quite different
A = /3 + tit - ut_1
For the AR(1) error in (3.1), we have
U -
' 1-pL
1-L A u -
t	 1-pL
et
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If p 0, then differencing the trend stationary
series will induce a moving average error with a unit
root which is not invertible. This would lead to
nonstationarity in the error term (viz, spurious
regressions, see Granger and Newbold (1974)).
In order to determine which type of nonstationarity is
present, a great deal of research has been aimed at
deriving statistics for testing the unit root
hypothesis, that is, testing for the presence of a
stochastic trend (see inter alia Dickey and Fuller
(1981), Phillips (1987), Perron (1988) and Phillips
and Perron (1988)). Most empirical applications of
unit root tests follow the by now very well known
procedure set out in Dickey and Fuller (1981).
An alternative, and arguably more preferable, approach
is the nonparametric procedure proposed by Phillips
(1987) and Perron (1988) (see also Phillips and Perron
(1988)) which allows for various kinds of
heterogeneity in the residuals and allows for serial
correlation not by adding extra lags as in the Dickey-
Fuller procedure but by allowing for it in the
calculation of a consistent estimator of the variance
in the unit root regressions. Testing the unit root
hypothesis using the Phillips-Perron procedure
involves estimating the following three models
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yt =	 (T--n + ayfri + ut
2
Yt	 ut*
Yt = dYt-i + at
(3.10a)
(3.10b)
(3.10c)
and using the modified F or t statistics (referred to
as Z statistics by Phillips-Perron) to test the
appropriate null hypothesis.
Taking model (a), there are three hypotheses that can
be tested. 4	First, we have Ho : (11.,0,a)	 (R,0,1),
which tests for a stochastic trend with drift. This
is tested using the modified F statistic Z(0 3 ) against
the alternative that the process is deterministic
nonstationary. The second hypothesis is given by Ho
(11,0,a) (0,0,1) which tests for a stochastic trend
without drift using the statistic Z(0 2 ). Finally we
can simply test Ho : a=1 using the z(a) or Z(ta)
statistics. With model (b), the null hypothesis is Ho:
(1.1.*, a* )	 (0,1) or Ho: a*	 1.	 These hypotheses are
tested using the Z(01 ) and z(a*) or Z(t) statistics
respectively. These hypotheses are tested against the
alternative that a*<1, that is, the series is a
4 Note that with the vast majority of unit root
tests, the null hypothesis is that the series has a
stochastic trend.
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stationary stochastic process. For model (c) the null
is Ho : 1. The alternative is the same as model
(b). The appropriate statistic in this case is Z(6)
or Z(C).
The reason for specifying three models to test the
unit root hypothesis becomes clear when we consider
the testing strategy to be adopted. 5 Dickey, Bell and
Miller (1986) argue that the appropriate model to use
is (b). Their reasons for suggesting this are that if
the series has a unit root with drift then the
statistics from model (c) would have low power. If on
the other hand the series has a unit root without
drift the statistics from model (a) would have low
power through the inclusion of both drift and a
deterministic trend.
However, Theorem 1 of Perron (1988) proves that as the
sample size increases it becomes impossible to
distinguish between a unit root and a deterministic
time trend. Moreover, the discussion above would
suggest that failing to allow for a deterministic
trend could prove disastrous at the modelling stage.
Therefore, Perron (1988) suggests the following
strategy : estimate model (a) and test the hypotheses
associated with it. If they cannot be rejected it may
5 For a detailed account of this strategy, see
Perron (1988). We only summarise it here.
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be due to low power of the tests. Therefore, estimate
model (b). If the hypotheses cannot be rejected for
model (b) then the appropriate model for testing is
model (c).
The problem with the Phillips-Perron approach is in
the choice of the truncation lag 1 since the results
may be sensitive to this choice. In order to check
the robustness of the results the unit root tests were
calculated using truncation lags of 1, 4, 7 and 10.
The results were qualitatively the same and
quantitatively very similar.6
Results of the unit root tests for 1=1 are presented
in table 3.1 overleaf.' Starting with model (a), it
is clear that the null of a stochastic trend with
drift and without drift cannot be rejected in favour
of the alternative of a deterministic trend in any of
the series. Moving on to model (b), again the null
hypothesis of a unit root without drift cannot be
rejected. Thus, the appropriate model would appear to
6 The unit root test statistics were calculated
using Peter Burridge's ROOTINE program.
7 5% critical values for the test statistics are
(see Perron (1988))
Z(03 )	 = 6.25	 Z(02,1_	 . 4.68	 Z(01:01) = 4.59
Z(a)
	 . -21.8	 Z(ce)	 . -14.1
Z(t)
	 = -3.41	 Z(t)	 . -2.86
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be model (c). 8	In fact it appears that the index
futures and Index prices are best described as
martingale sequences. Table 3.1 also reports unit
root tests on the first differences of the series and
the null hypothesis that the first differences of the
series contain a unit root is rejected in all cases.
Given that the series are I(1) in levels, I(0) in
first differences, it is possible that they
cointegrate (in fact they should cointegrate given the
arguments presented earlier). In order to test for
cointegration, we utilise the systems approach
presented in Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius
(1990). Recall from chapter 2 the VAR parameterised
in error correction form
Ayt
 = p +Ay" + 
	  rk-lAYt-k+i IlY 	 (3.11)
The tests for cointegration proposed by Johansen
(1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) then consist
of testing the rank of the matrix Fl which will have
reduced rank if there is cointegration. However, an
issue that does arise in testing the number of
cointegrating vectors is the lag length used in the
8 Although, as an anonymous referee of The
Economic Journal has pointed out, model (c) is rarely
used in practice since the mean is rarely known a
priori and this causes problems with regard to
invariance in finite samples.
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VAR, for as Hall (1991) demonstrates, the test
statistics can be sensitive to the choice of lag
length. Consequently, we start with a VAR(5) to allow
for any possible trading day anomalies that may be
present and test the restrictions imposed by reducing
the order of the VAR sequentially by one lag. Once we
obtain a rejection we have the order of the VAR that
should be used in testing for cointegration.
Likelihood ratio	 statistics	 testing for the
appropriate lag length in the VAR are presented in
table 3.2 overleaf. 9 With the exception of the
September contract three months from expiration and
the December contract three months from expiration,
which contains the effects of both the Big Bang and
the crash, the appropriate lag length for the VAR is
one. September 3 and December 3 both reject the
restrictions imposed in moving from the VAR(2) to the
VAR(1).
The tests for the number of cointegrating vectors are
presented in table 3.3, based on a VAR with a
9 In calculating the likelihood ratio test
statistic we make an adjustment for the relatively
small sample size. Thus, we have
-21ogX = (T-k)(log l Ed — logMI)
where k is the average number of regressors in the
VAR, IXJ is the determinant of the covariance matrix
from the restricted model and Ild is the determinant
of the covariance matrix from the unrestricted model.
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constant. With the exception of the September
contract three months from expiration (and the
possible exception of the September and December
contracts two and three months from expiration
respectively, where the null hypothesis of zero
cointegrating vectors is rejected at 90% but not 95%)
the null hypothesis of zero cointegrating vectors is
rejected whilst the null of one cointegrating vector
cannot be rejected, confirming the results of the
unit root tests.	 The implications of failing to
account for cointegration discussed earlier, then,
appear to be well justified.
The interesting question now is whether or not the
basis is the cointegrating vector. The cointegrating
vectors and unit root tests on the basis are presented
in tables 3.4 and 3.5. The cointegrating vectors are
plotted in figures 3 to 14. In all cases (even when
there
	 is	 apparently
	 no
	
cointegration)	 the
cointegrating vector is the basis with the estimates
of the coefficient on the Index price being remarkably
close to one. The first necessary condition for
effectively functioning markets, and by implication
efficiency, then, would appear to hold for the UK
stock and stock index futures markets.
Let us now focus on the identification issue mentioned
earlier. The arguments presented in the previous
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TABLE 3.4 : ESTIMATED COINTEGRATING VECTORS
MARCH 1	 f	 1.014s
MARCH 2	 f	 1.104s
MARCH 3	 f	 1.016s
JUNE 1	 f	 1.008s
JUNE 2	 f = 1.028s
JUNE 3	 f = 1.020s
SEPTEMBER 1	 f	 0.998s
SEPTEMBER 2
	 f	 0.999s
SEPTEMBER 3	 f	 1.026s
DECEMBER 1
	 f	 0.999s
DECEMBER 2	 f	 1.023s
DECEMBER 3	 f	 1.018s
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TABLE 3.5 : BASIS UNIT ROOT TEST RESULTS (1=1)
z(c11) z(c(*) z(tc,.)
MARCH 1 27.98 -58.55 -6.306
MARCH 2 11.96 -28.92 -4.185
MARCH 3 18.48 -32.14 -4.523
JUNE 1 16.26 -32.03 -4.452
JUNE 2 4.629 -14.93 -2.845
JUNE 3 14.64 -30.79 -4.329
SEPTEMBER 1 21.60 -59.23 -6.323
SEPTEMBER 2 9.771 -19.20 -3.281
SEPTEMBER 3 5.025 -8.257 -1.952
DECEMBER 1 18.57 -48.24 -5.564
DECEMBER 2 17.16 -29.90 -4.221
DECEMBER 3 11.85 -28.71 -4.072
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1011
chapter are that the equity market can be said to be
functioning effectively if the system describing the
pricing relationship between the FTSE 100 Index and
index futures contract cannot be identified. By
implication, of course, the futures market must be
fulfilling its prescribed role if this lack of
identification is the case. An alternate way to
phrase this is that both markets depend upon a common
factor only and that common factor is the short-run
disequilibrium between prices in the two markets
which, as we know, theoretically and empirically is
the basis.
We have already seen that with the exception of the
September and December futures contract three months
from expiration the most appropriate model is a VAR(1)
reparameterised in error correction form. That the
VAR(1) is the appropriate model for all bar two of the
contracts confirms that the identification condition
is satisfied, that is, from the VAR(1), the system
cannot be identified.n
This can be confirmed by writing out the
structural model for the reduced form system
P IIA ft P I2A it + P	 -s)t-1 + P14 = elr
P21 A it + P22 Aft P23(f-s)r-1 + /324 = e2r
Clearly, both equations cannot be distinguished and
will differ only by normalisation.
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Tests of the specification (that is, the joint
significance of the basis in the VAR and where
appropriate the significance of Aft _ i and Ast_0 and
misspecification tests for normality and serial
correlation are reported in table 3.6. It is clear
from this that the VAR, as given by (2.15) in chapter
two, which is reproduced at the beginning of this
chapter, is well specified in every case, with only
marginal evidence of serial correlation in two cases.
With the exception of September three months from
expiration the basis is jointly significant at least
at the 5% level in every other case, confirming the
fact that both markets depend on one common factor,
the basis, and that essentially they are
indistinguishable. Moreover, examination of figures
15 through 38, which plot break point Chow tests
constructed from recursive estimation of the VAR model
for each of the data sets together with scaled 1%
critical values, reveals that the error correction
parameterisation of the VAR, as well as capturing the
salient features of the pricing relationship between
the two markets, provides in most cases a remarkably
stable model.
The cases where the model seems to be quite unstable,
with varying degrees of instability, relate almost
exclusively to the December stock index futures
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FIGURE 3.22: INDEX EQUATION, JUNE ONE MONTH
BREAK POINT CHOW TEST BASED ON RECURSIVE ESTIMATION
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FIGURE 3.24: INDEX EQUATION, JUNE TWO MONTHS
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FIGURE 3.27: FUTURES EQUATION, SEPTEMBER ONE MONTH
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FIGURE 3.30: INDEX EQUATION, SEPTEMBER 2 MONTHS
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BREAK POINT CHOW TEST BASED ON RECURSIVE ESTIMATION
32	 42	 52	 42	 72	 az	 92	 102	 112	 122
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS
•  SCALED 1% CRITICAL VALUE
FIGURE 3.32: INDEX EQUATION, SEPTEMBER THREE MONTHS
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FIGURE 3.34: INDEX EQUATION, DECEMBER ONE MONTH
BREAK POINT CHOW TEST BASED ON RECURSIVE ESTIMATION
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FIGURE 3.36 : INDEX EQUATION, DECEMBER TWO MONTHS
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contract. When one considers what the December stock
index futures contract has been through this is
perhaps not so surprising, especially the December
contract three months from expiration. Specifically,
we have from October 1986 the Big Bang at the Stock
Exchange and from October 1987 the stock market crash,
both of which had a profound effect on the stock
market. Indeed, the effects of these two events
spilled over into November and December of their
respective years and hence had an effect on the
December contract two months from expiration and in
the expiration month, though the effect relative to
the December contract three months from expiration is
much less pronounced.
The important point to note here is that these two
events had a very profound impact on the stability of
the model which is otherwise an adequate description
of the pricing relationship. To anticipate
conclusions that will emerge later on, one possible
reason for such an effect is the fact that whilst the
two markets should effectively function as one, and
the evidence presented above certainly seems to
confirm this view during stable time periods, they are
regulated as two entirely separate entities." The
" For example, one difference that immediately
springs to mind is the different trading systems
operational in both markets, specifically open outcry
in the futures market versus the pure dealership,
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implication that follows from this is if the markets
are treated as two separate entities then during times
of pressure they will behave as separate entities.
One final issue is with regard to those contracts and
months to expiration for which the equity and futures
market appear not to be effectively functioning.
Specifically, for the September and December contracts
three months from expiration a VAR(2) seems to be the
best representation of the system and from this it is
possible that a structural model can be developed. If
this is the case then the two series are
distinguishable from each other.
However, in attempting to move from the reduced form
to a structural model the September contract is best
described as both series (Aft
 and As) being
independent white noise processes such that the levels
of the futures and index series are independent random
walks. For the December contract, the structural
model is in fact not identified once contemporaneous
values are included. Indeed, inclusion of the
contemporaneous values renders the lagged variables
insignificant such that the system, at the structural
level, becomes equivalent to the model in footnote 9.
Moreover, examination of the graph of the break point
screen-based trading system operational in the stock
market.
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chow test statistic reveals in recent years the
relationship has stabilised. We will return to this
point in the conclusion.
To conclude this section, then, it appears that on a
daily basis the necessary conditions, and hence
necessary and sufficient condition, for strongly
effectively functioning equity markets are satisfied
for the FTSE 100 Index and the FTSE 100 Index futures
contract. There appear to be only two aberrations
the September contract three months from expiration,
where the stability and identification conditions are
satisfied but the cointegration condition is not, and
the December contract three months from expiration,
where the cointegration and identification conditions
are satisfied but the stability condition is not,
certainly in the pre stock market crash period.
A final point to note here is the efficiency of the
markets. With the exception of the September futures
contract three months from expiration, the necessary
conditions, and hence the necessary and sufficient
condition, are satisfied for the system and hence both
markets can be said to be efficient. Given that they
are efficient, we should observe the basis behaving in
a stochastic fashion. Moreover, it should be mean
reverting, that is, stationary. We analyse the
stochastic properties of the basis in the next
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section.
3 . 3 .	 THE STOCHASTIC PROPERTIES OF THE BASIS
The discussion in the previous chapters suggested that
by the very definition of a cointegrating vector, the
basis will be a stochastic process rather than a path
dependent one. The argument is that if the basis is
path dependent, it will be a deterministic process.
However, given that a cointegrating vector is a
stationary linear combination of two stochastic
nonstationary variables, one might anticipate that the
basis will be path independent. Results from
modelling the basis are presented in table 3.7
overleaf. In each case, ten observations at the end
of the sample have been retained to evaluate the
stability of the coefficients. All of the equations
show no signs of misspecification, with diagnostic
tests for serial correlation, nonlinearity, non normal
errors, heteroscedasticity and ARCH all being
insignificant at conventional significance levels. In
addition, the model appears to be stable, as shown by
the insignificance of the Chow test for predictive
failure.
With the exception of the September contract three
months from expiration, the basis is adequately
described by an autoregressive process of at most
184

TABLE 3 . 7 CONT . . .
JUNE 1	 bt = 0.000 + 0.624bt _ i + 0.177bt _2 + dummy
(1.690)	 (8.165)	 (2.305)
bt = 0.000 + 0.929bt _ i + dummy
(1.836)	 (23.69)
1(1,106)=2.453
14(1,109)=2.729
17(1,106)=0.492
JUNE 2
101,102)=0.149
n4(1,104)=0.775
47(1,102)=0.223
12(1,106)=0.993
16(1,106)=0.215
12(1,102)=0.478
15(1,102)=0.075
13(2)=2.192
15(10,107)=0.250
13(2)=3.241
16(10,103)=1.139
JUNE 3	 bt = 0.000 + 0.800b t _ i + dummy
(1.528)	 (15.37)
	
1(1,100)=2.410	 12(1,100)=0.762	 113(2)=0.866
	
114(1,102)=0.080	 15(1,100)=0.041	 16(10,101)=0.669
117(1,100)=3.620
Notes
Figures in parentheses are t ratios.
11 is a test for 1st order serial correlation,
distributed F(,.,) under the null of no serial
correlation.
This a test for nonlinearity, distributed F(,.,) under
the null of linearity (correct functional form).
13 is a test for nonnormality, distributed x 2 (2) under
the null of normality.
T 4 is a test for heteroscedasticity, distributed F(, •,)
under the null of homoscedasticity.
15 is a test for ARCH, distributed F(,.,) under the
null of no ARCH.
116 is a test for predictive failure, distributed F,(,.,)
under the null of no predictive failure.
17 tests the significdhce of the addition of a
deterministic time trend, distributed F(,.,) under the
null of a zero coefficient.
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TABLE 3.7 CONT...
SEPTEMBER 1 bt . 0.000 + 0.572bt-1 +
(0.956)	 (10.09)
11(1,108)=0.414 12(1,108)=0.934	 13(2)=3.080
T14(1,110)=0.000 1 5 (1,108)=0.310	 16(10,109)=1.449
17(1,108)=0.005
SEPTEMBER 2 bt = 0.000 + 0.854bt_, + dummy
(1.913)	 (18.16)
11 ( 1,10 7 )=3. 8 46 12(1,107)=2.619	 1 3 ( 2 ) =4. 9 0 3
14(1,109)=0.109 15(1,107)=0.247	 16(10,108)=0.794
17(1,107)=0.043
SEPTEMBER 3 Abt= e t - 0.615et_ 1 - 0.000 + dummy
(-7.887)	 (-1.069)
Notes
Figures in parentheses are t ratios.
1 1
 is a test for 1st order serial correlation,
distributed F(,.,) under the null of no serial
correlation.
This a test for nonlinearity, distributed F(,.,) under
the null of linearity (correct functional form).
1 3 is a test for nonnormality, distributed x2 (2) under
the null of normality.
114 is a test for heteroscedasticity, distributed F(,.,)
under the null of homoscedasticity.
1 5 is a test for ARCH, distributed F(,.,) under the
null of no ARCH.
Ibis a test for predictive failure, distributed F(,.,)
under the null of no predictive failure.
11 7 tests the significance of the addition of a
deterministic time trend, distributed F(,.,) under the
null of a zero coefficient.
dummy
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order 2. The September contract three months from
expiration is best described by an ARIMA(0,1,1)
process. That this contract should behave differently
from the others is no surprise given that there was no
cointegration. However, it is interesting to note
that even in this case the basis has a nonstationary
stochastic trend.
Turning to the other contracts, they are all
stationary, with the some of the autoregressive
coefficients for each contract being less than one.
In addition, with the exception of the December
contract two months from expiration, the statistic
testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient on
the deterministic time trend cannot be rejected at the
1% leve1. 12 Even with the December contract two
months from expiration, the rejection is marginal (a
p-value of 0.009). These results confirm our earlier
intuition that the basis is indeed stochastic and that
evidence of path dependence is in fact evidence of
misspecification.
Let us now consider the behaviour of the basis in more
detail, focusing particularly on any mean reverting
behaviour it may exhibit. Recall from chapter two
12 With the exceptipn of the March contract one
and three months from expiration, the time trend is
insignificant at the 5%level. The rejection for March
one and three is marginal, though.
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that with a stationary autoregressive process, it will
always converge to zero (or to its mean if this is
non-zero) such that it is, by definition mean
reverting. It is clear from table 3.7 that this is
indeed the case for all contracts, with the exception
of the September contract three months from
expiration.
In addition, it is clear that (with the exception of
the June contract) the size of the autoregressive
coefficient increases monotonically with time to
expiration.' Thus, the further away the contract is
from expiration, the longer the basis takes to revert
to zero.' Note also that in most of the equations
there is a need for a dummy variable to capture
outliers, suggesting that mispricing is subject to
discrete jumps. All of these individual pieces of
evidence would suggest that a stochastic process with
solely mean reverting properties is not sufficient to
capture the behaviour of mispricing. Future research
on this matter might do well to concentrate on a mean
" The coefficients are March 1 : 0.61; March 2
0.811; March 3 : 0.820; June 1 : 0.801; June 2
0.929; June 3 : 0.800; September 1 : 0.572; September
2 : 0.854; December 1 : 0.681; December 2 : 0.738;
December 3 : 0.762. Where the appropriate model is an
AR(2), we have added the coefficients together to give
some idea of the 'persistence' of the mean reversion.
" The mean of the basis is given by the constant
in the regression. With the exception of the March
contract three months from expiration and the December
contract, the mean is zero.
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reverting process subject to discrete jumps.
3.4	 CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we have analysed the pricing
relationship between the stock market and stock index
futures market using daily data on the FTSE 100 Index
and the FTSE 100 Index futures contract. The question
of interest is whether or not these markets can be
said to function effectively, particularly further
from expiration. In order to test this proposition we
began by testing for a unit root in each individual
time series. The null hypothesis of a unit root could
not be rejected in any of the series, making them
candidates for cointegration. Indeed, with the
exception of the September contract three months from
expiration,	 the spot and futures prices do
cointegrate, with the cointegrating vector being the
basis.	 Thus, the first condition for effective
functioning and efficiency was found to be valid.
In terms of the identification of the system from the
reduced form, the appropriate model for all contracts
and expiration months, with the exception of the
September and December contracts three months from
expiration, is a VAR(1). This, coupled with the
evidence that the cointegrating vector is the basis,
suggests that the VAR(1) reparameterised in error
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correction form is the most appropriate model, in
which case the identification condition is satisfied.
This is reassuring for, from the conditions necessary
for efficiency, both markets are efficient regardless
of time to expiration.
The third condition for strong effectiveness is that
the model be stable. With the exception of the
December contract three months from expiration, which
shows signs of substantial instability, the models are
remarkably stable. This provides reassuring evidence
that the stock and stock index futures markets in the
UK are strongly effectively functioning. Even the
December contract three months from expiration begins
to show signs of stability after the stock market
crash of 1987 and this reveals the power of analysing
the issue of effectively functioning equity markets in
this framework.
Analysis of figures 37 and 38 reveal several
interesting points about the markets' ability to cope
with what may be termed radical events. In
particular, the December futures contract three months
from expiration has seen some extraordinary changes
the Big Bang of October 1986 and the stock market
crash of October 1987. Figures 37 and 38 show the
effect these events have had on the stability of the
relationship very clearly indeed. Whilst the pricing
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relationship between the markets is stable, both
markets depending only upon the same common factor,
the basis, this only applies to stable time periods.
In times of intense pressure, the markets appear to
have difficulty in maintaining their links. This is
suggestive of the fact that if the two are regulated
as separate entities, as indeed they are, they will
behave as separate entities in times of radical
change, a conclusion which is borne out in chapter
five.
The final issue that we examined was the behaviour of
the basis. The purpose of this analysis was to try
and shed some light on the path dependence versus path
independence debate. The results clearly support path
independence, with the basis, with one exception,
being adequately described by an AR process of at most
order 2. However, whilst the results support path
independence, they also show that the Brownian Bridge
process used by Brennan and Schwartz (1990) to model
the behaviour of mispricing is inadequate. Whilst it
retains the important mean reverting feature, is does
not capture the apparent presence of discrete jumps.
The implication of this is that a modification of the
Brownian Bridge process to incorporate discrete jumps
(and possibly the monotonic decrease in the mean
reversion coefficient as maturity approaches) should
fare better, although this is left to future research.
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To summarise the findings in this chapter, then, we
find reassuring evidence that the stock and stock
index futures markets in the UK are, on the whole,
strongly effectively functioning and efficient, a
reassuring conclusion because the implication of this
is that first the futures market generally serves its
prescribed role well, and second, that the stock
market generally functions reliably in its role as
resource allocator.
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CHAPTER FOUR : NoNSYNCHRONOUS TRADING AND THE
NATURE OF THE INTRA—DAILY PRICING
RELATIONSHIP
4 . 1 .	 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been a growth in the
availability of higher frequency price data in
relation to stock indices and related stock index
futures contracts, especially in the US and to a much
lesser degree in the UK. The availability of such
data has prompted renewed interest in the issue of
nonsynchronous trading. Nonsynchronous trading is
concerned with the possibility that some shares within
an index or portfolio, say, do not trade in every time
interval. The effect of this is that the observed
price of the index or portfolio is not necessarily a
reflection of its true price since it contains 'stale'
prices. Moreover, if these so-called thinly traded
stocks react to relevant new information with a time
lag they generate autocorrelation in the observed
behaviour of returns on the portfolio, potentially
generating false inferences with regard to the
predictability of returns.
It is these latter concerns that have prompted the
renewed interest in nonsynchronous trading, with the
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emphasis shifting from its effects on estimates of
beta in the CAPM (Scholes and Williams (1977) and
Dimson (1979)) and factors in the APT (Shanken (1987))
to the effect it has on security returns. More recent
models of nonsynchronous trading have concentrated on
estimating the probability of nontrading (Lo and
MacKinlay (1990)) and removing its effects by
filtering the data according to some model of the
relationship between the observed returns generating
process and the true returns generating process
(Harris (1989) and Stoll and Whaley (1990)).
The first section of this chapter is devoted to an
analysis of the nonsynchronous trading problem. If
one wishes to analyse the pricing relationship between
a stock index and a stock index futures contract on an
intra-daily time scale, then this problem cannot be
overlooked for, as already mentioned, its effects on
portfolio (index) returns can be potentially so
serious that no reliable inferences can be made with
regard to the pricing relationship.
In order to provide some perspective on the approaches
adopted to removing its effects, the next section
focuses on a discussion of two very recent models
proposed in the literature : those of Harris (1989)
and Stoll and Whaley (1990). Shortcomings with these
models, and what we see as a problem with one of the
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implications of Lo and MacKinlay's (1990) model, are
addressed. To overcome the problems with extant
approaches to the estimation of nonsynchronous trading
effects, we propose a new model which conceptually has
a similar starting point to the models discussed in
Harris (1989) and Stoll and Whaley (1990). The
advantage of our model, however, is that it overcomes
the problems associated with these other models
without sacrificing intuitive appeal in the face of
(perhaps unnecessary) complexity.
We utilise this new model to estimate the
nonsynchronous trading adjustment and armed with this
we construct a new measure of the FTSE 100 Index,
adjusted for nonsynchronous trading, for use in
analysing the intra-daily pricing relationship between
the two markets.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In
section two we consider in some detail the models
proposed by Harris (1989) and Stoll and Whaley (1990),
pointing out their shortcomings. We also consider a
problem with Lo and MacKinlay's (1990) model with
regard to the implications of nonsynchronous trading.
Having done this, we move on to consider a new method
for estimating the nonsynchronous trading adjustment.
We use this new model in section three to generate a
measure of the FTSE 100 Index, adjusted for
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(4.1)
nonsynchronous trading. Armed with this adjusted
Index, we utilise the framework developed in chapter
two and applied in chapter three to analyse the
functioning of the FTSE 100 Index and FTSE 100 Index
futures markets during a week in June 1991. Section
four summarises and concludes.
4 . 2 .
	
MODELS OF NONSYNCHRONOUS TRADING
Let us consider first of all Harris's (1989) model of
nonsynchronous trading. Harris developed his model in
order to analyse high frequency data on the S&P 500
Index and Index futures contract around and during the
October 1987 stock market crash. Harris starts by
considering two definitions of the value of a
portfolio at time t. First, we have that, in Harris's
notation
where St is the observed value of the portfolio, N is
the number of securities in the portfolio, q i is the
number of shares held in the ith security and P it is
the price of the ith security at time t. The observed
price of the portfolio at time t is then given by the
product of the number of shares outstanding for the
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ith security and the ith security's most recently
observed price, summed across the N securities
comprising the portfolio.
Second, we have the true value of the portfolio as of
time t which is given by
Sr* = E q,	 (4.2)
i=1
where S'; is the true value of the portfolio, q i is as
defined earlier and V it is the value (to be defined
shortly) of a share in the ith firm as of time t.
Subtracting (4.1) from (4.2) then gives us the
difference between the true value of the portfolio and
its observed value
S 	 St = E .1; ( 14,t Pit)	 (4.3)
To arrive at an expression for the nonsynchronous
trading adjustment, Harris assumes that value is equal
to price when price is observed. If this is the case,
then any difference between the true portfolio value
and the observed portfolio value will arise if the
last observed price is an old one, that is, it was
observed at t-k. In this case, (4.3) can be written
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as
St* - St = E qi A kt Vit	 (4.4)
where L k is the k period difference operator, that is,
Ak = (1-Lk )V1t where L is the lag operator and L k = t-k
and kit is the number of periods since the last share
price for security i was observed. Clearly, if all
prices are observed at time t, such that k=0, then the
observed portfolio value will equal the true portfolio
value. If k0, then AVit is a measure of the
nonsynchronous trading adjustment. Therefore, if AVit
can be estimated so can the true value of the
portfolio, S.
To estimate Avit , Harris uses a factor model, with the
factor to be estimated being the nonsynchronous
trading adjustment. Thus, values evolve according to
(lower case letters denote variables in natural
logarithms)
A v 	 A t + ett	 (4.5)
where X is a factor common to all the securities in
the portfolio and e it is a zero-mean, firm-specific
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component. Estimated changes in the unobserved value
of the portfolio are then given by
AV =k	 it (Eit P e	 1-1
kit 
4	 )
	
(4.6)
To estimate these changes in value, Harris
reformulates the problem of the extraction of the
common factor into a minimisation problem.
Specifically, Harris calculates the percentage change
in observed portfolio value (MS t 	 (St - S 1 )/S 1 ) by
minimising the following function
min E wi (% A Pat - ft)2	 (4.7)
ft 1=1
where wi=q i P it _ i /S t _ i , which is the value weight given to
security i in the portfolio. The reason for
specifying the problem in this way is that it yields
an equation similar to (4.5), viz.
% APit = ft ÷ eft,	 i = 1„N
	
(4.8)
where eit is as above, but with variance proportional
to 11w1 . In a multiperiod framework the model is
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kit
A Dke it = E ft-j+1 eit
j=1
for all the observed Pit for the i=1,....,N securities
in the portfolio. (4.8) and (4.9) impose a unit
coefficient on the common factor and therefore the
estimated factor reflects estimated true percentage
returns on the portfolio.
Formulating the nonsynchronous trading problem as one
of extracting a common factor has intuitive appeal.
However, the major problem with this approach lies in
the data requirements : essentially, the common factor
has to be estimated for each individual security and
then aggregated across all securities in the portfolio
to generate true portfolio returns. This requires
immense amounts of very specific data. To quote
Harris (1989, p.82),
'The stock sample consists of all primary
market trades of each S&P 500 stock from the
open of trading on Monday October 12 1987 to
the close of trading on Friday, October 23.
The data...include the date, time, price and
shares traded for each transaction on each
exchange in the United States.' (emphasis
added).
The data requirements for this method, then,
effectively preclude its use unless one has access to
trade by trade data on each individual stock in the
(4.9)
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index (to estimate Avit ) and information on the number
of shares traded and the number of shares outstanding
(to calculate qi ). In addition, it could be
computationally quite expensive. 1 This effectively
precludes it from use.
As an alternative to Harris (1989), Stoll and Whaley
(1990) consider a model that removes both
nonsynchronous trading and bid-ask price effects.
They initially derive separate models for each of
these effects and then combine them to produce a
single model that corrects the data for both.
Beginning with bid-ask effects, consider first of all
a single stock and assume that it trades at least once
in every time interval (so there is no nonsynchronous
trading effect). The observed return, which equals
the true return, is given by
= I.L a + Eat + Vet - 0 iv
	 (4.10)
where gi = E(RD and Eit and vit are mean zero
disturbances. (4.10) says that the observed return on
the ith security in period t is equal to the expected
return, plus any random deviations around the expected
1 For example, Harris (1989) calculates the value
of the S&P 500 Index at 5 minute intervals over ten
trading days.
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return, and a disturbance which follows an MA(1)
process. The MA(1) process represents the effects of
the bid-ask spread, for there will be an error
introduced by the bid-ask spread at the beginning of
the period and at the end of the period. Maintaining
the assumption of no nonsynchronous trading effects,
then extending this to a portfolio is straightforward:
= E qiRt*t	 (4.11)
1=1
where qi and N are as defined earlier. Substituting
(4.10) in to (4.11) yields, after some manipulation,
(4.12)
	
R * =- E	 qi(v it
	 e i v it-i )P	 P
1=1
Consider now the nonsynchronous trading problem.
Assuming that a stock trades at least once every n
time periods, Stoll and Whaley (1990) represent this
by
n-1
Ri7t = E (Dpk Rpst _k + lit	 (4.13)
k=0
where Int
 represents the observed return on the
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portfolio, which is no longer equal to the true
return, and wp,i, represents that fraction of true
returns reflected in observed returns.
The interpretation of (4.11) is straightforward. At
time t, only a fraction of the true portfolio return
is reflected in the observed portfolio return.
Obviously, this fraction will depend upon the number
of stocks within the portfolio that trade in every
time interval (and the weight these stocks take within
the portfolio). If wo=1 then the observed portfolio
return is equal to the true portfolio return and there
are no nonsynchronous trading effects. If wo*1 then
coo, represents that fraction of true returns that is
observed t+k periods later.
To obtain an estimable model, Stoll and Whaley rewrite
(4.13) expressing the ;k's (k0) as a proportion of
wo, rewrite the model using lag operator notation and
solve to give
.	 .
R° =6.) R* +rvpk Rpt	 p0 pt	 z-d I --p°t-k + V t - E Y pk V pt-k
k=1	 k=1
(4.14)
Substituting (4.12) into (4.14) and gathering terms
yields
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	i•	 cc
R° = W p + E 4) ° i. +Ept	 rp0 p	 kR pt--	 pt — u	 6 ke pt—k
	
k=1	 k=1
(4.15)
which shows that in the presence of nonsynchronous
trading and bid-ask price effects, observed returns
will follow an ARMA(p,q) process with p,q = 00 . Stoll
and Whaley then argue that true returns are given by
observed returns minus the fitted values from the
model, although this is incorrect : true returns are
given by the fitted values, as we shall see.
In practice, p and q cannot obviously equal infinity.
Stoll and Whaley find that an ARMA(3,2) process for
returns adequately removes these effects. However,
selection of the orders for p and q in ARMA models is
notoriously problematic and very subjective.
Moreover, overparameterisation of the model can
distort the results. If the true process is an
ARMA(1,1), an ARMA(2,2) will fit equally as well. The
notion of correct selection of the orders of p and q
is especially important given Stoll and Whaley's
interpretation of what constitutes true portfolio
returns. Overparameterisation in this case will yield
misleading inferences later on.
Another cause for concern with Stoll and Whaley's
model is the use of aiatoregressive terms to model
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nonsynchronous trading. This cause for concern also
applies to one of the implications of Lo and
MacKinlay's (1990) model of nonsynchronous trading,
that is, nonsynchronous trading induces positive
serial correlation in observed portfolio returns,
yielding an AR(1) process for observed returns.
To demonstrate, suppose we have a time series of
returns on a portfolio, shown by figure 4.1. Armed
with this returns series, we proceed to calculate the
autocorrelation coefficients, obtaining the results
shown in table 4.1, and plot a graph of the
autocorrelation function which is as shown in figure
4.2.
Observing first of all the size of the autocorrelation
coefficients and their significance at all lags, as
witnessed by the Box-Pierce (1970) statistic, we also
note that the serial correlation is generally positive
and declines geometrically. We then recall the fact
that one of the implications of Lo and MacKinlay's
(1990) model is nonsynchronicity generates an AR(1)
process in returns, and Stoll and Whaley's (1990)
model shows that observed returns also evolve
according to a more general ARMA process, of which an
AR(1) model is a special case. Estimating an AR(1)
model for returns, we find that Rpt 0.2 + 0.4Rpt_1,
confirming that indeed returns do follow an AR(1)
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FIGURE 4.1 : TIME SERIES OF SIMULATED RETURNS
R(t) = 0.2 + 0.4 R(t-1) + U(t)
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS
FIGURE 4.2 : AUTOCORRELATION FUNCTION
R(t) = 0.2 + 0.4 R(t-1) + U(t)
ORDER OF LAG
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TABLE 4.1 : AUTOCORRELATION FUNCTION FOR SIMULATED
RETURNS (Rt = 0 . 2 + 0 . 4Rt _ 1 + ut , ut - N ( 0, 1) )
*****************************************************
Order Autocorrelation 	 Standard Box-Pierce
Coefficient	 Error	 Statistic
*****************************************************
1 .51842 .070888 53.4839[.000]
2 .34989 .087899 77.8465[.000]
3 .25304 .094640 90.5879[.000]
4 .23574 .097980 101.6470[.000]
5 .19081 .10079 108.8921[.000]
6 .14531 .10259 113.0941[.0001
7 .13028 .10362 116.4718[.000]
8. .029248 .10444 116.6421[.000]
9 -.039901 .10448 116.9589[.000]
10 -.064712 .10456 117.7922[.000]
11 -.028572 .10476 117.9547[.000]
12 -.14130 .10480 121.9281[.000]
13 -.15932 .10575 126.9790[.000]
14 -.20868 .10695 135.64481.000)
15 -.14997 .10898 140.1204[.000]
16 -.079951 .11001 141.3925[.000]
17 -.067833 .11030 142.3082[.000]
18 -.062274 .11051 143.0799[.000]
19 -.13103 .11069 146.4964[.000]
20 -.16873 .11146 152.1621[.0001
******************************************************
Notes
Figures in square parentheses are p-values.
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process. On the basis of this evidence, we conclude
that we have a nonsynchronous trading problem and
recall Stoll and Whaley's (1990) argument that true
returns are given by the residuals from this model.
We therefore use the residuals, which we find to be
white noise, to reflect true portfolio returns and we
have a time series of returns with the effects of
nonsynchronous trading expunged.
The problem here is that we do not. The reason for
this is that the true returns generating process is
AR(1) : what we have is a genuine inefficiency. We
have interpreted it otherwise. This example is a
little contrived but it illustrates the point well
just because returns follow an AR process, it does not
mean that this is evidence of nonsynchronous trading.
It could be that returns are genuinely predictable.2
Clearly, this is a cause for concern and needs to be
overcome. We suggest a method that does this in the
2 As a little aside, table 4.1 also illustrates
the danger of making inferences solely on the basis of
calculated autocorrelation coefficients. It would be
tempting to conclude that there is strong
autocorrelation which we can make use of in
forecasting future returns. This is wrong : the
autocorrelations merely illustrate the effect of an
autoregressive process on the autocorrelation
function. Examination of the partial autocorrelation
function would demonstrate that indeed the correlation
persists for one lag only, that is, we have an AR(1)
process.	 Estimation yields a coefficient of 0.4.
Using this to forecast five periods ahead, say, we
find that E(R,5 IRt ) 0.01Rt. The autocorrelation is
not as strong as the autocorrelation function
indicates.
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next subsection.
4 . 2 . 1.
	 A MODEL OF NONSYNCHRONOUS TRADING
The last part of the previous section highlights some
of the dangers that can occur if we argue that
nonsynchronicity generates an autoregressive structure
in returns. The problem here is that genuine
autocorrelation may be treated as evidence of
nonsynchronous trading and, although failure to
account for nonsynchronous trading can generate
misleading inferences, incorrectly accounting for it
can generate equally misleading inferences. 3 The
solution to this problem is found in rethinking the
effects of nonsynchronous trading on prices and hence
returns.
An alternative way to analyse the nonsynchronous
trading problem is to think of nontrading as a lag in
the reaction of security prices to new information.
If new information arrives in a random fashion, such
that shocks generated by new information are exogenous
and unpredictable, failure to react immediately to
3 For example, by using the residuals from their
ARMA models for observed returns as true returns,
Stoll and Whaley (1990) force true returns to be white
noise, that is, they impose market efficiency.
However, there is no a priori reason why market
efficiency should hold. Indeed, one could even argue
that with high frequency intra-daily it will not hold,
even in the futures market.
211
this new information will not generate autoregressive
behaviour in prices and hence returns. It will
generate moving average behaviour. Therefore, in the
presence of nonsynchronous trading, returns will have
a moving average component which reflects this delayed
reaction to new information. Whilst any moving
average process that is invertible can be written as
a stationary autoregressive process, this is not
advisable in this particular instance because
confusion such as that identified above could ensue.
What is required, then, is a model which is
interpretable as a moving average model.
We know from the arguments outlined in Harris (1989)
that the observed value of the portfolio consists of
the true underlying value plus an adjustment for
nonsynchronous trading. Therefore, we have
St = S: + ut
	(4.16)
where, as noted earlier, St is the observed value of
the portfolio and S is the true underlying value. ut
is a zero mean process which can be interpreted as the
nonsynchronous trading adjustment. This model is very
similar to Harris's (1989) starting point. Our model,
however, differs from Harris's (1989) by the way we
treat the estimation of both the unobserved true
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_yr - c/a t + ut (4.17)
portfolio value and the unobserved nonsynchronous
trading adjustment. Following Garrett (1991), (4.16)
can be viewed as an unobserved components model in
which the observed series consists of a signal (the
true underlying portfolio price) and noise (the
nonsynchronous trading adjustment). Treated in this
way, the nonsynchronous trading problem becomes a
signal extraction problem, with the signal to be
extracted being the true value of the portfolio.
Therefore, if we can extract this signal, we also have
a measure of the nonsynchronous trading adjustment.
A method that can be used to extract the signal is the
Kalman Filter. Using the notation in Harvey (1987),4
we can set up the model in state space form as
follows. We have the measurement equation, which is
given by
and the transition equation, given by
4 For a very detailed exposition of the
econometrics of the Kalman Filter, see Cuthbertson,
Hall and Taylor (1992) and for an application see
Haldane and Hall (1991).
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a
t 
= ea	 + v
tt-1 (4.18)
In the above equations, yt is the observed variable, zt
is a vector of parameters and oct is known as the state
vector. (4.18) describes the evolution of the state
vector through time, with A being a matrix of
parameters. ut and vt are zero mean random variables
with variances at,21-it and •5Qt respectively. Define now
6,1 as the best estimate or.t _ l and the covariance matrix
of this estimate as Pt _ i . We then have the following
prediction equations
arl t-i = °Itt-i
	 (4.19)
and
Prit-1 = ePt-l ei + Qt
	 (4.20)
The idea behind the Kalman Filter is that as
observations on the observed variable Yt become
available, so we can use this information to update
the prediction equations. The updating equations,
which define the Kalman Filter, are given by
(4.21)si
t = it tl t-1 + Pt' r _ i zt (yt - ;la d	 )/z1t-1.- • t Ptit-i zt + ht
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and
Pt	 PtIt-i	 Ptlt-l ztzt
 t I t-l izt Ptit-l zt	 ht
	 (4.22)
This model is estimated by maximum likelihood, with
the likelihood function being expressed as a function
of the one-step prediction errors. The final
requirement before estimation is the specification of
the various vectors involved in the state space
formulation. The specification we use is the local
linear trend model (see Harvey (1984, 1987) and
Chatfield (1989)). This is given by
	
St = St* + ut	 (4.23a)
St* = St*_,	 p t_,	 v
	 (4.23h)
	
Pt = P t-1 + Ct
	 (4.23c)
where pt represents a stochastic trend such that true
returns can evolve in a stochastic fashion if need be.
Formulating the problem in this manner provides
several advantages. First, it represents an intuitive
and simple way to analyse the problem. Second, as is
pointed out by Harvey (1984) and Chatfield (1989), the
system (4.23a-c) has the same properties as an
215
ARIMA(0,2,2) process and as such, it captures the
moving average behaviour we require. Third, it is
quite general since p can be restricted to zero. 5 If
it is, then the model can be written as an
ARIMA(0,1,1). The ARIMA(0,1,I) has been adopted in
some studies as an ad hoc method of accounting for
nonsynchronous trading effects (see, for example,
Baillie and Bollerslev (1990)). This practice now has
a sound justification. Given that the model, either
with or without 13=0, can always be written as an ARIMA
process, estimation is straightforward. Thus, this
model avoids the complexities of Harris's (1989)
model. We use this model in the next section as a
first step in modelling the intra-daily pricing
relationship between the FTSE 100 Index and the FTSE
100 Index futures contract.
4 . 3 .
	
MODELLING THE INTRA-DAILY PRICING
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FTSE 100 INDEX AND
FTSE 100 INDEX FUTURES CONTRACT
The data used in this chapter are minute by minute
values of the FTSE 100 Index and trade by trade data
for the FTSE 100 Index futures contract over the
period Monday 10th June 1991 to Friday 14th June 1991.
5 In fact, in the applications that follow in this
chapter and the next chapter, p is constrained to
zero.
216
The transactions prices for the June 1991 contract,
the nearest to maturity at the time, were used for the
futures price. However, a problem with the futures
data is that there was not always a transaction in any
one given minute. Indeed, there are some quite long
periods without any transactions in the futures
market, some lasting fifteen minutes or more. Where
there are no transactions in any one given minute but
bid and ask prices are quoted, we have used an average
of the bid and ask prices as the futures price. Those
minutes where there are no prices quoted at all,
whether they be bid, ask or transaction prices, for
the June contract have been deleted.
The nonsynchronous trading adjustment was estimated
using the log of the Index price for each day (with
any observations corresponding to those were no
futures transactions took place deleted) and is
plotted for each trading day is plotted in figures 3
through 7 overleaf. Figures have been multiplied by
100 for readability of the scales on the graphs. It
is evident from the graphs that the nonsynchronous
trading adjustment is very small, implying that
nonsynchronous trading is not a major problem with the
FTSE 100 Index. This finding is consistent with the
fact that first, the FTSE 100 Index generally
comprises big (so-called blue chip) companies whose
shares tend to trade more frequently and second, the
217
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smaller the Index, the less severe the nonsynchronous
trading problem is.'
More interesting are the graphs of the percentage
changes in futures prices for each of the trading
days, plotted in figures 8 through 12. They reveal
that the futures price fluctuations are roughly of the
same magnitude, whether they be positive or negative.
Moreover, this pattern of behaviour is consistent
across all of the trading days in the sample,
suggesting that whilst the futures is not thinly
traded, it is most certainly not heavily traded.
Let us now turn our attention to modelling the intra-
daily pricing relationship between the two markets.
The interesting issue is whether the results found on
a daily basis carry over to an intra-daily basis. We
consider first of all whether the adjusted Index and
futures price cointegrate on each of the trading days
and whether or not the cointegrating vector is the
basis. There is an extra testable restriction on the
cointegrating vector on an intra-daily basis : the
cost of carry is constant on an intra-daily basis and
therefore a natural hypothesis to test is whether this
is zero, which it could be for two reasons.
'More recent evidence from the US shows that, not
surprisingly, the nonsynchronous trading problem is
much worse for the S&P 500 Index as opposed to the
MMI, which only comprises twenty securities.
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First, the cost of carrying the spot portfolio to
maturity may be trivial. This may be the case because
the dividend yield from holding a portfolio that
mimics the FTSE 100 may not be great. Second, as the
futures contract approaches maturity, so the carrying
cost must approach zero. Clearly, we are analysing
prices for the June 1991 contract in the expiry month.
Therefore, in the context of the cointegrating
regression f t To + 11s, the two restrictions are that
yo = 0 and Ti = 1.
Tests for the appropriate lag length of the VAR are
presented in table 4.2. Through the nature of intra-
daily data, and to allow for a general enough
specification of the model, we test down from ten
lags, reducing the order of the VAR by one each time
until we obtain a rejection at the 1% level.' The
table shows that for the 10th, 11th and 14th the
appropriate lag length in the VAR is two, whilst the
11th requires three and the 13th five.
Tests for the number of cointegrating vectors and
tests of the restrictions placed on them are reported
in table 4.3. As in the previous chapter, the
7 The reason for doing this is that we have not
made a small sample correction because of the size of
the sample. However, it is likely that a statistic
that is significant at 5% would not be if the small
sample correction were made.
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2.848	 4.817*
2.851
	
4.822*
TABLE 4.3 : TESTS FOR THE NUMBER OF COINTEGRATING
VECTORS AND TESTS OF THE RESTRICTIONS ON THE VECTORS
(H:: r=0, HZ: r=1 ; Hbo :r1, Hbi:r=2)
10TH JUNE	 11TH JUNE
H:	 Hbo	 H:	 Hbo
kmax 29.82	 2.901 25.87	 3.509
32.72	 2.901 29.38	 3.509
RESTRICTIONS :
To = 0 : x2(1)
yi = 1 : X2(1)
Notes
* denotes significant at 5%
" denotes significant at 1%
Critical Values (Johansen and Juselius (1990) Table
A.3.)
90%	 95%
r=0	 7.563
	 9.094
r=1	 13.78
	
15.75
trace	 r=0	 7.563
	
9.094
r=1	 17.96
	
20.17
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TABLE 4.3 CONT...
(H::r=0, III:r=1 ; Hbo :r1, Hbi:r=2)
12TH JUNE
	 13TH JUNE
H:
	 Hbo
28.73	 2.745 21.67
	 3.701
Xtrace
RESTRICTIONS :
yo = 0 : x2(1)
yi = 1 : x2(1)
Notes
31.47	 2.745	 25.37
	 3.701
9.062"	 2.896
9.081"	 2.902
* denotes significant at 5%
" denotes significant at 1%
Critical Values (Johansen and Juselius (1990) Table
A.3.)
90%	 95%
r=0	 7.563
	
9.094
r=1
	 13.78
	
15.75
Xtrace
	 r=0	 7.563
	
9.094
r=1
	 17.96
	
20.17
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TABLE 4.3 CONT...
(H::r=0, HI: r=1 ; Hbo :r..1, Hbi :r=2)
14TH JUNE
H:	 Hbo
16.87
	 3.520
Xt.. 
	 20.39	 3.520
RESTRICTIONS :
yo = 0 : e(1)
yl = 1 : 7c2(1)
Notes
0.355
0.356
* denotes significant at 5%
" denotes significant at 1%
Critical Values (Johansen and Juselius (1990) Table
A.3.)
x..
Xtrace
90% 95%
r=0 7.563 9.094
r=1 13.78 15.75
r=0 7.563 9.094
r=1 17.96 20.17
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Johansen procedure is used to test for the number of
cointegrating vectors (Johansen (1988) and Johansen
and Juselius (1990)). In all cases the null of zero
cointegrating vectors is rejected whilst the null of
one cointegrating vector is not. 8 Therefore, the two
variables are 1(1), with a linear combination of them
being stationary. The interesting question is whether
the linear combination is the basis, as required for
effectively functioning equity markets. 8 In all cases
but the 12th, both the proportionality and zero cost
of carry restrictions cannot be rejected at the 1%
level.	 For the 12th, the cointegrating vector is
given by f t	1.2713s - 2.1229.
With the exception of the 12th, then, the foundations
for the effective functioning of both markets on an
intra-daily is there. However, in moving to the
identification problem, the equations for both markets
on each day could be identified. The final equations
are reported in table 4.4 overleaf. Qsc(-) is the Box-
8 For the 13th June, we also tested for the number
of cointegrating vectors using seven lags in the VAR,
given that the reduction of the VAR from seven lags to
six is rejected quite strongly at the 5% level,
although it is not rejected at the 1% level. The null
of zero cointegrating vectors was marginally accepted.
The estimated cointegrating vector and the statistics
testing the restrictions were not altered.
9 Alternatively, if the proportionality
restriction is acceptecl_but the zero cost of carry
restriction is not, we have the basis adjusted for the
cost of carry as the cointegrating vector. The same
arguments with regard to effectiveness still apply.
234
TABLE 4.4 : MODELLING THE INTRA-DAILY PRICING
RELATIONSHIP.
10TH JUNE 1991
Number of Observations 286
FUTURES
Aft = -0.359 Aft_i
(-7.067)
(25c (10) = 8.532
	 QH(10) = 5.360
INDEX
A st
 = 0.566A st _ 1 + 0.014ecmt_1
(17.65)
	 (5.548)
Q5c (10) = 9.532	 QH(10) = 13.88
Notes
ecmt _ i denotes the error correction term which is the
basis if the restrictions are valid. If not, it is as
given in the text.
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TABLE 4.4 CONT....
11TH JUNE 1991
Number of Observations 327
FUTURES
Aft = 
-0.204A f.1
( -4.016)
Q5c (10) = 6.353	 QH(10) = 9.892
INDEX
A st = 0.786A st _ 1 + 0.007eant_1
(29.88)	 (4.676)
Qs(10) = 10.92	 QH(10) = 22.93
Notes
ecm, 1 denotes the error correction term which is the
basis if the restrictions are valid. If not, it is as
given in the text.
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TABLE 4 . 4 CONT . • • •
12TH JUNE 1991
Number of Observations = 293
FUTURES :
Aft
 = -0.211 A ft _ i - 0.145 Aft _2 + 2.053A s t _ i
 -1.943A st_2
(-3.876)	 (-2.663)	 (4.181)	 (-3.965)
Q5 ( 10) = 4.280	 QH (10) = 7.301
INDEX
	
A st = 0.786A s
	 -0.147 A ft _2 + 0.007 ecmt_i
	(29.88)	 (-2.418)	 (4.676)
Qsc (10) = 18.29	 QH(10) = 14.19
Notes
ecmt _ i
 denotes the error correction term which is the
basis if the restrictions are valid. If not, it is as
given in the text.
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TABLE 4.4 CONT....
13TH JUNE 1991
Number of Observations = 302
FUTURES :
A4 = - 0.140Aft _ 1
 - 0.135,6,4_ 3 - 0.103A f 6 -0.652A st_3
( -2.768)	 ( -2.685)	 (-2.047)	 (-2.202)
Qsc.(10) = 3.798	 QH (10) = 12.07
INDEX :
st
 = 0.663 A st _1 + 0.014A 4_ 3 + 0.144,6,4_4
 + 0.011ecnit_1
(20.96)	 (2.900)	 (3.053)	 (5.226)
Q5c (10) = 18.22	 QH(10) = 13.94
Notes
ecmt _ i denotes the error correction term which is the
basis if the restrictions are valid. If not, it is as
given in the text.
238
TABLE 4.4 CONT....
14TH JUNE 1991
Number of Observations = 289
FUTURES :
Aft = - 0.261 Aft _ i - 0.138Aft_2
(-4.878)	 (-2.596)
Qsc (10) = 5.592	 QH(10) = 5.583
INDEX
	
A st -= 0.554A s
	 + 0.009ecmt_1
	
(11.69)	 (4.338)
Q5c (10) = 11.22	 QH(10) = 5.033
Notes
ecm 1 denotes the error correction term which is the
basis if the restrictions are valid. If not, it is as
given in the text.
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Pierce test for serial correlation in the residuals,
distributed x2 (.) under the null of no serial
correlation, and W.) tests for serial correlation in
the squared residuals, that is, it is a test for ARCH,
distributed x2 (.) under the null hypothesis of no ARCH
effects.
Examining the diagnostics for the models, all are
insignificant at the 1% level and thus the models are
generally well specified. The interesting point to
note is that whilst contemporaneous values are not
significant in either equation on all of the days, a
'structural' model can still be identified. The
implication of this is that equity markets are neither
effectively functioning nor efficient when examined
intra-daily. Each of the equations can be identified
and therefore prices in both markets can be forecast
using past information. Clearly, this is the source
of both the ineffectiveness and the inefficiency.
It is interesting to note how this situation may
arise. One of the findings in the literature on
cointegration is that if the error correction term
(the cointegrating vector) is significant in only one
of the equations, then there is weak exogeneity. In
this case, in no instance is the cointegrating vector
significant in the futures equation. Therefore, the
change in the futures price is weakly exogenous for
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the change in the Index price. Moreover, on the 10th,
11th and 14th June the futures price is strongly
exogenous, that is, it is weakly exogenous for Index
returns, plus Index returns do not Granger cause
movements in the futures price : on these days the
movement in the Index futures price is best described
by an autoregressive process. For the futures market
to be effectively independent of the stock market
implies something is not functioning effectively.
That the basis is insignificant in the futures
equation	 suggests	 that	 the source of the
ineffectiveness and inefficiency is improper
functioning of arbitrage : it would appear to be
uni—directional whereas it should be bi-directional.
Thus, again by analysing the pricing relationship
within the context of the framework developed in
chapter two it is possible to infer likely sources of
ineffectiveness. It certainly appears to be the case
that from the evidence presented above, the blame lies
with ineffective functioning of arbitrage through the
fact that the stock index futures market is exogenous
to the stock market when in actual fact it should be
endogenous.
A final point worthy of note is the absence of (G)ARCH
effects in the models estimated above. This finding
singularly contrasts with findings in the US. For
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example, Chan, Chan and Karolyi (1991) examine the
relationship between intraday price changes and price
change volatility for the S&P 500 Index and S&P Index
futures contract. They specify returns as a vector
autoregressive process with vector GARCH errors and
find significant GARCH effects that persist. However,
consider their specification of the vector
autoregression for returns in both markets : it is a
VAR specified in first differences. Thus the critique
of tests of lead-lag relationships presented in
chapter two is equally applicable in this context,
that is, their model is misspecified. In this case,
then, the GARCH effects may not be genuine : they may
be more indicative of misspecification, something
which we have avoided here by utilising the framework
presented in chapter two for the analysis of pricing
relationships between spot and futures markets.
4 . 4 .	 CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter we have used minute by minute data on
the FTSE 100 Index and the FTSE 100 Index futures
contract for one week in June 1991 to analyse the
pricing relationship on an intra-daily basis to
determine if equity markets still function
effectively. A problem with the Index (and portfolios
in general) is that on an intra-daily time scale it
may suffer from nonsynchronous trading effects. The
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upshot of this is that the observed value of the Index
does not reflect its true value and therefore any
inferences based on it are misleading.
To overcome this problem, we proposed a new method to
estimate the nonsynchronous trading adjustment,
formulating the problem as one of signal extraction,
where the signal is extracted using the Kalman Filter.
This method overcomes problems with other models
proposed in the literature, in particular by modelling
nonsynchronous trading not as an autoregressive
process, which may in actual fact be genuine
correlation, but as a moving average process. That
nonsynchronicity generates a moving average error has
intuitive appeal since one can then recast the problem
of nonsynchronous trading as one of slow adjustment to
new information.
Utilising this model, we estimated the nonsynchronous
trading adjustment for the Index on each of the days
and found it to be small. Armed with the adjusted
Index, we then proceeded to examine whether both the
stock index futures market and the stock market could
be said to function effectively on an intra-daily time
scale. We find that the first necessary condition,
that the cointegrating vector be the basis, holds on
all days bar one. However, the second necessary
condition, that of under identification of the system,
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does not hold. Indeed, one can develop models that
can be used in forecasting prices in both markets. In
addition, an at first sight puzzling result emerges
the futures market is exogenous to the stock market,
as evidenced by the insignificance of the basis in the
equation for movements in the futures price.	 By
implication, arbitrage is only uni-directional and
therefore the markets can not possibly function
effectively. It is tempting to blame the stock index
futures market for this situation. However, one must
be careful for it may be equally valid that the
differing nature of the trading systems, in particular
the pure dealership system operated on the
International Stock Exchange, discourages arbitrage
trades.
If this scenario is the correct one, then the blame
lies with the stock market. Moreover, the
significance of the error correction term then
represents the stock market adjusting to information
provided by the futures market. We investigate these
possibilities in a little more detail in the next
chapter to see if it is possible to pin down the cause
of the crash to one particular market.
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CHAPTER FIVE : THE OCTOBER 1987 STOCK MARKET
CRASH
5 . 1 .	 INTRODUCTION
Events in the international financial markets on the
days surrounding the so-called Black Monday have
variously been labelled a panic, a debacle, a long-
overdue price correction, the burst of a speculative
bubble and so on, the list seems potentially endless.
Indeed, there was such concern about the speed with
which prices fell and the sheer volume of shares that
were traded that the then President of the United
States formed a task force to investigate the role of
market mechanisms in financial markets and in
particular to determine whether the market mechanism
ceased to serve its proper function on the days in
question. Moreover, such was the concern with which
the crash was viewed that the Task Force was ordered
to report within sixty days.
It is apparent then that some form of investigation
into the crash is necessary in order to determine what
happened to the market mechanism in financial markets
on the 19th and 20th October 1987.1
1 Note that here we are not interested in the
cause(s) of the crash but rather what turned the
initial downward pressure into the alarming decline in
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There is no shortage of proposed explanations for why
the market break took place. Indeed, as Roll (1988)
notes, the one industry that has positively flourished
since the crash is the production of explanations as
to why it took place in the first place. Most of
these 'explanations' seem to lay the blame fairly and
squarely at the door of the US, particularly the size
of its trade deficit, with the initial downward
pressure supposedly being exacerbated by such factors
as concurrent trading in stock index futures,
computer-assisted trading, portfolio insurance sales
and a whole host of other institutional
characteristics that comprise the world financial
system.
It is obviously of concern to determine the cause(s)
of the crash (see Roll (1988) for one explanation), if
for no other reason than to prevent it happening again
given the profound effect it had on the confidence of
world markets. However, of perhaps greater importance
is the determination of what actually caused the
initial downward pressure to be converted into the
alarming decline in prices that followed.
prices that followed. Roll (1988) has investigated
the cause(s) of the crash, though for a critique of
the method he uses see Garrett (1991a,b).
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Attempting to explain what happened becomes even more
important when one considers the fact that strong
selling pressures generated by the market break
threatened, and could easily threaten again, the
short-term liquidity and long-term solvency of the
financial markets so very important in the effective
functioning of a modern economy. This point is
elegantly summarised on the first page of the report
of the Presidential Task Force (1988)
'The significance of this decline lies in
the role that the stock market plays in a
modern industrial economy...Stock price
.levels can have an important effect on the
confidence and hence the behaviour of both
businesses and households.. .Equity markets
are inextricably linked to the wider
financial system through the structure of
banks and other financial institutions.
Given the importance of equity markets to
the public, effectively structured and
functioning equity markets are vital.'
Clearly the crash provoked widespread concern over the
notion of effectively functioning stock markets and,
by association, stock index futures markets. 2 Various
aspects of the crash have been examined in some detail
in the US (see, for example, Blume, MacKinlay and
Terker (1989), Furbush (1989), Harris (1989) and
Netter and Mitchell (1989)).	 These studies have
2 Indeed, one only has to examine the speed with
which the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel
Lawson, reacted by lowering interest rates to avoid
the feared recession that would follow the crash.
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focused on the role of stock index futures in the US
market decline, following on from the discussion of
their role in the Presidential Task Force Report
(1988). As yet, however, there has been little
systematic empirical investigation of the crash in the
UK. We aim to rectify this here.
In previous chapters, the daily pricing relationship
was examined and an important point that emerges is
the importance of the basis in the pricing
relationship given its role its role in the arbitrage
process and also its natural interpretation as the
error correction mechanism which prevents prices in
the two markets drifting apart without bound. In this
chapter, we investigate the pricing relationship
between the stock market and the stock index futures
market using minute by minute values of the Index and
minute by minute transaction prices for the December
1987 stock index futures contract.
We examine the pricing relationship between the two
markets because this should allow us to determine
whether the link between the two markets deteriorated
to such an extent that the two markets effectively
functioned as separate entities rather than acting as
if they were one market. This latter scenario is the
one that should occur given the inextricable links
between derivative and underlying spot markets.
248
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The
next section provides an overview of events
surrounding the stock market crash to set the scene.
In section three we briefly review the nonsynchronous
trading problem and consider the extent to which
nonsynchronous trading contributed to the observed
behaviour of the markets on the 19th and 20th October
1987. In section four we model the minute by minute
pricing relationship to determine whether or not the
arbitrage link, so crucial to the effective
functioning of equity markets broke and if it did,
what precipitated the break. Section five concludes.
5 . 2 .	 THE CRASH
During the months preceding the worldwide market break
of October 1987 the performance of stock markets
differed quite markedly from country to country.
However, by October 1987 all stock markets were
generally moving in the same direction : downwards
with most markets suffering falls in the region of 20%
(Roll (1988) p.21). This co-movement of all major
stock markets appears to provide support to the belief
that for too long stock markets had been overvaluing
equity and a major price correction was due, 3 a point
3 In terms of equity prices in relation to
fundamentals, the well-known dividend valuation model
(or, to use the terminology of Shiller (1981), the
efficient markets model) did not hold, that is, equity
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that is confirmed by figures 3.1 and 3.2 in chapter
three. It is clear from these graphs that the crash
returned price levels to their pre-Big Bang trend.
The relatively sharp upward trend in prices that
commenced in the UK with Big Bang had begun to falter
by April 1987 in the New York and London markets with
Tokyo following suit in June. Despite this potential
early warning signal, by September all three markets
had embarked upon another sharp upward swing.
Such was the extent of the bull market that prevailed
pre-October 1987 that at its peak, the London market
was experiencing share price levels 46% higher than
those at the beginning of 1987, with New York and
Tokyo experiencing peaks of 44% and 42% respectively
(Bank of England (1988) p.51). With the benefit of
hindsight, it is not surprising that some form of
price correction was overdue.
The downturn in share prices commenced on October 6th
and prices fell almost continuously over the next two
trading weeks. The most telling evidence of what was
to come can be found by examining the New York market
on the 14th, 15th and 16th October, where the Dow
Jones Index fell by 95 points, 58 points and 108
prices did not reflect the expected present value of
future dividends.
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points on respective days (Bank of England (1988)).
This substantial downturn signalled the worldwide
collapse that was to follow, 4 the FTSE 100 Index
opening 138 points down and closing 250 points down on
October 19th5 (Bank of England (1988)). What emerges
from this, however, is an apparently surprising
difference in attitudes between the US and UK
authorities as to the role derivative markets, and
stock index futures in particular, played in the
decline.
The Presidential Task Force Report (1988) pays
considerable attention to the importance of stock
index futures in the decline. This singularly
contrasts with the view taken by the Bank of England
that
4 It is interesting that in attempting to explain
the cause of the crash, Roll (1988) intimates that the
crash cannot be traced back to the US since the
American markets are the last to trade on any given
trading day. In examining the transmission of
international stock market movements over the period
1980-1985, however, Eun and Shim (1989) found that
innovations in non-American markets had very little
effect on the US markets whereas innovations in the US
markets were rapidly transmitted to markets in other
countries. This seems to concur with the pattern of
events surrounding the crash.
5 The International_Stock Exchange in London did
not open on the 16th October due to severe storms in
the south of England. Consequently the collapse in
share prices seems all the more bewildering.
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'...the interaction of the cash and
derivative products markets seems to have
played a very limited direct role in the
crash in London.' (Bank of England (1988)
p.57).
Whilst this may be true, figures for the daily trading
volume and open interest of the December futures
contract on the 19th and 20th appear to tell a
different story, with approximately 10,000 contracts
traded on each day, approximately double that of any
other near-maturity contract in 1987. 6 This
reinforces the fact that we cannot overlook the
importance of stock index futures in the market
decline and in particular the change (if any) in the
pricing relationship on these two crucial days in
stock market history.
5 . 3 .
	 NONSYNCHRONOUS TRADING AND THE CRASH
In this section, we address the issue of
nonsynchronous trading and whether this contributed to
the observed behaviour of the markets on the 19th and
20th October 1987. Harris (1989) investigated this
issue for the US markets and concluded that
nonsynchronous trading could explain some of the
6 At the time of the crash, the December contract
was nearest to maturity. Recall that the other
expiration months for the FTSE 100 stock index futures
contract are March, June and September. The
expiration date is the last trading day of the
expiration month.
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observed behaviour of the basis, but not all.
However, how much confidence we can have in Harris's
results is unsure since he draws this conclusion
solely on the basis of graphical analysis. We
investigate the issue in a more rigorous fashion in
the next subsection.
5 . 3 . 1.	 THE DATA AND THE NONSYNCHRONOUS TRADING
ADJUSTMENT
The data we use to model the pricing relationship are
minute by minute values of the FTSE 100 Stock Index
and minute by minute transactions prices' for the
December 1987 FTSE 100 Stock Index futures contract
for the 19th and 20th October 1987. The data are for
the period 09.05 to 16.05 on both days. The data were
kindly provided by the International Stock Exchange
and LIFFE and are plotted in figures 1 and 2 overleaf.
One of the interesting features of the data is the
fact that the futures appears to have traded at a
discount which was at times substantial. This point
is confirmed in figures 3 and 4 overleaf, where the
minute by minute basis is graphed for both days. The
' There are a few minutes during both days where
transactions never took-place. In this case, we use
an average of the bid-ask quotes for that minute.
These periods of no trading are, however, very few and
far between.
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size of the basis on both days would appear to be
indicative of the presence of arbitrage opportunities.
An interesting issue to be analysed is why these
apparent opportunities for arbitrage persisted.
However, as we know from chapter four, caution must be
exercised at this point for, as we have seen
previously, one must be careful in uncritically using
the data for the FTSE 100 Index since the recorded
value is unlikely to reflect its true value. This
arises because not all shares within the Index will
necessarily trade in any one given minute. Some will
react to new information with a time lag, leading to
the so-called problem of nonsynchronous trading
whereby the reported value of the Index contains old,
or stale, prices.
Removing the effects of nonsynchronous trading, then,
is important if we are to obtain an accurate measure
of the basis. Recall from chapter four that the
nonsynchronous trading problem to be considered can be
stated as follows
Sr = S: + ut
	 (5.1)
where St is the observed value of the Index, S, which
is unobservable, is the true value of the Index and ut
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is the nonsynchronous trading adjustment. Following
Garrett (1991), and as discussed in chapter four,
(5.1) should be treated as an unobserved components
model. By doing this, we can extract S * using the
Kalman Filter. 8 The specification of the model that
we use is the local linear trend model (Harvey (1987))
which is given by
St = St
 + ut
	 (5.2a)
st* = st*_ 1 	 p t-1 + V ,
	 (5.2b)
Pt =	 Ct
	 (5.2c)
The system given by (5.2) was estimated using (the log
of the) minute-by-minute recorded value of the FTSE
100 Index to generate the nonsynchronous trading
adjustment. Graphs of the nonsynchronous trading
adjustment to the Index', minus the first five
observations lost through the initialisation of the
Kalman Filter are presented in figures 5 and 6
overleaf.
8 We will not repeat the econometrics of the
Kalman Filter as they were discussed in chapter four
and are not essential to the argument here.
9 The figures are multiplied by 100 for
readability.
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As can be seen, the adjustment is relatively small on
both days, perhaps reflecting the fact that the Index
only comprises 100 shares. 1° The fact that the
nonsynchronous adjustment is small implies that
nonsynchronicity alone cannot explain why prices in
both markets fell so dramatically and in unison. In
order to test this proposition, we regress the basis
on the nonsynchronous trading adjustment estimated
from the system (5.2). However, before we report the
results of these models for the 19th and 20th, one
point worth commenting on is the behaviour of the
basis.
The time series of the basis on both the 19th and the
20th October, plotted in figures 3 and 4, appears to
have quite substantial variation, more than we would
expect. This would appear to suggest that the
variance of the basis changes over time and as such
any attempt to model the effect the nonsynchronous
trading adjustment has on the basis must take this
time variation in the variance into account.
That the variance of financial time series can change
over time is not a new concept (see Mandlebrot (1963)
and Fama (1965) for example). However, it is only in
10 This seems consistent with results emerging
from the US showing that, as one would expect, those
indices comprised of more shares suffer more from the
problems of nonsynchronous trading.
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happens because large price changes
uncertainty and, as price changes
variance will not. The argument
recent years, with the advent of ARCH (Engle (1982))
and its extensions (Bollerslev (1986), Engle, Lilien
and Robins (1987), Bollerslev, Engle and Wooldridge
(1988), Nelson (1991) to name but a very few) that
changing variance in a series has been modelled
explicitly.
The ARCH model, first introduced by Engle (1982) is
based on the rather simple observation that large
price changes tend to be followed by large price
changes and small price changes tend to be followed by
small price changes, but of unpredictable sign. In
this situation, whilst the unconditional variance of
the returns series will be constant, the conditional
is measured by the conditional
here is that this
generate increased
fluctuate between
If uncertainty
variance, then this
large and small, so will uncertainty.
must change as well.	 In particular, it will be
autoregressive, hence ARCH (AutoRegressive Conditional
Heteroscedasticity). To capture the effects of a
changing conditional variance, Engle (1982) proposed
that the conditional variance of a series E(eflfk).cy
where 4 is the information set at time t, be
parameterised as
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, the
q 2
cr
2 
=	 + E a g e t-4
i=1
where co > 0 and ai  0. This model is the linear
ARCH(q) model. The problem with this model is that
often q is chosen to be quite large and thus, to
ensure that more distant shocks have a smaller impact,
an ad hoc linearly declining lag structure has to be
imposed. Bollerslev (1986) overcame this problem by
generalising Engle's (1982) ARCH model. The model
proposed by Bollerslev (1986) is the GARCH(p,q) model
and can be thought of as the ARCH equivalent to the
ARMA(p,q) model (Box and Jenkins (1970)). The
GARCH(p,q) model is given by
4	 P2	 2	 2
a t = (A) + E a i et-t + E Piat-i
1=1	 i=1
This model has proved to be extremely popular in
modelling financial time series (see the bibliography
in Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992)), primarily
(5.3)
(5.4)
because it has two attractive features.
GARCH(1,1) specification almost invariably best
describes the behaviour of the conditional variance
and second, it allows for a unit root in the
conditional variance such that shocks to the
conditional variance are permanent. If the latter is
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the case, then the series has an integrated GARCH
(IGARCH) representation. This will occur if the sum
of the a i 's and P i 's is equal to one. To give some
indication of how the conditional variance may change,
a simulated stationary GARCH(1,1) process is plotted
in figure 5.7.11
To examine whether nonsynchronous trading contributed
to the observed behaviour of the markets, we formalise
Harris (1989) and estimate the following model for
both the 19th and 20th, with the conditional variance
evolving as a GARCH(1,1) process
(f-s) r 	 a o	 a 1(f-s) r-1 	 a z ar 	 a 3 12r-1 + Et
	 (5.5)
where ü is the estimated nonsynchronous trading
adjustment and lower case letters denote variables in
natural logarithms. Estimation of (5.5) yields
(standard errors in parentheses, T.415)
For figure 7,
2
a
2 
= 0.25€
2 
+ 0
-
6 a t-1r-i
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i) 19th October
(f-s) t = 0.00 + 0.96 (f-s) t _ 1 - 0.184t + 0.204„,
(0.00)	 (0.01)	 (0.07)	 (0.08)
a t2 = 0.13 10 5 + 0.204_ 1 + 0.61 at2_1
(0.20 -6 )	 (0.04)	 (0.05)
ii) 20th October
• (f-s), = 0.00 + 0.96 (f-s) t _ i + 0.454 t - 0.154t_i
(0.00)	 (0.01)	 (1.03)	 (1.26)
2
at = 0.31 W
-4 
+ 0.38e_ + 0.23 at2_1
(O .63 105 )
	
(0.08)	 (0.11)
Likelihood ratio tests testing the restrictions a2=cc3=0
yield x2 (2).13.14 for the 19th and x2 (2)=0.24 for the
20th. The restrictions are clearly rejected for the
19th, but are accepted on the 20th. Therefore,
nonsynchronous trading did explain some of the
variation in the basis on the 19th, although it
explained none of the variation on the 20th. However,
the effect of the nonsynchronous trading adjustment is
small relative to the effect of the previous period's
basis and it can by no means explain the behaviour of
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the basis. One possible explanation of this is that,
as Harris (1989) found for the US, the relationship
between the two markets actually broke down completely
on at least one of the days. We turn attention to
examining this possibility in the next section of the
chapter.
5 . 4 .	 DID THE LINK BREAK?
From the framework presented in chapter two, any
analysis of the pricing relationship should be
conducted in the context of a VAR, taking into account
the arbitrage link between the two markets which can
be identified as the basis. The basis provides this
link theoretically through its role in index arbitrage
and econometrically through its role as the error
correction mechanism which ensures that the two prices
do not drift apart without bound, that is, it ensures
that in the long-run f.s. Thus, as in previous
chapters, we begin our analysis in the context of the
VAR reparameterised in error correction form (Johansen
(1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990))
Aye = p +	 +
	
"k-1 A Yt-k+1 31Yr-k Ut
	 (5.6)
where r-1 represents the long-run response matrix.
Writing the long-run response matrix as 1-1,4', then
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the linear combinations P i xt _k will be I(0) if there is
cointegration, with a being the adjustment
coefficients, and the long-run response matrix will be
of reduced rank. The Johansen test for cointegration
is then based on testing the rank of the matrix H.
Denoting rank cm by r, recall that there are three
possibilities. First, r=0 in which case all of the
variables are I(1) and there are no cointegrating
vectors. Second, r.N in which case all of the
variables are I(0) and there will be N cointegrating
vectors given that any linear combination of
stationary variables will also be stationary.
Finally, 0<r<N in which case there will be r linear
combinations of the nonstationary variables that are
stationary, that is, there will be r cointegrating
vectors or, equivalently, N-r common stochastic
trends.
The advantage of using the Johansen procedure for our
purposes here is that it is possible to test
restrictions on the cointegrating vectors, the
statistics being x 2 distributed. This is particularly
useful in this case since we know the form the
cointegrating vector should take.
For the basis to be the cointegrating vector, we
require proportionality to hold, that is, in terms of
the equation f,	 70 + 1 1s, + e„ we require yi to be
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equal to one. 70 can be interpreted as the cost of
carry in this case since on an intra-day basis it will
be constant and if the futures contract is near
maturity, it should be near zero. Table 5.1 overleaf
reports the test statistics discussed in Johansen and
Juselius (1990) for the number of cointegrating
vectors and also tests the restrictions on the
cointegrating vectors.
The null hypothesis of zero cointegrating vectors is
rejected at the 5% level on both days whilst the null
of one cointegrating vector cannot be rejected. 12 It
is clear, then, that both variables are I(1), a point
which is confirmed graphically in figures 8 through
11, with the linear combination being I(0).
What is interesting from these results is the form of
the cointegrating vector for the two days. This
provides us with a first idea as to what happened on
these two days. The important restriction here is the
proportionality restriction, though the cost of carry
restriction does have minor interest. 12 The
12 For critical values see Johansen and Juselius
(1990), table A3.
12 The zero restriction is not so important for if
the homogeneity restriction were valid but the zero
cost of carry restriction were not, the error
correction term would simply be the basis adjusted for
the cost of carrying and this is what arbitrageurs
would compare with transactions costs to see if
arbitrage opportunities were available.
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HboH:
TABLE 5.1 : TESTS FOR THE NuMBER OF COINTEGRATING
VECTORS AND TESTS OF THE RESTRICTIONS ON THE VECTORS
(HZ:n=0, HZ:n=1 ; le:r1, 1-111:r=2)
19TH OCTOBER	 20TH OCTOBER
x,...
X trace
21.71
25.31
3.606
3.606
18.51
23.83
5.318
5.318
RESTRICTIONS :
yo = 0 : x2 ( 1 ) 14.17 2.339
yi = 1 : x2 (1) 14.13 2.233
Notes
Critical Values (Johansen and Juselius (1990) Table
A.3.)
90%	 95%
r=0	 7.563	 9.094
r=1	 13.78	 15.75
xtrace
	 r=0	 7.563	 9.094
r=1	 17.96	 20.17
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FIGURE 5.8: PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN FUTURES PRICE
19TH OCTOBER 1987
1 5
- 1.3
9:10	 10:10	 11:10
	 1210	 1310	 14:10	 1.510
TIME (MINUTES)
03
0.2
0.1
- 0.1
-0.2
- 0.3
- 0.4
FIGURE 5.9: PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN ADJUSTED INDEX PRICE
19TH OCTOBER 1987
9.10	 10:10	 11:10	 1210	 13:10
	 14.10	 15:10
TIME (MINUTES)
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FIGURE 5.10: PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN FUTURES PRICE
20TH OCTOBER 1987
10	 10t10	 11:10	 1210	 1310	 1410	 1310
TIME (MINUTES)
FIGURE 5.11: PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN ADJUSTED INDEX PRICE
20TH OCTOBER 1987
9:10	 10:10	 11:10	 1Z10	 1310	 14:10
	
15:10
TIME (MINUTES)
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proportionality restriction is strongly rejected for
the 19th October, as, less importantly, is the zero
cost of carry restriction.
The implication of this is that whilst the two markets
were linked on the 19th, that link was not the basis
(adjusted for the cost of carry) and therefore, by
implication, the link was not the one provided by
index arbitrage. Indeed, for the 19th, the
cointegrating vector is given by ft=1.2704st-2.0765.
The evidence, then, suggests that the arbitrage link
did not operate effectively on the 19th October : the
important link between the two markets broke down.
The implication of this is that the mechanism that
serves to stabilise prices in both markets, index
arbitrage, would not serve its purpose. If stock
index futures prices were falling such that the
futures price was below its fair value and outside of
the no-arbitrage window then arbitrageurs would buy
futures and sell stock. Initial selling pressure
would then be transmitted from the stock index futures
market to the stock market. If the futures price then
rose so that it lay outside the upper no-arbitrage
window, then the reverse trade would be initiated and
buying pressure would be transmitted from the stock
index futures market. Thus, the futures price would
fluctuate around its equilibrium value and the basis
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would be stationary.
However, the basis on the 19th is best described as a
martingale process such that arbitrage trades based on
the basis would be incorrect trades since the basis
was nonstationary and thus of little guide in
determining the existence of arbitrage opportunities.
In other words, the markets could not possibly have
been effectively functioning on the 19th because the
first necessary condition does not hold.
This was not the case on the 20th, when the link
between the two markets was the basis and again, by
implication, the arbitrage link was restored. We will
return to the question of how this might have occurred
later. What we appear to observe, then, is different
behaviour by the markets on the two different days.
On the 20th, the error correction term was the basis
whilst on the 19th it was not.
It must be noted, however, that some link did still
exist on the 19th because both prices continued to
fall in unison. The implication of this is that we
should observe differences in the behaviour of the
pricing relationship between the two markets on both
days.
From the discussion in earlier chapters, and the
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cointegration results, we know that the pricing
relationship should be modelled in the context of the
error correction representation of the VAR. Given the
evidence of significant ARCH effects documented by
Antoniou and Garrett (1989), we estimate the models
using the GARCH(1,1) specification (see Bollerslev
(1986)). Starting from a model with 10 lags of each
variable (except the error correction term, which is
lagged once), 14 we obtained the parsimonious models
reported overleaf. The models seem to he adequately
specified with none of the diagnostic tests being
significant at the 1% level.'s
Turning our attention to the results, an interesting
scenario emerges. If both the equity and futures
markets were effectively functioning then the basis
should be significant in explaining price movements in
both markets.	 However, we observe something very
different.
" We realise of course that the choice of lag
length is somewhat ad hoc. However, 10 minutes does
not seem an unreasonable starting point for our
analysis given the extraordinary events that took
place on those two fateful days.
The standardised residuals used in the
construction of the Box-Pierce-type tests are given by
CO'.t rt-  The test for heteroscedasticity is based on the
autocorrelation function of the squared standardised
residuals.
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A44 	0	 0 IA4,1
ASt4 (0im) (0.000)
0.007	 0
(2.045) (0.000)
0	 0 [44-91 4105 [ecmt_]
l
Afr-s
As,a1+ (0.000) (0.000) ks,-cr (-2.51)
0.022	 0 0
(8.146) (0.000) (0.000)
TABLE 5.2 : ESTIMATED EQUATIONS
19TH
[AA4si=
OCTOBER 1987
0	 1.198 1[44_ 1 1
(0.000) (3.083) [Ast_il
0.010	 0.194
0
(0.000)
0.014
0
(0.000)
0211
(2.768) (3.613) (5.021) (3.613)
0 o 44.4 0 0
(3.000) (0.000) A3 + (0.000) (0.000)
0.015 0.146 0.011 0.049
(4.423) (3.497) (2.760) (2.022)
0 0 P441	 0 0
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)[Als,A+ (0.000)
0.003 0 0.012 0
(0.934) (0.000) (4.101) (0.000)
14441 	 0	 0 [A4_,1
A3_21 (0.000) (0.000) [As,..3.1
0.011 0.143
(3.367) (4.446)
0.132
(5.2941
0.002
(6.765)
+
0218
(3.973)
0
(0.000)
0
(0.000)
0.988
(1227)
ti2a-11
2	 4.
0.605
(10.99)
0
(0.000)
0
(0.000)
0.046
(1.021)
[
02	 I
At-1
20s,t_l
Futures :
	
Qsc(10)=15.86	 QH(10)=5.06
Index	 Qsc ( 1 0 ) =1 6 . 3 5 	QH ( 1 0 ) 	. 10
Notes
Figures in parentheses are t ratios
Constants in the variance equation are multiplied by
10 for readability
Qsc(.) is a portmanteau test for serial correlation in
the standardised residuals.
QH (.) is a portmanteau test for heteroscedasticity in
the standardised residuals.
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2 0 TH OCTOBER 1 9 8 7
Al,[As,
-0.29	 0
(-4.60) (0.000)
0	 0
(0.000) (0.000)
[Af,_21
[Ast-zi
0	 l[ecmfrd
(0.000)
0.004	 0.484 0	 0.293 0.004
(2.708)	 (9.190) (0.000) (5.154) (3.574)
2
as,t
2.490
(4.(76)
0.002
(2.969)
+
0.464
(6.087)
0
(0.000)
0
(0.000)
0.105
(3.557).
[
e/24-11
2
es4-1
4-
0.272
(2328)
0
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.760
(11.93)
as4-11
2
Futures	 Q5c( 10 ) =15 . 25	 QH(10)=10.38
Index	 Qsc( 10 ) =12.71	 QH (10). 9.46
Notes
Figures in parentheses are t ratios
Constants in the variance equation are multiplied by
10 5 for readability
4sc(.) is a portmanteau test for serial correlation in
the standardised residuals.
Q H (•) is a portmanteau test for heteroscedasticity in
the standardised residuals.
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The first indication of breakdown is the fact that, as
was discussed earlier, the basis was not the error
correction term on the 19th. The results also tend to
support those found in studies of the US markets (for
example, Kawaller, Koch and Koch (1987), Stoll and
Whaley (1990)) in the sense that the structure of
feedback between the two markets is asymmetric, with
the futures playing the predominantly greater role.
However, what is of interest here is the extent of the
feedback from the stock market to the stock index
futures market on the 19th October for whilst some of
the feedback occurs through the error correction term
the interesting point to note is the coefficient on
As t _ i : it is approximately 1.2. Thus, whilst the
stock market was reacting to declines in the stock
index futures market, the stock index futures market
was reacting (indeed one could argue overreacting) to
declines in the stock market. Therefore, a vicious
downward spiral in prices ensued. Moreover, given the
evidence presented earlier that t:te abitmage link
effectively broke on the 19th, there was nothing to
counteract the fall.
This conclusion of market breakdown is reinforced when
we consider the behaviour of the conditional variance
for the markets on both days. An interesting aspect
of the interaction between conditional variances is
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the notion of cointegration in variance (for a brief
discussion, see Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992)).
There is a great deal of evidence (see the review and
bibliography in Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992))
showing that for many financial time series the
restriction that a+13.1 in the conditional variance
equation cannot be rejected such that the conditional
variance has a unit root (IGARCH).
This obviously raises the question about whether the
conditional variances of two similar series
cointegrate such that a linear combination of them
shows no persistence. Through the similarity of the
stock index and stock index futures prices one would
expect their conditional variances to cointegrate, and
this is indeed the case on the 20th since shocks to
the conditional variances for both markets are not
persistent" and therefore a linear combination would
not be persistent. However, the 19th again shows an
altogether different state of affairs, with the
conditional variance for the index exhibiting I(1)
behaviour as opposed to the apparent I(0) type
16 Given the evidence in Antoniou and Foster
(1992) that shocks to volatility do not persist when
one allows for the effects of futures markets and also
the evidence in Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990) that
persistence may in actual fact be caused by structural
shifts in volatility (which in itself may be
indicative of misspecification), one would expect that
the conditional variances for the stock and stock
index futures prices are indeed not persistent.
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behaviour of the conditional variance for the futures.
Given that cointegration requires the same order of
integration in the individual series, it is apparent
that the two are not cointegrated in variance and this
is a further indication of market breakdown.
Thus, there is clear evidence that there was a
breakdown. Moreover, the overreaction of the futures
price would appear to provide prima facie evidence
that the anti-futures lobby is correct : futures
destabilise. However, this may not be the case, as we
shall see.
5.4.1.	 WHY DID THE LINK BREAK AND WHY WAS IT
RESTORED ?
It would seem that the initial downward pressure on
prices manifested itself in the decline that followed
because the link between the two markets broke down.
The important question is why this should be the
case. Given that, with the futures being
undervalued, the appropriate arbitrage strategy would
be to buy futures and sell stock it would appear that
indeed arbitrage broke down, certainly on the 19th.
Consider now the 20th. We see a partial reversal of
what occurred on the 19th : we see that the stock
index futures market leads the stock market, both
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through Aft _ i and through the error correction term,
with no feedback from the stock market to the futures,
even though the futures sold at a discount. This also
coincides with the restoration of the basis as the
arbitrage link. It would appear, then, that the
reaction of participants in the stock index futures
market on the 20th was to effectively ignore price
movements in the stock market whilst the stock market
utilised the information provided by price movements
in the index futures market.
There are several points to note about the behaviour
of the markets which may explain why this apparent
'reversal' took place. Consider first of all the
conclusions reached in the Quality of Markets Report
(see the discussion in Kleidon and Whaley (1992))
about why sellers were willing to trade futures at a
discount. They argue that two factors were at work
sellers did not believe they could transact
immediately in the stock market at quoted prices and
second, sellers may not have believed that the prices
quoted were the correct ones.
Consider now the nonsynchronous trading adjustment
plotted in figures 5 and 6. These show that the
nonsynchronous trading problem was more severe on the
20th and therefore, by implication, there was less
trading in the stock market on the 20th relative to
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the 19th.	 These results appear to confirm the
conclusions reached in the Quality of Markets Report.
This situation may also help to explain why the basis
was restored as the link. One possible reason for the
break in the link on the 19th is the argument put
forward in the Quality of Markets Report. The Quality
of Markets Report suggests that sellers came to
believe that they could not transact in the stock
market. As a result, sellers moved away from the
stock market to the futures market. By implication,
there was less trading in the stock market on the 20th
relative to the 19th, thereby alleviating the selling
pressure, allowing the link to be restored. Drawing
all these points together, the evidence seems to point
to the stock market as the cause of the breakdown.
5 . 5 .	 CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we have set out to analyse the
pricing relationship between the FTSE 100 Index and
the FTSE 100 stock index futures contract on the 19th
and 20th October 1987, the period of the stock market
crash. In particular we have set out to investigate
the extent to which the FTSE 100 futures contract
contributed to the crash.
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To address this question, we examine the pricing
relationship between the stock market and stock index
futures market on those two fateful days, using the
foundation provided in chapter two for analysing
problems of this sort. Before modelling the pricing
relationship, however, we address the nonsynchronous
trading problem prevalent in high frequency price data
on indices. We find that nonsynchronicity explains
little of the observed behaviour of the markets, a
result consistent with Harris' (1989) findings for the
US.
Despite the fact that the futures traded at a
discount, which is indicative of arbitrage
opportunities, we find that the link between the two
markets on the 19th was not the link provided by
arbitrage. We also find that the futures price
strongly leads the Index with some weaker evidence of
feedback from the Index to the futures on the 19th, a
result apparently consistent with evidence from the US
for stable time periods.
However, in this turbulent period we observe the
futures price on the 19th overreacting to information
contained in the previous minute's Index price. On
the basis of this evidence, it is tempting to conclude
that the futures market was to blame. This
conclusion, however, may be a premature one. What we
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observe on the 19th is a situation where apparently
arbitrage trades could not be executed effectively.
As a result, the arbitrage link broke down, the
outcome being a vicious downward spiral in prices in
both markets.
For the 20th, the futures continued to trade at a
large discount, again pointing to the presence of
unexploited arbitrage opportunities. In addition, we
also observe a change in the nature of the pricing
relationship with the restoration of the basis as the
link between the two markets, the futures still
leading the spot but this time with no feedback from
the spot to the futures. As the Quality of Markets
Report suggests, sellers did not believe they could
transact immediately in the stock market, driving
sellers away from the stock market to the futures
market. It would appear that this action is precisely
what restored the basis as the link.
ghat seems clear, then, is that the futures market did
not serve its purpose on the 19th. Indeed, it helped
exacerbate the downward movement in prices. However,
the blame for this does not necessarily lie with the
Eutures market, for the initial source of the problem
nay have been the stock market.
nhe message from this is clear.
	
Looking towards
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further regulation of the futures market as a separate
entity may be premature because the futures market may
not be the source of the problem. To further regulate
the futures market may be to alleviate the symptoms
without curing the illness. Regulating the two
markets as a single entity, as recommended in the
Presidential Task Force Report (1988) is only part of
the solution. In addition, it is necessary to
consider the trading practices in both markets.
Kleidon and Whaley (1992) suggest that the solution
for the US is more efficient trading systems for the
stock market. Similar conclusions may apply for the
UK, with reforms of trading practices bringing trading
systems in both markets closer together. 11
 Ne cannot
know for sure, but we suspect that had this been the
case the crash might never have taken hold in the way
it did.
" For example, in the UK there are two markets
closely linked yet with different trading systems.
The stock market is a purely screen-based system
whilst the futures market has trading based on open
outcry. Whilst in theory there is no reason as to why
purely screen-based systems shouldn't execute trades
efficiently, in practice human and technical factors
will ensure this isn't the case in times of market
turbulence.
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CHAPTER SIX : SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
t the start of this thesis, we observed that the
raditional notion of the behaviour of prices in asset
arkets, and the argument that the introduction of
utures contracts traded on these underlying assets
akes matters worse, still persists because the
traditional' analysis of pricing relationships
etween spot and futures markets is separated into two
holly independent areas. As such, no framework
Kists to allow the appraisal of the anti-futures
arket lobby argument that futures provide no
anefits. Rather, they destabilise prices in spot
arkets already populated by emotional and irrational
raders.
chapter two we developed a framework within which
le validity of this argument can be appraised. In
lapter two, it was shown that treating the analysis
lead-lag relationships and mispricing as two
iparate issues is not only incorrect, it can generate
)nclusions which are potentially false. The reason
iy is these issues are very much interdependent, with
le latter contributing greatly to any analysis of the
)rmer.
r unifying these two areas into a coherent error
)rrection framework, in which the error correction
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term is the basis, which is also a measure of the
degree of mispricing, we argued that they become the
single question of whether equity markets can be said
to function effectively. Further, by analysing the
pricing relationship in a systems error correction
framework, it is possible to have two categories of
effective functioning : a strong categorisation and a
weak categorisation. Necessary conditions, which
together provide a necessary and sufficient condition,
where proposed for each of these categories.
By categorising effective functioning in this way, it
is then possible to pinpoint any source of
ineffectiveness through seeing which necessary
condition is violated. This is obviously of interest
to regulators for it allows regulation to be directed
at the correct market. A further advantage generated
by this framework is that it is also possible to
conjointly analyse the efficiency of markets in an
objective manner, the necessary conditions, which
again taken together provide a necessary and
sufficient condition, for efficiency following on
directly from the conditions for effective
functioning. In chapter three, we used this framework
to analyse the functioning of the UK stock and stock
index futures markets. We find that not only are they
strongly effectively functioning, they are efficient
as well. Therefore, at least on a daily basis, the
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stock index futures market does serve its prescribed
role(s), as discussed in chapter one. The conclusion
here is that the stock index futures market does
provide direct benefits and is useful. Moreover, if
it functions effectively, as it does at least on a
daily time scale, it should stabilise the stock market
rather than destabilise it.
This analysis was extended to an intra-daily time
period in chapter four, where we proposed and utilised
a model that expunges nonsynchronous trading effects
from the Index. We argued that extant models of
nonsynchronous trading are flawed because they predict
that nonsynchronous trading generates autoregressive
properties in observed returns. The problem is that
a true inefficiency may be wrongly interpreted as
evidence of nonsynchronous trading. By redefining
nonsynchronous trading, we are able to argue that
generates moving average behaviour in observed
returns. To capture this moving average behaviour,
the appropriate model to use is then an unobserved
components model, with the unobserved component being
extracted by the Kalman Filter. This model not only
has the attractive feature of capturing moving average
behaviour. It is intuitively appealing in its
formulation, easy to estimate and implement, and
justifies previous ad hoc methods of removing
nonsynchronicity by simply including a moving average
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error term in the model.
Using the indices adjusted for nonsynchronous trading,
we analysed the effectiveness of both the stock and
stock index futures market using minute by minute data
using the framework developed in chapter two. We
found that whilst the foundations for effectiveness
are present, they do not function effectively, with
the probable source of the ineffectiveness being the
stock market.
Using both the method proposed for removing
nonsynchronous trading in chapter four and the
framework for analysing effective functioning proposed
in chapter two, chapter five analysed claims that
stock index futures were at fault during the stock
market crash of October 1987. Specifically, the claim
we investigate is that they (stock index futures) did
not serve their purpose on the 19th and 20th October
1987 and as a consequence prices spiralled downward
not only in the stock index futures market but also in
the stock market. Using the framework of effective
functioning we find that indeed stock index futures
did not serve their purpose. However, to argue that
the futures market was at fault is possibly premature
since the blame could lie fairly and squarely at the
door of the stock market, particularly in terms of its
pure dealership trading system. This is reinforced by
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the conclusions from chapter four.
The policy implications of the analysis in this thesis
are clear. If markets are not functioning
effectively, it may be unwise to assume that the cause
of the ineffectiveness lies with the futures market.
It may lie with the spot market, certainly in the case
of the relationship between the stock market and the
stock index futures market. Moreover, this situation
will arise because the two markets are regulated as
entirely separate entities when in fact they are one.
Thus, whilst stock index futures will serve their
purpose well in tranquil periods, they will function
as a separate entity in a crisis period such as the
stock market crash not because they are not useful,
but because they are treated as a separate entity from
a regulatory standpoint. It is hoped that the
analysis presented in this thesis provides some of the
necessary insights to be used in correcting this state
of affairs.
In addition to the usefulness of the framework for
analysing the effective functioning of markets and, in
the case of stock markets, the usefulness of the model
of nonsynchronous trading, proposed, several
extensions of this work naturally suggest themselves.
A first area for future research is the rather obvious
one : what insights does this framework provide in the
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nalysis of other markets,
	 for example the
elationship between spot, forward and futures foreign
xchange markets. Second, for those markets where
olatility is genuine, the framework for analysing
ffective functioning can be extended to incorporate
olatility using the multivariate GARCH model
iscussed in Bollerslev, Engle and Wooldridge (1988).
n interesting issue worthy of further investigation
ere would be the analysis of the cointegration
roperties of the conditional variances of spot and
ltures prices.
3 far as the model of nonsynchronous trading is
)ncerned, this can also be generalised to allow for
)1atility in the nonsynchronous trading adjustment
5ing the model presented in a very recent paper by
trvey, Ruiz and Sentana (1992).
.1 of these extensions represent very real and
Lteresting areas worthy of investigation in the
Lture.
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APPENDIX : CONSTRUCTION OF THE DATA USED IN
CHAPTER THREE
In this appendix, we discuss the construction of the
lata series used in the empirical analysis in chapter
:hree. To recap briefly, one of the interesting
mipirical issues raised in chapter three is that of
:he behaviour of both the stock and stock index
futures markets as time to maturity varies.
3pecifically, does(the equations of the system) alter
is time to maturity alters? Conceptually, under
7ational.expectations, the structure of the model will
iiffer, the difference between periods being a
:umulative moving average term. In practice, this may
Lot happen because of factors such as, for example,
.ggregation of futures contracts, or the true model is
eckward looking. Therefore, it is of interest to see
f the structure of the model alters as time to
xpiration alters.
n order to analyse this issue, the data were split by
ontract and according to time to maturity. To
llustrate, consider the following series
1=	 , x2 , „
efine X as the futures price (or spot price, the
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Lrgument is applicable to both), constructed as a
-ollover. Thus, we define the vectors XI , X2 and X3 as
he daily futures price quoted for the March 1985
ontract in January, February and March 1985
espectively; X4 , X5 and X6 are defined as the daily
utures price for the June contract 1985 quoted in
pril, May and June 1985, respectively; X7 , X8 and X9
re defined as the daily futures price for the
eptember 1985 contract, quoted in July, August and
eptember 1985, respectively; Xn, Xn and Xn are
efined as the daily futures price for the December
985 contract, quoted in October, November and
ecember 1985 respectively. The procedure continues
a this fashion, such that Xn, for example, is the
aily price of the March 1986 contract, quoted in
anuary 1986. The data series ends with Xn being equal
D the daily futures price for the December 1990
)ntract, quoted in December 1990.
le construction of the data series for the empirical
lalysis then proceeds as follows. Consider what has
en termed the March 3 series. This consists of the
-ices quoted in January for the March futures
mtract. Thus, the series for March 3 is given by
M3 = (	 , Xi3 , X25 ,	 X n-12 )1
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Similarly, for March 2,
M3 = ( X2 , Xi4 , X26
rhe series for the other contracts are constructed in
the same way.
)f course, constructing the data in this fashion
introduces breaks into the levels of the series. To
t.ombat this, dummy variables were used in the
t.ointegration regressions to capture the breaks which
ire not a feature of the data but a feature of the way
the data are constructed. In taking first
lifferences, the nature of the construction of the
lata induces large outliers where, for example, the
larch 85 data meets the March 86 data. The outliers
vere removed since, as already mentioned, they arise
is a result of the way the data are constructed rather
than being properties of the data itself.
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